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Tomlinson v. Camel City Motors, Inc.: The North Carolina
Supreme Court's Hybrid Solution to Surety Liability
Under General Statutes Section 75-16
Transactions between a buyer and a seller can often be adversarial in
nature. The buyer bargains for a low price while the seller hopes for a
higher one. Similarly, the seller emphasizes the favorable qualities of the
product or service, whereas the buyer attempts to discover its drawbacks.
In today's market, individual buyers often may feel at a disadvantage
when dealing with commercial sellers because of an inferior ability to
negotiate price and limited access to information about the product. The
buyer is at the seller's mercy. Consumers especially may worry about the
forthrightness and good faith of a seller when purchasing a car from a
dealer. Certainly everyone is familiar with the stereotype of the smooth-
talking, unscrupulous car salesman who takes advantage of the unwitting
consumer.' For example, imagine the stereotypical car salesman, Seller,
who sells to Consumer a car that has a serious defect. Seller is aware of
the defect but insists that the car is in good condition and induces Con-
sumer to buy it.
Today, consumer protection laws are supposed to provide remedies
to injured consumers and deter unfair or deceitful sellers. One compo-
nent of North Carolina's consumer protection scheme is North Carolina
General Statutes section 75-1.1, which prohibits unfair methods of com-
petition and unfair or deceptive trade practices.2 Section 75-1.11 forms
the basis of protection for North Carolina's consumers and also supple-
ments the federal antitrust laws.4 In particular, section 75-1.1 prohibits
Seller's misrepresentation to Consumer. Additionally, North Carolina
General Statutes section 75-16 plays a role in the state's statutory scheme
by establishing a private cause of action for persons injured by violations
of Chapter 755 Under section 75-16, Consumer may bring suit against
Seller because of Seller's misrepresentation about the car. The usefulness
1. Stereotypes ought to be avoided; certainly this is an unfair characterization of many
car dealers. Nevertheless, one North Carolina appellate court has made reference to the stere-
otypical car salesman, commenting that "the [sale and] distribution of motor vehicles is a
business which easily could be conducted so as to become a medium of fraud and dishonesty."
Butler v. Peters, 52 N.C. App. 357, 360, 278 S.E.2d 283, 285 (1981).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1988). For the text of the statute, see infra note 25.
3. For Seller's actions to be prohibited under § 75-1.1, it is not necessary that the dealer's
actions be intentional. See, e.g., Marshall v. Miller, 301 N.C. 539, 544, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400-01
(1981) (noting that whether or not the defendant acted in bad faith is not relevant).
4. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1988). For the full text of the statute, see infra note 24.
This statute is discussed fully at infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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of section 75-16 as an enforcement mechanism is bolstered by its auto-
matic treble damage feature.6
While section 75-1.1 is a general prohibition against unfair trade
practices, numerous regulatory schemes for specific industries also exist. 7
In particular, motor vehicle dealers are subject to detailed statutory regu-
lation.' Many of these statutory provisions are designed to protect the
consumer.9 Recently, the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed how
the state's general consumer protection scheme and the more specific reg-
ulations of motor vehicle dealers should interact.10 Tomlinson v. Camel
City Motors, Inc., 11 a case of first impression in North Carolina, raised
the issue of whether a motor vehicle dealer's surety is liable for a treble
damage judgment against the dealer under section 75-16.12
This Note explains the facts of Tomlinson13 and the majority's rea-
soning, as well as the arguments of the concurring and dissenting jus-
tices. 4 The Note describes the three areas of law that interact in
Tomlinson: North Carolina's unfair trade practice law,15 specific con-
sumer protection provisions of North Carolina's motor vehicle dealers
licensing laws,16 and the state's general law of suretyship.17 An analysis
6. The threat of treble damages deters would-be violators of Chapter 75 provisions;
treble damages also serve as an incentive to injured consumers to pursue claims. See infra note
98 and accompanying text.
7. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25A-1 to -45 (1986 & Supp. 1991) (regulating consumer
credit sales); id. §§ 53-164 to -191 (1990 & Supp. 1991) (regulating the business of lending
amounts of $10,000 or less); id. §§ 143-434 to -470.1 (1990 & Supp. 1991) (regulating the
pesticide industry).
8. Article 12 of Chapter 20 of the North Carolina General Statutes regulates motor vehi-
cle dealers and manufacturers. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-285 to -308.2 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
Article 15, entitled the "Vehicle Mileage Act," prohibits the alteration of odometers. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-341 to -350 (1989).
9. The particular statutes that this Note addresses are N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-288(e)
and 20-294 (Supp. 1991). For the text of these statutes, see infra note 29.
10. It is not clear whether the General Assembly intended for certain sections of the two
schemes to interrelate. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
11. 330 N.C. 76, 408 S.E.2d 853 (1991).
12. Id. at 78-79, 408 S.E.2d at 855. All motor vehicle dealers are required to post a surety
or cash bond. An injured purchaser has a cause of action against the dealer and its surety.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-288(e) (Supp. 1991).
13. See infra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 34-66 and accompanying text. Justice Martin wrote for the majority.
Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 78, 408 S.E.2d at 854. Justice Webb filed a concurring opinion in
which Justice Meyer joined. Id. at 81-82, 408 S.E.2d at 857 (Webb, J., concurring). Justice
Frye filed an opinion in which he dissented in part. Id. at 82, 408 S.E.2d at 857 (Frye, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15. See infra notes 67-100 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
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of whether the Tomlinson holding is a consistent synthesis of these three
areas of law then follows. Because the North Carolina General Assem-
bly did not explicitly contemplate any interaction between these two con-
sumer protection schemes, the extent to which a surety is liable for
section 75-16 treble damages is not clear."8 This Note suggests that the
Tomlinson court's solution was not the best choice from either a practical
or a policy standpoint. 19
The facts of Tomlinson are similar to the transaction between Seller
and Consumer.20 The plaintiff, Ellen Tomlinson, purchased a car from
the defendant, Camel City Motors (CCM).21 The dealer's president,
James "Babe" Johnson, Jr., promised to assume the remaining install-
ment payments on Tomlinson's old car, which she traded in as part of
the transaction.22 The dealership failed to make any of the promised
payments, however. Tomlinson brought suit2" under North Carolina
General Statutes section 75-16,24 alleging that CCM had violated section
75-1.1(a) by committing an unfair or deceptive trade practice.25 Both
CCM and Johnson failed to answer the complaint, and Tomlinson ob-
tained a default judgment against them.26 Tomlinson was awarded
$3,459.72 in actual damages (the total amount of the unpaid car pay-
ments) which was trebled according to section 75-16 to S10,379.16.27
She also was awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $2,563.00 pursu-
ant to section 75-16.1.28
18. See infra notes 122-54 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
20. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
21. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 78, 408 S.E.2d at 855.
22. Id. at 76, 78, 408 S.E.2d at 853, 855.
23. In 1988, Tomlinson sued Camel City Motors, Johnson, Barclays American/Financial,
and Lawyers Surety Corporation. Plaintiff Appellee's New Brief at 2, Tomlinson (No.
93PA91).
24. Section 75-16 provides that
[i]f any person shall be injured.., by reason of any act or thing done by any
other person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such
person... so injured shall have a right of action on account of such injury done, and
if damages are assessed... judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1988).
25. Section 75-1.1 provides that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting com-
merce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlaw-
ful." Id. § 75-1.1(a).
26. Plaintiff Appellee's New Brief at 2, Tomlinson (No. 93PA91). Tomlinson filed suit on
January 29, 1988, in Forsyth County. The default judgment against CCM and Johnson was
entered on October 23, 1989 by Judge Loretta C. Brigg. Id.
27. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 78, 408 S.E.2d at 855.
28. Id. Section 75-16.1 states that
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North Carolina General Statutes section 20-288(e) requires all mo-
tor vehicle dealers to post a surety bond and establishes a cause of action
for injured purchasers against the surety.29 Pursuant to this statute,
Tomlinson moved for summary judgment against CCM's surety, Law-
yers Surety Corporation (Lawyers Surety), for the amount of the default
judgment.30 Tomlinson's motion was granted,31 and Lawyers Surety ap-
pealed, claiming that it should not be held liable for more than compen-
satory damages.32 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed,
stating that "[t]he only limit in [section 20-288(e)] is the principal
amount of the bond ($15,000.00), which was not exceeded in this case."
33
On review, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed in part and
[i]n any suit instituted by a person who alleges that the defendant violated G.S. 75-
1.1, the presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a reasonable attorney fee to the
duly licensed attorney representing the prevailing party, such attorney fee to be taxed
as a part of the court costs and payable by the losing party, upon a finding by the
presiding judge that:
(1) The party charged with the violation has willfully engaged in the act or
practice, and there was an unwarranted refusal by such party to fully resolve the
matter which constitutes the basis of such suit; or
(2) The party instituting the action knew, or should have known, the action was
frivolous and malicious.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1 (1988).
29. Section 20-288(e) requires a motor vehicle dealer to post a bond in the amount of
$25,000. Id. § 20-288(e) (Supp. 1991). Section 20-288(e) also provides that
[a]ny purchaser of a motor vehicle who shall have suffered any loss or damage by any
act of a license holder subject to this subsection that constitutes a violation of [Article
12] or Article 15 shall have the right to institute an action to recover against the
license holder and the surety.
Id.
At the time of CCM's violation, § 20-288(e) required a surety bond of $15,000 and an
additional $5,000 for each additional salesroom. See Act of June 14, 1977, ch. 560, 1977 N.C.
Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 660 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-288(e) (Supp. 1991)).
The North Carolina Supreme Court stated that CCM violated § 20-294(4) of Article 12,
Chapter 20. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 80, 408 S.E.2d at 856. It also appears that § 20-294(6)
was violated by CCM, although the court did not address this possibility. Section 20-294
provides that "[a] license may be denied, suspended or revoked on ... the following grounds:
... (4) [w]illfully defrauding any retail buyer, to the buyer's damage, or any other person in
the conduct of the licensee's business... [or] (6) [h]aving used unfair methods of competition
or unfair deceptive acts or practices." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-294(4), (6) (Supp. 1991).
30. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 78, 408 S.E.2d at 855. The defendant car dealership failed to
answer Tomlinson's complaint. Id.
31. Id.
32. Tomlinson v. Camel City Motors, Inc., 101 N.C. App. 419, 421, 399 S.E.2d 147, 148,
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 330 N.C. 76, 408 S.E.2d 853 (1991). Lawyers Surety admitted that
it was the surety for CCM and that it was liable for actual damages in the amount of $3,459.72.
See id. at 421, 399 S.E.2d at 149.
33. Id. at 421, 399 S.E.2d at 149. For a discussion of the requirements of § 20-288(e), see
supra note 29.
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affirmed in part the court of appeals' decision.34 The majority noted ini-
tially that "two hurdles" must be overcome before a motor vehicle pur-
chaser is eligible to proceed under section 20-288(e): the consumer must
show that the dealer violated a provision of either Article 12 or Article
15 of Chapter 20,31 and also prove that the consumer suffered damage or
loss because of that violation.36 The court found that CCM violated sec-
tion 20-294(4) and that Tomlinson suffered damages in the form of the
unpaid car payments,37 enabling Tomlinson to proceed against Lawyers
Surety.38
The court further interpreted section 20-288(e) as limiting the dam-
ages recoverable by the plaintiff to "those that are 'suffered;' "I' the
court explained that Tomlinson actually "suffered" damages of only
$3,459.72, the amount of the unpaid car payments.' Because the trebled
portion of the damages awarded by the trial court represented more than
"the damages [Tomlinson] actually 'suffered,'" the court held that the
surety was not liable for the additional amount of the award.41 Accord-
ing to the majority, section 20-288(e) effectively protects a surety from
liability for the trebled portion of damages where the trebled portion rep-
resents an amount over and above the plaintiff's actual loss.42
The court observed that although in this case the treble damages did
not compensate the plaintiff, in other situations the surety might be liable
34. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 78, 408 S.E.2d at 855.
35. North Carolina's motor vehicles laws are found in Chapter 20 of the North Carolina
General Statutes; Article 12 comprises §§ 20-285 to -238; Article 15 comprises §§ 20-340 to -
350. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-285 to -238 & 20-340 to -350 (1989 & Supp. 1991).
36. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 79, 408 S.E.2d at 855.
37. Id. at 79-80, 408 S.E.2d at 856. The court explained that
the dealer induced plaintiff to purchase a car and defrauded the purchaser by telling
her that the dealer would make the remaining installment payments on the old car if
the purchaser would trade it in with the dealer for another car, and these promised
payments were not made. This fraudulent inducement by the dealer violated
N.C.G.S. § 20-294(4).
Id. at 80, 408 S.E.2d at 856.
38. The court emphasized that § 20-294 does not expand the category of persons eligible
to bring a cause of action against the dealer's surety. The surety bond is available only to
purchasers as a source of indemnity. Id. at 79-80, 408 S.E.2d at 856 (citing NCNB Nat'l Bank
v. Western Sur. Co., 88 N.C. App. 705, 364 S.E.2d 675 (1988)); see also Triplett v. James, 45
N.C. App. 96, 99, 262 S.E.2d 374, 376, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 202, 296 S.E.2d 621 (1980)
(holding that under § 20-280(e) only the purchaser is authorized to collect from the surety).
39. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 80, 408 S.E.2d at 856.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 80-81, 408 S.E.2d at 856.
42. Id.
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for damages trebled under section 75-16.4 3 According to the court, sec-
tion 75-16 serves three functions as a consumer protection measure: de-
terring undesirable business practices, encouraging private enforcement,
and providing a remedy for the injured or aggrieved consumer. 4 The
court believed that the statute's deterrence policy would not be served if
the surety were liable for the trebled portion of the damages,4 but sug-
gested that sometimes the statute's compensatory goal would be achieved
by imposing liability on the surety for treble damages." If the consumer
"'suffered' more than just the initial damages," these additional damages
could "transform the trebled portion of the award from a punitive to a
compensatory award" and justify holding the surety liable for the trebled
portion.47
Justice Webb concurred in the court's holding, but believed that the
majority elaborated unnecessarily on the issue of a surety's liability for
treble damages.4" He stated that the court should limit its holding to the
factual situation before it.49 Additionally, Justice Webb argued that a
surety should never be liable under section 20-288(e) for damages trebled
according to section 75-16.10 He interpreted section 20-288(e) as creat-
ing liability for the surety for claims arising only under Articles 12 and
15 of Chapter 20.51 Tomlinson's claim was brought under Chapter 75.
Justice Webb believed that the two consumer protection schemes were
43. Id. at 80, 408 S.E.2d at 856 (noting that "[i]n [other cases], trebling against the surety
may be appropriate").
44. Id. The court previously described the hybrid nature of § 75-16 in Marshall v. Miller,
302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981), and the Tomlinson court cited that description with
approval. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 80, 408 S.E.2d at 856.
45. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 80, 408 S.E.2d at 856. "Because the surety had no knowledge
that the dealer was operating in a fraudulent manner, enforcing the exemplary and punitive
damages against the surety would not produce the deterrent effect that is the purpose behind
the statute." Id.
46. Id. at 80-81, 408 S.E.2d at 856.
47. Id. "In situations where the injured consumer has lost a great deal more than the
initial damages by spending extra money and time to gain a modicum of satisfaction, the treb-
led portion of the award is seen as compensating the consumer for those losses rather than as
punitive in nature." Id. at 80, 408 S.E.2d at 856. Here, according to the court, Tomlinson had
not proved that she suffered any damages other than the unpaid car installment payments, and
so the treble damages were primarily punitive in nature. Id. at 81, 408 S.E.2d at 856.
The majority also found that Lawyers Surety failed to raise before the court of appeals the
issue of whether it should be held liable for attorney's fees under § 75-16. Id. For that reason,
the issue was not properly before the supreme court; the judgment against Lawyers Surety for
attorney's fees was affirmed. Id.
48. Id. at 81-82, 408 S.E.2d at 857 (Webb, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 82, 408 S.E.2d at 857 (Webb, J., concurring).
50. Id. (Webb, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 81-82, 408 S.E.2d at 857 (Webb, J., concurring). See supra note 35 and accom-
panying text for an explanation of the sections included in these statutory articles.
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not intended to interact and, therefore, that the majority improperly
stated that a surety might be held liable for treble damages on different
facts.52
Justice Frye dissented in part from the majority opinion.5 3 He dis-
agreed with the majority's finding that Lawyers Surety was not liable for
the trebled portion of the damages, 4 and declared that a surety always
should be liable for treble damages as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion." He characterized the majority's opinion as "recogniz[ing] a well-
established public policy exception to the general rule that a surety is
liable for the debts and obligations of its principal. 51 6 This well-estab-
lished public policy exception exempts a surety from liability for puni-
tive, exemplary, or statutory penal damages because the deterrent
purpose of these damages would not be achieved by imposing liability on
the surety.
7
Justice Frye did not disagree with the public policy exception or its
rationale. Instead, he believed that treble damages under section 75-16
are not of a purely punitive nature and, therefore, that the public policy
exception simply does not apply to the statute.58 He gave two reasons for
this conclusion. First, punitive damages usually are a tool available at a
court's discretion to punish intentional wrongdoers, but section 75-16 au-
tomatically trebles any damages found pursuant to section 75-1.1.11 Fur-
thermore, he noted that neither section 75-1.1 nor section 75-16 requires
a finding of intentional wrongdoing by the defendant.' Justice Frye ex-
plained that other states that apply the public policy exception require a
52. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 82, 408 S.E.2d at 857 (Webb, J., concurring).
53. See id. (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. Id. (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. Id. at 84, 408 S.E.2d at 859 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Id. at 82-83, 408 S.E.2d at 857 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 83, 408 S.E.2d at 857-58 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Frye explained that unless the surety "is somehow relieved of its duty by statute, con-
tract or other legally enforceable limitation," the surety must be liable for the entire judgment
against its principal. Id. at 82, 408 S.E.2d at 857 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). He noted that the only limitation on the surety's liability in § 20-288(e) is the $15,000
required bond amount. Following the lead of other state courts, the majority made an excep-
tion to the general rule of liability based on the punitive nature of § 75-16. Id. at 82-83, 408
S.E.2d at 857-58 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. Id. at 83, 408 S.E.2d at 858 (Frye, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Frye wrote that "[t]he issue in this case ... is whether the disputed portion of the
damage award.., is an award for exemplary and punitive damages, and therefore within the
public policy exception. I do not believe it is." Id. (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
59. Id. (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Newton v. Standard
Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 113, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301 (1976)).
60. Id. at 83-84, 408 S.E.2d at 858 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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finding of intent in order to treble damages for unfair trade practices.61
Because North Carolina's statutory scheme deems the actor's intent irrel-
evant,62 he found the deterrence rationale of the public policy exception
unpersuasive.63 Second, Justice Frye noted that the North Carolina
Supreme Court has described section 75-16 as serving both remedial and
deterrent purposes.64 It would be judicially inconsistent, he said, to char-
acterize section 75-16 as a primarily penal statute65 and within the public
policy exception to the general rule of surety liability.66
The contrary conclusions reached by the supreme court justices can
be explained as a result of the interaction of three overlapping areas of
North Carolina law: North Carolina's unfair trade practice law, specific
consumer protection provisions of North Carolina's motor vehicle deal-
ers licensing laws, and the general law of suretyship. The following dis-
cussion of legislative history and case law provides some guidance as to
how these three areas ought to interact and what the outcome of the
Tomlinson issue should have been.
The first area of law at issue in Tomlinson, North Carolina's unfair
trade practice law, consists primarily of sections 75-1.1 and 75-16. In
1969, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted section 75-1.1 to
provide statutory protection to consumers from unfair methods of com-
61. Id. at 82-83, 408 S.E.2d at 857-58 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Frye cited Darr v. Long, 210 Neb. 57, 313 N.W.2d 215 (1981), and Butler v. United
Pacific Ins. Co., 265 Or. 473, 509 P.2d 1184 (1973) (en banc), as two cases that have applied
this public policy exception. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 82-83, 408 S.E.2d at 857-58 (Frye, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Butler court stated that "[p]unitive damages
were a penalty assessed against a fraudulent automobile dealer for the purpose of deterring...
fraudulent conduct." Butler, 265 Or. at 477, 509 P.2d at 1186 (emphasis added).
62. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981).
63. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 83-84, 408 S.E.2d at 858 (Frye, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
64. Id. at 83, 408 S.E.2d at 858 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"'The statute is partially punitive in nature in that it clearly serves as a deterrent to future
violations. But it is also remedial for other reasons, among them the fact that it encourages
private enforcement and the fact that it provides a remedy for aggrieved parties.'" Id. (Frye,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Marshall, 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at
402).
65. Often a distinction is made in statutes and by courts between "penal" and "punitive"
measures of damages. See THOMAS H. AINSWORTH, III, HIGHTOWER'S N.C. LAW Op DAM-
AGES § 6-1 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HIGHTOWER'S]. "The amount of a penalty is specified in
the statute authorizing it.... In contrast, the jury... determines whether punitive damages in
any amount should be awarded and, if so, the amount of the award." Id. The outrageousness
of the defendant's conduct determines the amount of the punitive damage award. Id. Ains-
worth explains that treble damages are an example of a hybrid of penal and punitive damages.
Id. "[Tlhe amount [of actual damages] assessed by the jury varies, but the fact that it will be
tripled is established by statute." Id.
66. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 83-84, 408 S.E.2d at 858 (Frye, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
petition and unfair or deceptive trade practices. 67  The language of the
statute was borrowed in part from federal law.68 The 1969 legislation
followed a national trend of increased state consumer protection which
supplemented and paralleled federal laws.6 9
The definition of "unfair or deceptive trade practices"70 has been
67. Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988)). For a discussion of North Carolina's antitrust and consumer
protection law prior to 1969, see William B. Aycock, Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Law
in North Carolina - Federal Law Compared, 50 N.C. L. REv. 199, 201-07 (1972); see also
Wallace C. Tyser, Jr., Note, Unfair Competition - Law of Unfair Competition in North Caro-
lina, 46 N.C. L. REV. 856, 883-84 (1968) (describing North Carolina unfair trade practice
law). Tyser's discussion focuses on the law of unfair competition. In a brief summary of
North Carolina's pre-1969 unfair trade practices law, Tyser comments that "North Carolina's
legislative approach to the regulation of business practices has been ad hoc and lacking in
overview." Id. at 883. Section 75-1.1 creates a more comprehensive consumer protection
scheme. Professor Aycock describes section 75-1.1 as "sufficiently comprehensive to include
the common law of unfair competition and unfair methods of competition.... [I]t will protect
competitors as well as consumers from such practices." Aycock, supra, at 251.
68. See Aycock, supra note 67, at 247. The statute, as enacted, read:
(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade of commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
(b) The purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal means to
maintain, ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business, and be-
tween persons engaged in business and the consuming public within this State, to the
end that good faith and fair dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of com-
merce be had in this State.
(d) Any party claiming to be exempt from the provisions of this section shall
have the burden of proof with respect to such claim.
Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-1.1 (1988)).
Part (a) of the enacted statute was modelled after section five of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988). As Professor Aycock explains, "[t]he first com-
ponent, '[u]nfair methods of competition,' appeared in section five of the FTC Act in 1914.
The second component, 'unfair or deceptive trade practices,' was added to the FTC Act by the
Wheeler-Lea amendments of 1938." William B. Aycock, North Carolina Law on Antitrust and
Consumer Protection, 60 N.C. L. REv. 207, 211 (1982).
For a discussion of section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act, see Neil W. Aver-
itt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 21 B.C. L. REv. 227 (1980).
69. See William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV.
724, 724-31 (1972); see also Robert Morgan, The People's Advocate in the Marketplace - The
Role of the North Carolina Attorney General in the Field of Consumer Protection, 6 WAKE
FOREST INTRAMURAL L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1969) (describing the passage of the 1969 legislation
and its intended role in North Carolina's overall consumer protection scheme).
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized the supplemental role that § 75-1.1 is
intended to play by observing that "commentators agree that state statutes such as ours were
enacted to supplement federal legislation, so that local business interests could not proceed
with impunity, secure in the knowledge that the dimensions of their transgression would not
merit federal action." Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 549, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981).
70. This Note focuses on the development of the law of unfair and deceptive trade prac-
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refined gradually since 1969 through case law and legislative amend-
ment.7' The North Carolina Supreme Court first interpreted section 75-
1.1 in Hardy v. Toler.72 In Hardy, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
car dealer misrepresented the condition of the car that he sold to her. 3
The court stated that "[p]roof of fraud would necessarily constitute a
violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts; however,
the converse is not always true."'74 The dealer's actions amounted to
fraud and thereby violated section 75-1.1.
71
In 1977, the North Carolina Supreme Court narrowly interpreted
tices. The other element of § 75-1.1, "unfair methods of competition," regulates relationships
and activities between businesses. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988). Unfair and deceptive
trade practice law is intended to regulate the relationship of consumers and merchants. See
Aycock, supra note 67, at 220. For a discussion of the "unfair methods of competition" ele-
ment of § 75-1.1, see id. at 217-20.
71. The 1977 amendment is discussed infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
72. 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
73. Id. at 305-06, 218 S.E.2d at 344.
74. Id. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346 (citing D.D.D. Corp. v. F.T.C., 125 F.2d 679 (7th Cir,
1942)). Much of the interpretation of § 75-1.1 has focused on what constitutes an unfair or
deceptive trade practice. Hardy established that a fraudulent practice involving a consumer
will always be a violation of § 75-1.1. Id. at 311, 218 S.E.2d at 347; see also Winston Realty
Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 97, 331 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1985) (reaffirming that "[p]roof of
fraud necessarily constitutes a violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts").
The legislature has expressly provided that violations of certain statutes are per se viola-
tions of § 75-1. 1. For example, violations of the following statutes are per se violations of § 75-
1.1: the Retail Installment Sales Act (RISA), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-1 to -45 (1986 & Supp.
1991) (regulating consumer credit sales and similar activities); the Business Opportunity Sales
Act, id. §§ 66-94 to -100 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (concerning franchise offerings and other busi-
ness opportunities); the Loan Brokers statutes, id. §§ 66-106 to -112 (1985); the Rental Refer-
ral Agencies statutes, id. §§ 66-142 to -146 (1985 & Supp. 1991); id. § 75-29 (1988) (regulating
the use of the term "wholesale" and unfair and deceptive trade names). See generally HIGHT-
OWER'S, supra note 65, § 29-5, at 442- 43 & Supp. 1991 (providing and discussing a list of the
statutes whose violations have been designated by the General Assembly as per se violations of
§ 75-1.1); Aycock, supra note 67, at 212-13 (same).
Other statutory violations have been judicially determined to be violations of § 75- 1.1 as a
matter of law. HIGHTOWER'S, supra note 65, § 29-5, at 444 & Supp. 1991. Examples are N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 95-47.6(2), (9) (1989) (regulating private employment agencies) and id. § 58-63-
15 (1991) (regulating the insurance industry).
The legislature has expressly excluded certain areas from the scope of § 75-1.1. See
HIGHTOWE's, supra note 65, § 29-5, at 443 and Aycock, supra note 67, at 212, for a discus-
sion of some legislatively excluded provisions. Section 75-1.1 excludes from its scope "profes-
sional services rendered by members of a learned profession," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b)
(1988), as well as advertising activities where the "publisher, owner, agent, or employee" was
unaware of the false or misleading nature of the advertisement. Id. § 75-1.1(c) (1988).
"Learned professionals" include" 'physicians, attorneys, clergy and related professions.'" See
HIGHTOWER'S, supra note 65, § 29-5, at 443 (quoting 47 N.C. Att'y Gen. Rep. 118 (1977)).
The exclusion applies only to the members of the learned profession in the performance of
services relating to their specific profession. Id. at 443.
75. The Hardy court also held that the jury was to determine the facts of the case, but the
court was to decide whether the facts constituted an unfair or deceptive trade practice. Hardy,
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the scope of section 75-1.1 to exclude debt collection practices.76 In State
ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney,77 the court determined that the legisla-
ture intended to limit the scope of section 75-1.1 by using the phrase "in
the conduct of any trade or commerce. '7'  After comparing the language
of section 75-1.1 to the language of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
79
the court concluded that the General Assembly intended to limit the
statute to practices in a "bargain, sale, barter, exchange or traffic;" there-
fore, according to the court, debt collection practices were not within the
purview of the statute.80
The North Carolina General Assembly rejected the J.C. Penney
court's narrow interpretation of section 75-1.1 and responded with the
Consumer Protection Act of 1977.1 The 1977 amendments eliminated
the word "trade" from section 75-1.1 and defined commerce to "in-
clude[] all business activities, however denominated." 2 Section 75-
288 N.C. at 310, 218 S.E.2d at 346-47; see also Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 516, 239
S.E.2d 574, 583 (1977), disc. rev. denied, 294 N.C. 441, 241 S.E.2d 843 (1978).
76. See State ex rel Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 233 S.E.2d 895 (1977).
77. Id. J.C. Penney was the supreme court's second opportunity to interpret § 75-1.1. See
Susan W. Mason, Comment, Trade Regulation - The North Carolina Consumer Protection
Act of 1977, 56 N.C. L. REv. 547, 547 n.5 (1978).
78. J.C Penney, 292 N.C. at 314-16, 233 S.E.2d at 897-99. For the text of the statute in
force at the time of the JC. Penney decision, see supra note 68.
79. As enacted in 1969, § 75-1.1(a) was intended to parallel and complement section five
of the FTC Act. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
80. J.C. Penney, 292 N.C. at 316-17, 233 S.E.2d at 899. The court noted that the federal
legislation used the word "commerce" but not the word "trade." Because the supreme court
believed that "trade" was narrower in meaning than "commerce," it concluded that the word
"trade" was intended to limit the scope of the statute. Id. at 316, 233 S.E.2d at 898-99. The
court also emphasized that § 75-1.1(b) spoke of "buyers" and "sellers." Aycock, supra note
67, at 214. Professor Aycock states that "it is highly likely that the drafter of G.S. 75-1.1
incorporated the word 'trade' in order to conform to the language of G.S. 75-1." Id. at 214
n.56. The J C. Penney court's narrow construction was short-lived. See infra notes 81-83 and
accompanying text.
81. Act of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, §§ 1-5, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 984 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1(a) & (b), -15.2, -50 to -56 (1988)). For a detailed discussion of the
1977 amendments, see Mason, supra note 77, at 548-68.
82. One commentator summarized the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act of
1977 as follows:
(1) the text of the basic unfair trade practices provision, section 75-1.1(a), was
amended so that the language of that section is now precisely the same as section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act; (2) section 75-1.1(b) was rewritten to
preclude the application of the North Carolina unfair trade practices law to the ren-
dering of professional services; (3) section 75-15.2 was added to provide for the impo-
sition of civil penalties in suits brought by the attorney general under the unfair trade
practices law; and (4) sections 75-50 to 75-56 were added prohibiting certain debt
collection practices and providing limited remedies for that type of unfair trade
practice.
Mason, supra note 77, at 548 (citations omitted).
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1.1(a), as amended, is almost identical to section five of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.83 Through the 1977 legislation, the General As-
sembly clearly expressed its intention that section 75-1.1 be applied
broadly.
Since 1977, judicial decisions have continued to define the scope of
section 75-1.1." Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co." ex-
tended the scope of section 75-1.1 to include a mortgage broker's activi-
ties. In Johnson, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, a mortgage
broker, attempted to thwart their efforts to develop a shopping center
and that his actions constituted fraud and an unfair or deceptive trade
practice.8 6 The court defined an unfair practice as one that is "immoral,
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to con-
sumers;"" a deceptive act was defined as "ha[ving] the capacity or ten-
dency to deceive."88 The North Carolina Supreme Court found that a
commercial mortgage broker's activities are within the scope of the stat-
ute, but held that the defendant's actions did not constitute an unfair or
deceptive trade practice.89
In 1981, the North Carolina Supreme Court revisited section 75-1.1
83. Id. at 548.
84. Ainsworth comments that since the 1977 amendments, "North Carolina has followed
closely the FTC Act and the federal decisions in determining the scope and meaning of G.S.
75-1.1." HIGHTOWER'S, supra note 65, § 29-5, at 444.
85. 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980).
86. Id. at 249-51, 266 S.E.2d at 613-14.
87. Id. at 263, 266 S.E.2d at 621 (citing Spiegal, Inc. v. F.T.C., 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir.
1976)).
88. Id. at 265, 266 S.E.2d at 622. Ainsworth notes that this is the same language that was
used in federal cases decided under section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act. HIGH-
TOWER'S, supra note 65, § 29-5, at 445.
89. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 261-66, 266 S.E.2d at 619-22.
Since 1977, other areas have been held to be within the scope of § 75-1.1. See, e.g.,
Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 715 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 848 (1983) (aircraft sales); Pearce v. American Defender Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 461,470,
343 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1986) (insurance practices); Bailey v. LeBeau, 79 N.C. App. 345, 352,
339 S.E.2d 460, 464, modified and aff'd, 318 N.C. 411, 348 S.E.2d 524 (1986) (automobile
sales); Starling v. Sproles, 66 N.C. App. 653, 655-56, 311 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1984) (real estate
brokers' activities); Pedwell v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 51 N.C. App. 236, 238, 275 S.E.2d 565,
567 (1981) (banking practices); Kent v. Humphries, 50 N.C. App. 580, 589, 275 S.E.2d 176,
183, modified and aff'd, 303 N.C. 675, 281 S.E.2d 43 (1981) (commercial property rental);
State ex rel. Edmisten v. Zim Chem. Co., 45 N.C. App. 604, 607, 263 S.E.2d 849, 851 (1980)
(misbranding of goods); Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 516, 239 S.E.2d 574, 583 (1977),
disc rev. denied, 294 N.C. 441, 241 S.E.2d 843 (1978) (housing rental); see also HIGHTOWER'S,
supra note 65, § 29-5, at 444-45 (discussing activities within the scope of § 75-1.1); Aycock,
supra note 67, at 214-15 (same); Mitchell F. Ducey, Note, Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business
Systems, Inc.: Recovery of Lost Profits for a Violation of North Carolina General Statutes Sec-
tion 75-L1, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1170, 1178-79 (1987) (same).
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in Marshall v. Miller,90 which involved the rental of mobile homes.91
The subject matter of the suit was clearly within the scope of section 75-
1.1. The issue presented to the court was whether bad faith was an essen-
tial element of a violation of that section.92 Rejecting the court of ap-
peals' distinction between public and private actions,93 the supreme court
stated that "the question of whether the defendant acted in bad faith is
not pertinent;" 94 rather, "[w]hat is relevant is the effect of the actor's
conduct on the consuming public."95 The court expressly overruled any
cases which implied that bad faith was an essential element of a private
cause of action based on a violation of section 75-1.1.96
90. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
91. Id. at 540, 276 S.E.2d at 398.
92. See id. The plaintiffs, residents of a mobile home park owned by the defendants, al-
leged that the defendants led them to believe they would be provided certain services and
amenities. Id. At trial, the jury found that the defendants failed to provide these services for
the residents of the park, and the judge determined that the defendants' actions constituted an
unfair or deceptive trade practice. Id. at 540-41, 276 S.E.2d at 398-99. The court of appeals
reversed because the "defendants could be adjudged to have committed unfair or deceptive
acts without a showing that they acted in bad faith." Id. at 542, 276 S.E.2d at 399.
For a detailed discussion of the Marshall decision, see Marilyn H. Stout, Note, Unfair
Trade Practices - Intent Not Required to Award Treble Damages for a Violation of North
Carolina's Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices Statute - Marshall v. Miller, 18 WAKE FOR-
EsT L. REv. 134 (1982) and Edward M. McClure, Jr., Comment, The Trouble With Trebles:
What Violates G.S. § 75-L1?, 5 CAMPBELL L. REv. 119, 145-49 (1982).
93. The Attorney General is authorized to prosecute persons violating the provisions of
Chapter 75. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-14 to -15.2, -56 (1988); id. § 75B-4 (1985). A statu-
tory private cause of action is also authorized. Id. § 75-16 (1988).
94. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 544, 276 S.E.2d at 400-01. To decide the issue of the relevance
of bad faith, the Marshall court used federal decisions interpreting the FTC Act as a guide. Id.
at 542, 276 S.E.2d at 399. Examining the federal consumer protection laws and decisions, the
court noted that the FTC could issue a cease and desist order under section five of the FTC
Act, regardless of the good or bad faith of the offending party. Id. at 542-43, 276 S.E.2d at
399-400. The court recognized that the federal scheme did not provide for a private cause of
action for section five violations, but refused to draw a distinction on the basis of this difference
between North Carolina law and federal law. Id.
Marshall's expansive interpretation of § 75-1.1 has been criticized as unconstitutionally
vague. See Thomas A. Farr, Unfair and Deceptive Legislation: The Case for Finding North
Carolina General Statutes Section 75-L1 Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied to an Alledged
[sic] Breach of a Commercial Contract, 8 CAMPBELL L. REv. 421, 426-29 (1986); see also
Hammers v. Lowe's Cos., 48 N.C. App. 150, 154, 268 S.E.2d 257, 259-60 (1980) (questioning
the validity of § 75-1.1 because of its broad language); Dinita L. James, Note, Myers & Chap-
man, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc.: A Lesson in Reading Between the Lines, 67 N.C. L. REV.
1225, 1239, 1243 (1989) (arguing that the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Myers
& Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988), "can be
interpreted as a silent concession that its Marshall decision impermissibly extended the reach
of the statute" and can be read to "apply different standards to the determination of section 75-
1.1 violations in consumer and commercial contexts").
95. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403.
96. Id. at 545-46, 276 S.E.2d at 401.
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In its analysis, the Marshall court also commented on the nature of
section 75-16. 97 The Marshall court affirmed the automatic trebling fea-
ture of section 75-16 and described the statute by noting that
it is an oversimplification to characterize G.S. 75-16 as puni-
tive. The statute is partially punitive in nature in that it clearly
serves as a deterrent to future violations. But it is also remedial
for other reasons, among them the fact that it encourages pri-
vate enforcement and that it provides a remedy for aggrieved
parties. It is, in effect, a hybrid.98
The court recognized that many other states require a finding of inten-
tional wrongdoing in order for exemplary or treble damages to be
awarded, 99 but warned that "[a]s [section 75-16] is a hybrid,... analo-
gies to other rules of common law governing the imposition of punitive
damages should not control.""
The second area of law at issue in Tomlinson was North Carolina's
regulatory scheme for motor vehicle dealers.101 This regulatory scheme
was important to the Tomlinson case because it provided the basis for
Tomlinson's cause of action against CCM's surety. The two consumer
protection features of Article 12 at issue in Tomlinson were sections 20-
288(e) and 20-294.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1988). For the text of § 75-16, see supra note 24.
Section 75-16 was enacted in 1913 to establish a private cause of action for persons injured
because of violations of Chapter 75 provisions. Act of Mar. 3, 1913, ch. 41, § 14, 1913 N.C.
Pub. Laws 66, 70. In 1977, the statute was amended to eliminate the requirement that the jury
assess damages. Act of June 23, 1977, cl. 707, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 852. For a
discussion of the requirements of § 75-16, see HIGHTOWER'S, supra note 65, § 29-5, at 442-43
& Supp. 1991; Aycock, supra note 67, at 258-59.
98. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402 (citing State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C.
Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 319, 233 S.E.2d 895, 900 (1977) and Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc.,
43 N.C. App. 229, 237, 259 S.E.2d 1, 6-7 (1979)).
99. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(c) (Michie 1989) (treble damages awarded for inten-
tional violations of Georgia's deceptive or unfair practices law); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
93(A), § 11 (West Supp. 1992) (double or treble damages awarded if the violation of unfair
competition or unfair trade practices provisions is willfully or knowingly committed); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (treble damages awarded for willful or knowing
violation).
100. Marshall, 320 N.C. at 546-47, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-285 to -328 (1989 & Supp. 1991). Section 20-285 sets forth
the purpose of and authority for Article 12:
The General Assembly finds and declares that the distribution of motor vehicles in
the State of North Carolina vitally affects the general economy of the State and the
public interest and public welfare, and in the exercise of its police power, it is neces-
sary to regulate and license motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors, dealers, sales-
men, and their representatives doing business in North Carolina, in order to prevent
frauds, impositions and other abuses upon its citizens and to protect and preserve the
investments and properties of the citizens of this State.
Id. § 20-285 (1989).
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Section 20-288(e) of Article 12102 protects consumers by requiring
each motor vehicle dealer to post a $25,000 surety bond.103 In addition,
section 20-288(e) states that "[a]ny purchaser of a motor vehicle who
shall have suffered any loss or damage by any act of a [licensed motor
vehicle dealer] .. that constitutes a violation of [Article 12] or Article
15 shall have the right to institute an action to recover against the
[dealer] and the surety."1" By establishing a cause of action against the
surety, section 20-288(e) protects the injured consumer from an insolvent
or thinly capitalized dealership.
The combination of section 20-288(e) with section 20-294 10 creates
a potentially strong measure of protection for the consumer. Section 20-
294 enumerates specific grounds for denying, suspending, or revoking a
motor vehicle dealer's license, several of which are directed toward pro-
tecting the consumer.1 0 6 Because of section 20-288(e), an injured con-
sumer has a cause of action against a dealer who violates the conditions
of section 20-294. 107
The third general area of law at issue in Tomlinson, the law of sure-
tyship, was involved by virtue of section 20-288(e)'s surety bond require-
ment. "A surety is a person who is primarily liable for the payment of
102. Id. § 20-288(e) (Supp. 1991).
103. Id. The statute provides that each "motor vehicle dealer, manufacturer, factory
branch, distributor, distributor branch, or wholesaler shall furnish a corporate surety bond or
cash bond or fixed value equivalent." Id. The required amount of the bond at the time of the
Tomlinson case was $15,000. Act of June 14, 1977, ch. 560, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess.
660 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-288(e) (Supp. 1991)).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-288(e) (emphasis added).
105. Id. § 20-294.
106. Among the conditions of § 20-294 intended to protect the consumer are:
(4) [w]illfully defrauding any retail buyer, to the buyer's damage, or any other person
in the conduct of the licensee's business;
(6) (h]aving used unfair methods of competition or unfair deceptive acts or practices;
(7) [k]nowingly advertising by any means, any assertion, representation or statement
of fact which is untrue, misleading or deceptive in any particular relating to the
conduct of the business licensed or for which a license is sought; [and]
(8) [knowingly advertising a used motor vehicle for sale as a new motor vehicle.
Id.
107. Section 20-288(e) establishes a cause of action only for the injured consumer. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-288(e). Section 20-294 provides that a dealer can have its license re-
voked for injuring or defrauding any person. See id. § 20-294. Section 20-294 has been inter-
preted as not enlarging the scope of § 20-288(e), however. See NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Western
Sur. Co., 88 N.C. App. 705, 709, 364 S.E.2d 675, 677-78 (1988) (section 20-294(4) does not
extend the coverage of § 20-288(e) to any parties other than the purchaser); Triplett v. James,
45 N.C. App. 96, 99, 262 S.E.2d 374, 375-76, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 202, 296 S.E.2d 621 (1980)
(same).
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the debt or the performance of the obligation of another."108 When
property is pledged, the surety is liable for the debt of the principal, but
only to the extent of the property that was pledged. 1 9 "A judgment
against the principal constitutes prima facie evidence" of the surety's
liability. 110
Before Tomlinson, the North Carolina Supreme Court had not con-
sidered the issue of a surety's liability for treble damages under sections
75-1.1 and 75-16. Other state courts, however, had considered whether a
surety should be liable under similar statutory provisions."' These deci-
sions held that absent an express statutory provision, a surety is not liable
for punitive or exemplary damages. 112  The courts reasoned that a
108. Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Creasy, 301 N.C. 44, 52, 269 S.E.2d 117, 122 (1980).
For a detailed summary of the law of suretyship, see HIGHTOWER'S, supra note 65, §§ 24-1 to -
4 & Supp. 1991.
109. LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP 31 (1950).
110. HIGHTOWER'S, supra note 65, § 24-4. The surety has available to him all the defenses
of the principal. Id. § 24-2. The surety can also "attack the judgment for fraud or collusion,"
or establish an independent defense. Id. § 24-4.
111. See, eg., Harper v. Home Ins. Co., 23 Ariz. App. 348, 349-50, 533 P.2d 559, 560-61
(1975) (holding that the surety for a mobile home dealer is not liable for punitive damages
awarded against the dealer); Darr v. Long, 210 Neb. 57, 67, 313 N.W.2d 215, 220-21 (1981)
(same, motor vehicle dealer); Butler v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 265 Or. 473, 478, 509 P.2d 1184,
1187 (1973) (en banc) (same, motor vehicle dealer).
In Butler, the plaintiff obtained a judgment for fraud against an automotive dealer and
was awarded actual and punitive damages. Butler, 265 Or. at 474, 509 P.2d at 1185. When
the dealer defaulted on the judgment, the plaintiff sued the dealer's surety. Id. Like North
Carolina, Oregon state law requires an automobile dealer to post a surety bond. OR. REV.
STAT. § 822.030 (1) (1991). The statute also establishes a private cause of action for persons
injured by "reason of the vehicle dealer's fraud, fraudulent representations or violations of
provisions of the vehicle code [relating to the sale of a vehicle]." Id. § 822.030(2). The Oregon
Supreme Court found that the surety was not liable for the punitive damages. Butler, 265 Or.
at 480, 509 P.2d at 1188.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has determined similarly that a surety is not liable for
punitive damages. See Darr, 210 Neb. at 67, 313 N.W.2d at 220-21. In Darr, consumers
injured by the fraudulent acts of a motor vehicle dealer brought a cause of action against the
dealer's surety. Id. at 58-59, 313 N.W.2d at 217. Nebraska law also requires a motor vehicle
dealer to post a surety bond. Suns Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 169 Neb. 94, 105-06, 98 N.W.2d
692, 699 (1959). The statute does not establish a private cause of action for the injured con-
sumer, but courts have determined that an implied cause of action exists. See id.
112. Harper, 23 Ariz. App. at 350, 533 P.2d at 561; Darr, 210 Neb. at 67, 313 N.W.2d at
220-21; Butler, 265 Or. at 474-75, 509 P.2d at 1185-86.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that a surety is not liable for punitive damages,
although the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the surety bond differed from those of
the Tomlinson case. See, e.g., Koch v. Merchants Mut. Bonding Co., 211 Kan. 397, 403, 507
P.2d 189, 193 (1973) (concerning a guardian's bond); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
State, 182 So.2d 919, 922 (Miss. 1966) (sheriff's bond); Stumpf v. Pederson, 180 Okla. 408,
410, 70 P.2d 101, 103 (1937) (attachment bond); Carter v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 266 Cal. App.
2d 805, 807, 72 Ca. Rptr. 462, 464 (1968) (attachment bond); United States Fire Ins. Co. v.
McDaniel, 408 S.W.2d 134, 134-35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (real estate broker's bond). But cf
CONSUMER LAW
surety's liability is limited to actual damages and that punitive damages
are not designed to compensate the plaintiff."1 3 Also, imposing liability
upon the surety for punitive damages does not further the deterrent pur-
pose of the statute.' 14 Although these decisions involve statutes similar
to sections 75-1.1 and 75-16 and therefore provide guidance in resolving
the Tomlinson issue, none of the statutes' elements mirror the elements of
North Carolina law." 5 In particular, none of these statutes shares sec-
tion 75-16's hybrid character; instead, the statutes are purely punitive.
1 1 6
Whether North Carolina's motor vehicle licensing laws are intended
to limit the surety's liability to actual damages is unclear. The Tomlinson
court concluded that the surety's liability is dependent upon whether
treble damages awarded under section 75-16 can be characterized as
compensating the injured consumer."17  The question presented to the
Tomlinson court can be separated into two issues. First, the court con-
sidered whether the legislature intended the motor vehicle licensing laws
to be an independent regulatory scheme or, alternatively, one that inter-
acts with Chapter 75. Second, if the motor vehicle licensing laws are not
Gaston v. Gibson, 328 F. Supp. 3, 6 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (noting that a sheriff's bond surety is
liable for punitive damages under Tennessee law); Breeding v. Jordan, 115 Iowa 566, 568, 88
N.W. 1090, 1090-91 (1902) (holding that a surety is liable for punitive damages on a bond
issued to a saloon operator); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 647-
49, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1964) (holding that an automobile insurance company is liable for puni-
tive damages in a drunken driving case).
113. See Darr, 210 Neb. at 67, 313 N.W.2d at 220-21 (a penal or treble damage "award
under [the statute] is a penalty and a reward for bringing the action successfully, and is not
limited or designed to compensate [an injured consumer] for a 'loss suffered' "); Butler, 265 Or.
at 474-75, 509 P.2d at 1185 (citing 11 JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 6361, at 86 (1944)) ("The general rule is . . . 'a surety is liable only for payment of actual
damages caused by the principal, and may not be held for exemplary or punitive damages, in
the absence of any statutory provision imposing such liability.' ").
114. Butler, 265 Or. at 478, 509 P.2d at 1187 ("The purpose of punitive damages is to
deter. Requiring the surety to pay a judgment for punitive damages likely will not be a deter-
rent to automobile dealers.").
115. The relevant elements of §§ 75-1.1 and 75-16 are the automatic trebling provision, the
hybrid nature of § 75-16, and the absence of a bad faith requirement.
116. In fact, the Butler court clearly rejected characterizing the Oregon statute as a hybrid,
noting that the "punitive damages were not awarded both as a penalty and to compensate the
plaintiff for any expenses, inconvenience, or other injury he suffered." 265 Or. at 477, 509 P.2d
at 1186.
Darr is distinguishable from Tomlinson because the statute at issue in Darr required an
element of intentional wrongdoing. See Darr, 210 Neb. at 58-59, 313 N.W.2d at 216 (noting
that the Nebraska statute provides: "'Tihe licensed dealer will fully indemnify any person...
by reason of any loss suffered because of ... false or fraudulent representations or deceitful
practices."' (emphasis added)). North Carolina's statutory scheme does not require a finding
of bad faith. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
117. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 80, 408 S.E.2d at 856; see also supra notes 34-47 and accom-
panying text (discussing this point further).
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a self-contained regulatory scheme, the court had to decide whether the
surety should be held liable for damages under section 75-16.
Neither the statutes nor their legislative histories provide a clear an-
swer to the first question, but the Tomlinson court apparently assumed
that the two regulatory schemes were intended to interact.118 The an-
swer to the second question is unclear because, as a matter of public
policy, a surety is generally not held liable for punitive damages absent
express statutory authority. 19 However, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has characterized section 75-16 as only partially punitive in na-
ture.120 Thus, it is not entirely appropriate to exclude punitive damages
from a surety's liability under a statute that is both punitive and compen-
satory. The North Carolina General Assembly failed to indicate its in-
tent with respect to both the interaction of the two consumer protection
schemes and the applicability of the public policy exception.12 1
Because of the lack of guidance from the legislature, three different
solutions to the Tomlinson issue could be reached logically: (1) the
surety never is liable for treble damages awarded under section 75-16; (2)
the surety always is liable for treble damages awarded under section 75-
16; or (3) the surety sometimes will be liable for treble damages awarded
under section 75-16, depending on whether the treble damages are com-
pensatory as to the plaintiff.122 Two arguments support the conclusion
that a surety never should be liable for treble damages awarded under
section 75-16. First, one can interpret section 20-288(e) of the Motor
Vehicle Act, establishing a private right of action against a motor vehicle
dealer's surety, as limiting the plaintiff's remedy to losses or damages
suffered because of the dealer's violation of a provision of Article 12 or 15
of North Carolina's motor vehicle laws.'23 Arguably, because the events
which trigger the surety's liability are limited to violations of Articles 12
and 15, the remedies available to the plaintiff also should be limited to
those provided under these same Articles. 124
118. See generally Tomlinson, 330 N.C. 76, 408 S.E.2d 853 (analyzing both sections of the
general statutes together). For an argument that the motor vehicles laws are an independent
regulatory scheme, see infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
120. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 546, 274 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981); see supra notes 98-
100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the hybrid nature of § 75-16.
121. See discussion infra notes 123-24.
122. In Tomlinson, the concurring justice chose the first conclusion, the dissenting justice
reached the second conclusion, and the majority held that the third solution was correct. See
supra notes 43-66 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 29 for the text of § 20-288(e).
124. This argument was the essence of Justice Webb's concurring opinion. See Tomlinson,
330 N.C. at 81-82, 408 S.E.2d at 857 (Webb, J., concurring). The language of the statute fails
to state whether a plaintiff's remedies are limited to those available under the particular statu-
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If the injured consumer's remedies are interpreted not to be exclu-
sively limited to Articles 12 and 15, another argument exists to support
limiting the surety's liability to actual damages. Courts in other jurisdic-
tions have found implicit limitations in statutes similar to North Carolina
General Statutes section 20-288(e).12 Section 20-288(e) provides that
"[a]ny purchaser of a motor vehicle who shall have suffered any loss or
damage by any act of a [motor vehicle dealer] ... that constitutes a
violation of [Article 12] or Article 15 shall have the right to institute an
action to recover against ... the surety." 126 The phrase "suffered any
loss or damage" suggests that the purpose of the surety is to insure that
an injured consumer will be compensated for his actual damages. Fur-
ther, because section 75-16 is partially punitive in nature,'27 the treble
damages awarded pursuant to that section are not consistent with the
purpose of the right of action against the surety.
1 2
1
The conclusion that the surety is not liable for treble damages
awarded under section 75-16 seems satisfactory because the plaintiff re-
covers his actual damages and the deterrent purpose of the statute is not
violated. Nevertheless, this same conclusion can be criticized as inconsis-
tent with the court's prior characterization of section 75-16, and a more
persuasive argument can be made that the second solution, generally
holding the surety liable for treble damages awarded under section 75-16,
is the correct one. Unlike many other state supreme courts, the North
Carolina Supreme Court has described treble damages awarded pursuant
to section 75-16 as serving three functions: deterrence, compensation,
and incentive for private enforcement. In Marshall v. Miller,1 29 the court
explained that the statute is partially punitive in nature because it is in-
tory articles under which his claims are made. Nevertheless, one certainly could argue that the
legislature intended the remedies to be limited to those available under the same articles that
establish the plaintiff's right to a cause of action.
125. See, eg., Harper v. Home Ins. Co., 23 Ariz. App. 348, 533 P.2d 559 (1975) (holding
that the surety for a motor vehicle dealer is not liable for punitive damages awarded against
the dealer); Darr v. Long, 210 Neb. 57, 313 N.W.2d 215 (1981) (en bane) (same); Butler v.
United Pac. Ins. Co., 265 Or. 473, 509 P.2d 1184 (1973) (en banc) (same); these cases are
discussed supra at notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-288(e) (1988) (emphasis added).
127. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
128. This is essentially an argument for the application of the public policy exception that
does not hold a surety liable for punitive, exemplary, or statutory penal damages. See supra
notes 111-16 and accompanying text. Application of the public policy exception would em-
phasize that the purpose of the punitive damages (deterrence) will not be achieved by imposing
liability upon the surety.
This same line of reasoning can be used to hold the surety liable for treble damages
awarded under § 75-16. See infra notes 129-48 and accompanying text.
129. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
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tended to deter violations of Chapter 75.130 Marshall further character-
ized section 75-16 as remedial because it encourages private enforcement
and provides a remedy for aggrieved parties.' As a result of the hybrid
nature of section 75-16, the court warned that "analogies to other rules
of common law governing the imposition of punitive damages should not
control."1
32
The Marshall court's caveat seems especially pertinent to the resolu-
tion of the Tomlinson issue. The public policy exception is essentially a
common law exception to the general rule of surety liability and is based
on the idea that the goal of punitive damages is deterrence. The Mar-
shall court determined that bad faith is not necessary to establish a viola-
tion of section 75-1.1.133 Also, upon a determination that section 75-1.1
has been violated, section 75-16 mandates the imposition of treble dam-
ages.'1 4 It is hard to reconcile the absence of a bad faith requirement
with the application of a public policy exception based on deterrence. 3
Because of the hybrid nature of section 75-16, a good argument also
can be made that the public policy exception should not apply to the
facts of Tomlinson and that the general rule of surety liability should
apply.' 3 6 Referring to a section 75-1.1 violation, the Marshall court em-
phasized that "[w]hat is relevant is the effect of the actor's conduct on
the consuming public."' 3 7 This seemingly shifts the focus of section 75-
16 from deterrence to compensation.' 3 8 Surety liability is also consistent
with providing a remedy for aggrieved consumers, one of the three pur-
poses of section 75-16.139
130. Id. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
131. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
132. Id. at 546-67, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
133. Id. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
134. Id. at 547, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
135. The North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that punitive damages are allowed
in North Carolina "on the basis of [the state's] policy to punish intentional wrongdoing and
deter others from similar behavior." Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 113, 229
S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976).
136. This is true if one accepts that the motor vehicle licensing laws were not intended to
be an exclusive and comprehensive consumer protection scheme. What triggers the injured
consumer's right to a cause of action arguably does not have to be coextensive in coverage with
what the consumer's remedies are. In this way, the consumer would not be limited to remedies
provided under Articles 12 and 15. But see supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
137. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403.
138. Although the Marshall court was referring to § 75-1.1, id., its statement is relevant to
§ 75-16 because of the automatic trebling characteristic of the statute.
Certainly deterrence remains a central purpose of the trebling provision of § 75-16, but
the language of the Marshall court illustrates that the remedial purpose of § 75-16 is also
significant.
139. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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Other jurisdictions have held that a surety is not liable for treble
damages under statutes similar to section 20-288(e).' 4 Nevertheless,
these cases can be distinguished from the facts of Tomlinson. In Butler v.
United Pacific Insurance Co., 4 ' the Oregon court held that the surety
was not liable for punitive damages according to the general rule that a
surety is only liable for actual damages and not for punitive or exemplary
damages. 142 The court's reasoning, however, focused on the deterrent
purpose of punitive damages and emphasized that the "punitive damages
were not awarded both as a penalty and to compensate the plaintiff for
any expenses, inconvenience, or other injury he suffered." '43
Darr v. Long'" also involved a statute similar to section 20-288(e)
and held that the surety was not liable for penal damages. 145 As in But-
ler, the Nebraska court found that the statute at issue was "not meant to
compensate for actual damages suffered but, rather, [was] designed to
punish or deter."' 46 Section 75-16 is intended, in part, to compensate the
injured consumer."4 Thus, despite the similarity of the cases, the reason-
ing of the Darr and Butler courts does not apply to Tomlinson.1
4 8
The third possible solution to the issue presented in Tomlinson was
the one chosen by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The court re-
solved the dilemma created by the hybrid nature of section 75-16 by de-
veloping a hybrid solution. The court's conclusion was that the surety's
liability for the trebled portion of damages awarded under section 75-16
depended on whether the treble damages could be characterized as com-
pensating the injured consumer. 149 Recognizing the several purposes of
140. See, e.g., Harper v. Home Ins. Co., 23 Ariz. App. 348, 349-50, 533 P.2d 559, 560-61
(1975) (holding that the surety for a motor vehicle dealer is not liable for punitive damages
awarded against the dealer); Darr v. Long, 210 Neb. 57, 67, 313 N.W.2d 215, 220-21 (1981)
(en bane) (same); Butler v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 265 Or. 473, 478, 509 P.2d 1184, 1187 (1973)
(en banc) (same); these cases are discussed supra at notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
141. 265 Or. 473, 509 P.2d 1184 (1973).
142. Id. at 478, 509 P.2d at 1185.
143. Id. at 477, 509 P.2d at 1186.
144. 210 Neb. 57, 313 N.W.2d 215 (1981).
145. Id. at 67, 313 N.W.2d at 220-21. In Darr, the statute at issue imposed treble damages
for violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1984 (1988), but capped punitive damages at $1,500. Darr, 210
Neb. at 59, 313 N.W.2d at 217.
146. Darr, 210 Neb. at 65, 313 N.W.2d at 220.
147. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
148. The majority cited Darr to support its holding that the surety in Tomlinson was not
liable for the trebled portion of the damages. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 80, 408 S.E.2d at 856.
Justice Frye criticized the majority for relying on Darr because the Nebraska statute at issue
was purely punitive in nature. See id. at 84, 408 S.E.2d at 858-59 (Frye, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
149. See id. at 80, 408 S.E.2d at 856.
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section 75-16, the court essentially developed a solution based on
whether the compensatory or punitive nature of the statute dominated.
A two-part argument was used by the Tomlinson court in reaching
its hybrid solution. First, the court determined that "the damages allow-
able [under section 20-288(e)] are those that are 'suffered.' "10 This con-
clusion limited the surety's liability under section 20-288(e) to
compensatory damages.' 51 Next, the court examined whether the plain-
tiff had established that the trebled portion of the damage award repre-
sented compensation for her."12 If the trebled portion of the award was
primarily punitive in nature, then the public policy exception applied and
the surety was not liable for the trebled portion of the damages. But if
the plaintiff proved that the treble damages were compensatory in na-
ture,153 the surety would be liable because section 20-288(e) was designed
to compensate the plaintiff.'54
The Tomlinson court's hybrid solution to the issue of surety liability
is most satisfactory from a theoretical standpoint; 1 from a practical and
policy perspective, however, it is laden with problems. First, the court
failed to provide a workable standard for determining when a plaintiff
has suffered damages beyond "initial" damages. Second, because the
court chose not to establish a bright line rule, the incentive to litigate the
issue of a surety's liability under section 75-16 seems guaranteed. The
plaintiff will be motivated by the potential reward of treble damages; the
surety will seek to limit its liability to actual damages. A bright line rule
possibly would have encouraged the parties to settle. Third, from a pol-
icy perspective, the Tomlinson decision has created uncertainty as to the
potential liability of a corporate surety.' 56 Rates on surety bonds will
150. Id.
151. Id. The court essentially adopted the reasoning of Darr, 210 Neb. 57, 313 N.W.2d
215 (1981), and Carter v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 805, 72 Cal. Rptr. 462
(1968).
152. Tomlinson, 330 N.C. at 80-81, 408 S.E.2d at 856. The court started with the pre-
sumption that the trebled portion of the damages was primarily punitive in nature, noting:
"[t]he plaintiff has not alleged further actual damages that would transform the trebled portion
of the award from a punitive to a compensatory award." Id. at 80, 408 S.E.2d at 856.
153. The court stated that "[i]n situations where the injured consumer has lost a great deal
more than the initial damages by spending extra money and time to gain a modicum of satis-
faction, the trebled portion of the award is seen as compensating the consumer for those
losses." Id.
154. This third solution could be viewed as interpreting § 75-16 to be discretionary in na-
ture when it is a surety who will be held liable. In effect, the court is directed to consider the
extent of the consumer's injury in order to determine whether to hold the surety liable for the
trebled portion of the damages.
155. The court's solution can be criticized for transforming a mandatory trebling provision
into a discretionary one when a surety is involved. See supra note 154.
156. See Petition for Discretionary Review Under G.S. 7A-31 at 7, Tomlinson (No.
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probably be raised based on the assumption that the surety is liable for
treble damages. The resulting higher costs for dealers are likely to be
passed on to consumers although there is no assurance that the consumer
can collect treble damages from the surety.
The Tomlinson court was faced with a multitude of problems. The
statutes at issue provide no guidance as to whether or how they are in-
tended to interact. Further, the public policy exception that normally
governs a surety's liability for treble damages awards is ill-suited to the
facts of Tomlinson because of the hybrid nature of section 75-16.157
Since Marshall v. Miller158 clearly held that section 75-16 was partially
remedial in nature, Marshall restrained the court's ability to find that the
surety was not liable for treble damages awarded under section 75-16.
The challenge faced by the Tomlinson court was to develop a solution
consistent with prior case law and legislative intent.1 59
Because of the confusion in this area of the law, a bright line rule
regarding a surety's liability for treble damages is preferred to the hybrid
solution of the Tomlinson court. The simplest resolution to the dilemma
revealed by Tomlinson would be a clear expression by the General As-
sembly of its intent. The General Assembly could amend section 20-
288(e) to state expressly whether the surety is liable for treble damages
under section 75-16, or amend section 75-16 to require a finding of inten-
tional wrongdoing.6 Alternatively, the next time the question
presented by Tomlinson arises, the North Carolina Supreme Court could
reject a hybrid solution and clearly hold the surety either liable or not
liable. Obviously, the legislature or the court must determine first which
purpose of section 75-16 it wishes to emphasize: deterrence or compen-
93PA91). In its petition to the supreme court for discretionary review, Lawyers Surety stated
that the court of appeals' decision "judicially alter[ed] existing contractual obligations by in-
creasing the potential liability contractually assumed by corporate sureties." Id. Although
Lawyers Surety was referring to the court of appeals' decision that held the surety liable for
treble damages, the same criticism can be made of the supreme court's hybrid solution.
157. One option for the court would have been to overrule Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C.
539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981), insofar as it held that bad faith was not required for a § 75-1.1
violation. Trebled damages awarded under § 75-16 could then have been characterized as
primarily punitive in nature and the public policy exception applied.
158. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
159. The decision of the Tomlinson court could be interpreted as reluctance by the court to
make an absolute rule of law. The court preserved the opportunity to clarify the issue of a
surety's liability for § 75-16 damages without having to overrule Tomlinson expressly.
160. By requiring a finding of intentional wrongdoing, the General Assembly would alter
the character of § 75-16. Section 75-16 would be essentially punitive in nature, and the public
policy exception would apply.
One commentator has previously argued that § 75-16 should be amended. See Stout,
supra note 92, at 150 (suggesting an amendment that would "specifically limit treble damages
to violations committed in bad faith").
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sation. 161 Whether by legislative amendment or judicial decision, the hy-
brid solution created by the Tomlinson court needs to be discarded and a
practical, bright-line rule established.
CHRISTINA L. GOSHAW
161. This statement assumes that the General Assembly intended for Chapters 20 and 75
to interact. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. If the remedy of the injured con-
sumer is limited under § 20-288(e) to those available under Articles 12 and 15, then the Gen-
eral Assembly should amend § 20-288(e) to state expressly this limitation on the consumer's
remedy.
When making the choice between deterrence and compensation, the court or legislature
should recognize that denying the consumer the ability to collect the actual and trebled por-
tion of the damages from the surety may frustrate the goal of consumer protection. The con-
sumer would have to (1) obtain a judgment under § 75-16 against the dealer; (2) collect the
part of the damages representing actual damages from the surety; and (3) proceed against the
(presumably) insolvent dealer for the remaining part of her judgment. Requiring this of the
consumer seems burdensome and judicially inefficient. The better public policy choice might
be to require the surety, instead of the consumer, to proceed against the insolvent dealer.
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Undermining the Usury Statutes: Swindell v. Federal National
Mortgage Association
This kindness I will show
Go with me to a notary, seal me there
Your single bond; and in a merry sport
If you repay me not on such a day,
In such a place, such sum or sums as are
Express'd in the condition, let the forfeit
Be nominated for a equal pound
Of your fair flesh, to be cut off and taken
In what part of your body pleaseth me.'
The regulation of interest rates to protect borrowers against unscru-
pulous lenders is by no means a recent legal development.2 North Caro-
lina, through its intricate usury laws,3 regulates both traditional
"interest" and late payment fees on loans.4 North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 24-10.1 states that the maximum fee a lender can charge for
a late payment is four percent of the amount past due.5 The statute,
however, contains no express remedy for charging a late fee higher than
four percent. In fact, the only express remedy for any violation of the
usury statutes is found in section 24-2.6 That remedy, however, will be
invoked only by the "charging of a greater rate of interest."7 In Swindell
v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n,8 the North Carolina Supreme Court
stated that a late payment fee on a note is a transaction in and of itself
and, in reality, compensation for the lender's loss of the money's use dur-
ing the period of delay.9 Accordingly, charging a usurious late fee will
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 3, his. 143-51, THE
RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 259 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1974).
2. For a discussion of the history of usury laws, see David M. Moore II, Comment,
Usury Law in North Carolina, 47 N.C. L. REv. 761, 761-63 (1969).
3. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 24-1 to -17 (1991).
4. Id. § 24-10.1.
5. Id. § 24-10.1(b).
6. Id. § 24-2. The statute provides:
The taking, receiving, reserving or charging a greater rate of interest than permitted
by this chapter ... shall be a forfeiture of the entire interest which the note...
carries with it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. And in case a greater
rate of interest has been paid, the person... by whom it has been paid, may recover
twice the amount of interest paid in an action in the nature of action for debt.
Id.
7. Id.
8. 330 N.C. 153, 409 S.E.2d 892 (1991).
9. Id. at 158-59, 409 S.E.2d at 895.
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result, under the usury penalty statute,1° in the forfeiture of only the late
fee." Furthermore, a "usury savings clause," by which a lender agrees
to reduce any charge determined as usurious to the maximum rate al-
lowed by law, cannot protect a lender from a violation of the usury
statutes. 
12
This Note discusses the North Carolina courts' prior treatment of
the relationship between borrower and lender and the remedies that have
been invoked for violations of the usury statutes.1 3 The Note analyzes
the rationale used by the Swindell court to support its result, and dis-
cusses the possible future consequences of the court's reasoning and its
consistency with the concerns underlying the statutes. 14 The Note con-
tends that the court's holding regarding the controversial "usury savings
clause" was decided correctly in light of North Carolina precedent' 5 but
concludes that the result reached in Swindell failed to provide economic
incentives for private enforcement, and therefore, is too weak to deter
lenders from drafting usurious notes.
16
On March 22, 1985, Gary and Lillian Swindell together with Epic
Mortgage, Inc., using a Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) Uniform Instrument Form,17 executed a note for $112,500 se-
cured by a deed of trust on a home. 8 In a blank on the form, Epic had
typed five percent as the late charge to be assessed on an overdue pay-
ment of principal and interest. 9 Also in the note, a usury savings clause
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1991).
11. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 160, 409 S.E.2d at 896.
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 58-90 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 95-116 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
17. The note was on Form 3501, the "MULTISTATE ADJUSTABLE RATE NOTE-
ARM S-1-Single Family-Fannie Mae Uniform Instrument." See Record at 21, Swindell v.
Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, 97 N.C. App. 126, 387 S.E.2d 220 (1990) (No. 8926SC617).
18. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 155, 409 S.E.2d at 893.
19. Id. The note provided the required fifteen days before the assessment of any late
charges. Record at 21, Swindell (No. 8926SC617); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.1(b)(3). The
maximum late fee on a note at the time the parties executed the note was four percent. Id.
§ 24-10(e) (Supp. 1983), repealed by Act of July 15, 1985, ch. 755, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws
1023, 1023 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.1 (1991)). The terms of the late
fee statute now in place are substantially similar to those in § 24-10(e). See id. § 24-10.1.
North Carolina courts generally test a loan for usury against the laws that existed when the
loan was made. See e.g., Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 530-31, 180
S.E.2d 823, 827-28 (1971); Rosenthal's Bootery, Inc. v. Shavitz, 48 N.C. App. 170, 173, 268
S.E.2d 250, 251-52 (1980). The Swindell court, however, analyzed the transaction under § 24-
10.1. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 157, 409 S.E.2d at 894. Because there is no material difference
between the two statutes, using § 24-10.1 rather than § 24-10(e) had no influence upon the
court's decision.
stated that if the interest rate or "other loan charges" ever exceeded that
allowed by the law, the loan charge in the note would be reduced to the
maximum lawful amount.20
In October 1987, Skyline Mortgage Corporation, the new servicer of
the note,2 sent the Swindells notice of uncollected late charges.22 Upon
discovery that the five percent late payment fee violated the applicable
statute,23 Skyline reduced the charge to the maximum legal rate of four
percent.24
The Swindells, rather than pay the amount due, brought an action
for declaratory judgment against both FNMA and Skyline, claiming that
the late payment fee was usurious. 25 They sought both a declaration that
the note was usurious and an order that the defendants forfeit all the
interest due under the note.26 The trial court granted summary judg-
ment to the defendants. 27 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed
in part and reversed in part, holding that while the late fee was in excess
of the legal maximum, the penalties imposed by section 24-2 applied only
when there was a" 'taking, receiving, reserving or charging a greater rate
of interest.' "2 Because a late payment fee was not interest, according to
the court, the penalty statute did not apply.29 The court, however, held
that public policy and the spirit of the usury statutes required that the
defendants forfeit the late fee.30 On review, the North Carolina Supreme
Court reached the identical result but based its conclusion directly on the
usury statutes.3'
20. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 155, 409 S.E.2d at 893. The provision also provided for the
return of any amount already paid that exceeded the legal maximum. Id. Such a provision is
commonly called a "usury savings clause." See id. at 160, 409 S.E.2d at 896.
21. FNMA bought the note from Epic and used Skyline to service the note. Id. at 155,
409 S.E.2d at 893.
22. Id.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.1 (1991).
24. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 155, 409 S.E.2d at 893.
25. Id. The Swindells also claimed that the reduction to four percent was a "fraudulent
and material alteration" discharging them from the obligations of the note under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-3-407 (1986). Swindell, 330 N.C. at 156, 409 S.E.2d at 894. Neither the trial court
nor the supreme court gave this claim much weight. See id. at 160-61, 409 S.E.2d at 897; see
infra note 33.
26. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 155-56, 409 S.E.2d at 893-94.
27. Id. at 156, 409 S.E.2d at 894.
28. Swindell v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 97 N.C. App. 126, 129, 387 S.E.2d 220,
221 (1990) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1991)), modified and aft'd, 330 N.C. 153, 409
S.E.2d 892 (1991). For the text of § 24-2, see supra note 6.
29. Swindell, 97 N.C. App. at 129, 387 S.E.2d at 221-22.
30. Id. Otherwise, the court reasoned, there would be nothing to discourage violations of
the statute. Id.
31. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 156, 409 S.E.2d at 894.
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The supreme court prefaced its decision by stating that the court's
only power with regard to usury statutes is" 'to interpret and execute the
legislative will'" and, therefore, it must find a basis for its holding in the
statutes.32 The remainder of the opinion focused on two issues: (1) the
remedy for violating the late fee statute, and (2) the effect of the usury
savings clause.33
Chief Justice Exum, writing for the court, began the discussion of
the remedy for violations of section 24-10.1 by defining "interest" as
"'the compensation . . . for the use or forbearance or detention of
money.' "3 The court said that the note executed by the Swindells and
Epic "contemplated interest" in two separate transactions: (1) the stated
interest on the loan for $112,500, 3" and (2) the money to compensate the
defendants for the delayed payment.36 The court reasoned that the two
purposes behind a late payment fee were to encourage prompt payment
and to compensate the lender for its loss of the use of the money during
the period of delay.37 Thus, the court concluded that the use of the late
payment fee as compensation for delayed payment constituted
"interest.
'38
In addition to its decision that the late payment fee was interest, the
court also found that the charge possessed the traits of usury. The court
stated that, in North Carolina, the four elements of usury are: (1) A loan
or forbearance of money, (2) an understanding that the money owed will
be paid,39 (3) payment or agreement to pay interest greater than the max-
imum allowed by law, and (4) the lender's corrupt intent to receive more
interest than the legal rate permits.' According to the court, all the
usury elements were present in the late payment fee. First, the individual
32. Id. (quoting Smith v. Old Dominion Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 119 N.C. 249, 256, 26 S.E.
41, 42 (1896)).
33. The court also addressed the claim that reducing the late fee was a material and fraud-
ulent alteration of the contract that would discharge the Swindells from the contract under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-407 (1986). It concluded, however, that the required fraudulent in-
tent was not present. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 160-61, 409 S.E.2d at 896-97.
34. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 158, 409 S.E.2d at 895 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
729 (5th ed. 1979)).
35. The parties to a home loan greater than $10,000 may agree to any interest rate. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 24-1.lA(a)(1) (1991). Thus, the interest rate on the loan itself was not at issue.
36. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 158, 409 S.E.2d at 895.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The description of this element differs slightly from the way the court had previously
characterized it. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
40. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 159, 409 S.E.2d at 895 (citing Western Auto Supply Co. v. Vick,
303 N.C. 30, 37, 277 S.E.2d 360, 366, af'don reh'g, 304 N.C. 191, 283 S.E.2d 181 (1981) and
Henderson v. Security Mortgage and Fin. Co., 273 N.C. 253, 263, 160 S.E.2d 39, 46 (1968)).
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payment of principal and interest due was a "loan."'" Second, the sched-
ule for the payments on the note demonstrates that the parties expected
each payment to be paid.42 Third, the late payment charge was greater
than the four percent allowed by law.43 Finally, there was the showing of
an "'intentional charging of more for money lent than the law al-
lows.' "I Thus, despite the contract's label for the charge,4" the court
held that the late payment fee was interest and the four elements of usury
were present in the late fee transaction."
In North Carolina, the penalty for charging an unlawful rate of in-
terest is the "forfeiture of the entire interest which the ... evidence of
debt carries with it."'47 The court, however, stated the "entire interest"
in a late fee transaction "can only signify any and all penalty fees for late
payments"48 because the interest on the note itself and the compensation
for delayed payment are separate transactions. 49 Thus, the court forced
the defendants to forfeit only their right to receive the late fee rather than
the entire interest on the note.50
The court also addressed whether the usury savings clause could
save the defendants from liability under usury laws by lowering the late
payment fee to a legal level.5" Looking to the spirit of the usury statutes,
the court stated that the usury statutes exist to protect the borrower and
to relieve him of "the necessity for expertise and vigilance regarding the
legality of rates he must pay."5 2 According to the court, a usury savings
clause would shift the burden of knowing the laws to the borrower, con-
tradicting the concern underlying the usury statutes.5 3 The court con-
cluded that a lender cannot escape liability for usurious charges by
41. Id. at 159, 409 S.E.2d at 896.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 159, 409 S.E.2d at 895. (quoting Kessing v. National Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C.
523, 530, 180 S.E.2d 823, 827 (1971)).
45. "'[A]ny charges . . . in excess of the lawful rate of interest, whether called fines,
charges, dues or interest are, in fact, interest and usurious.'" Id. at 158, 409 S.E.2d at 895
(quoting Hollowell v. Southern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 120 N.C. 286, 287, 26 S.E. 781, 781
(1897)).
46. Id. at 159, 409 S.E.2d at 896.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1991). For the text of § 24-2, see supra note 6.
48. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 160, 409 S.E.2d at 896. The alternative would have been to
interpret "entire interest" to mean the interest under the note together with the late fee. See
infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
49. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 158, 409 S.E.2d at 895; see supra text accompanying notes 35-
36.
50. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 161, 409 S.E.2d at 897.
51. The court of appeals did not consider the effect of the usury savings clause.
52. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 160, 409 S.E.2d at 896.
53. Id.
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providing for a subsequent reduction in the interest rate or late payment
charge.
5 4
Before Swindell, the North Carolina courts had not addressed either
the issue of whether a late payment fee is "interest" so as to fit within the
penalty provision of the usury statutes or the proper penalty for charging
a late payment fee above the legal maximum. Three areas that the courts
previously have addressed are helpful in understanding Swindell: (1) the
role and method of the courts in their construction of the usury stat-
utes;55 (2) the differences between interest and fees;56 and (3) the reme-
dies given without express statutory authorization for violations of other
usury statutes.57
It is well-settled in North Carolina that usury regulation is the prov-
ince of the legislature; the court's role is limited to interpreting and ap-
plying the "'legislative will.' " North Carolina courts consistently
have held that the penalty provisions must be construed strictly and that
a court may not grant relief other than that provided by the statutes.5 9
There is disparity, however, over whether certain transactions should be
included within the usury statutes. Some cases indicate that courts
should construe the statutes strictly to ensure that sanctions are levied
only for the "extraction or reception of more than a specified legal rate
for the hire of money, and not for anything else."'  Other cases, in con-
trast, have enlarged the scope of the usury laws6 out of concern for the
borrower.62
54. Id.
55. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 63-78 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
58. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 156, 409 S.E.2d at 894 (quoting Smith v. Old Dominion Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n, 119 N.C. 249, 256, 26 S.E. 41, 42 (1896)).
59. See Auto Fin. Co. v. Simmons, 247 N.C. 724, 728, 102 S.E.2d 119, 122-23 (1958)
(stating that the court cannot give more relief than the forfeiture that the statute prescribes);
Argo Air, Inc. v. Scott, 18 N.C. App. 506, 512, 197 S.E.2d 256, 259 (1973) (same).
60. Hansen v. Jonas W. Kessing Co., 15 N.C. App. 554, 555, 190 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1972)
(citing Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Hanner, 268 N.C. 668, 672, 151 S.E.2d 579, 581 (1966)); see
also Anderson v. Pamlico Chem. Co., 470 F. Supp. 12, 15 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (stating that the
North Carolina usury statutes should be construed strictly).
61. See e.g., Western Auto Supply Co. v. Vick, 303 N.C. 30, 37, 277 S.E.2d 360, 366
(noting that when a transaction involving chattel paper is "structured in such a manner that its
essential character is masked" the court will "look beneath the formality of the activity to
determine whether.., it is, in fact, usurious"), affid on reh'g, 304 N.C. 191, 283 S.E.2d 181
(1981); See also Susan P. McAllister, Note, Judicially Imposed Penalties in the Absence of
Statutory Penalties: Can Freedom of Contract Co-Exist with Public Policy After Merrit v.
Knox?, 68 N.C. L. REy. 1021, 1026 n.53 (1990) (stating that courts have looked beyond the
nomenclature to bring essentially usurious transactions within the statutes).
62. Courts have viewed the usury statutes as designed to protect the borrower who is a
"'victim of the rapacious lender.'" Carolina Indus. Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 340,
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The second issue addressed by the courts is the difference between
interest and fees. Prior to the enactment of specific statutes regulating
maximum late payment fees and origination fees, courts often classified
fees as interest in order to bring them within the existing usury statutes.
In Smith v. Old Dominion Building & Loan Ass'n,63 the lender had col-
lected $20 in fines for nonpayment.6 The court stated that" '[a] penalty
or fine for nonpayment is interest.' "65 Likewise, in Henderson v. Secur-
ity Mortgage & Finance Co.,66 the court held that if a lender charges the
borrower a flat fee for making the loan, then that charge is interest no
matter what "'disguise it may assume.' "67
In 1982, the North Carolina Supreme Court in In re Foreclosure of
Bonder68 seemed to state that the statutory section entitled "Maximum
fees on loans secured by real property"'69 did not extend to "the separate
and different issue of interest rates."7 In Bonder, the borrower and
lender executed a $50,000 home loan7" containing a due-on-sale clause.72
The lender stated that it would agree to a sale of the home and note only
with an interest rate increase.7 3 After the borrower sold the house, the
lender refused payment from the new owners and initiated foreclosure
proceedings.74 The borrower defended partly on the ground that the in-
terest rate increase would be more than the $400 maximum alienation fee
132 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1963) (quoting GMAC v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 70, 262 S.W. 425,
428 (1924)). But see Moore, supra note 2, at 763 ("This justification ... has little basis in
fact.").
63. 119 N.C. 257, 26 S.E. 41 (1896).
64. Id. at 258, 26 S.E. at 42.
65. Id. at 259, 26 S.E. at 42 (quoting Meroney v. Atlanta Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 116 N.C.
882, 922, 21 S.E. 924, 937 (1895)). The common law in most jurisdictions, however, did not
consider such a fee to be included in interest because the borrower could avoid the fee simply
by paying promptly. William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for
Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale
and Loan Transactions, 70 VA. L. REv. 1083, 1095 (1984).
66. 273 N.C. 253, 160 S.E.2d 39 (1968).
67. Id. at 263, 160 S.E.2d at 46 (quoting Doster v. English, 152 N.C. 339, 341, 67 S.E.
754, 755 (1910)).
68. 306 N.C. 451, 293 S.E.2d 798 (1982).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10 (1991). The late fee statute, before the general assembly
switched it to section 24-10.1, was embodied by § 24-10(e). See supra note 19.
70. Bonder, 306 N.C. at 462, 293 S.E.2d at 805.
71. Id. at 452, 293 S.E.2d at 799.
72. Id. at 459, 293 S.E.2d at 803. A "due-on-sale clause' is a "provision... whereby the
entire debt becomes due and payable at mortgagee's option upon sale of mortgaged property."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (6th ed. 1990).
73. The lender wanted to increase the rate from 7.75% to 12%. Bonder, 306 N.C. at 452-
53, 293 S.E.2d at 799.
74. Id. at 453, 293 S.E.2d at 800.
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allowed under statute.75 The court noted, however, that since the parties
could agree to any interest rate,76 the lender legally could use a due-on-
sale clause to obtain a higher interest rate from potential buyers.77 The
court simply stated that an alienation fee and the increase in interest rate
in this case were distinct; it never held that a "fee" could not be consid-
ered "interest" so as to invoke section 24-2.78
The third area the North Carolina courts have examined is the
availability of the remedy prescribed in section 24-2 of the North Caro-
lina General Statutes without express statutory authorization. In Kessing
v. National Mortgage Corp. , the lender, in order to execute a $250,000
loan at the maximum legal rate of eight percent, 0 required the borrower
to enter into a partnership agreement naming the lender as a limited
partner with a one-quarter interest."1 The lender also required that the
borrower convey the property secured by the deed of trust pursuant to
the loan to the partnership. 2 The court found that the transfer of the
partnership share violated a statute prohibiting, on a loan of less than
$300,000, the transfer of a "'thing of value or other consideration'"
other than the pledged security, fees, and interest.8 3 As with a late pay-
ment fee violation, an express remedy for the additional transfer did not
exist. The court, however, held without debate that the partnership
share was "interest" on the loan 4 and that the lender, under the penalty
statute, must forfeit the entire interest carried by the note, which in-
cluded both the usurious partnership share and the eight percent stated
75. Id. at 462, 293 S.E.2d at 804. The statute states that a lender "may charge to [one] ...
that assumes a loan, secured by real property, ... [w]here the.., deed of trust contains a due
on sale clause, a fee not to exceed four hundred dollars." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10(d)(1)
(1991).
76. Parties may agree on any interest rate for a home loan greater than $10,000. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1A(a) (1991).
77. Bonder, 306 N.C. at 459, 293 S.E.2d at 803.
78. To hold otherwise would be contrary to prior law. See supra notes 63-67 and accom-
panying text. The facts of Swindell are different from those of Bonder in that the restriction on
late payment fees was expressly applicable to the Swindells' loan. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-
10.1 (1991).
79. 278 N.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 823 (1971).
80. The legal rate for a loan of $300,000 or less is eight percent. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 24-8 (1991).
81. Kessing, 278 N.C. at 526, 180 S.E.2d at 825. The lender paid only $25 for this share.
Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 531, 180 S.E.2d at 828 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-8 (1991)).
84. The lender's president testified that, with the expected profits from the partnership,




In State Wholesale Supply, Inc. v. Allen,8 6 a seller of goods charged
past due accounts a two percent per month "service charge" that was
above the legal maximum for the unpaid balance in open-end credit
transactions.87 After concluding that the charge was not actually a
higher credit price, 8 the court held that the service charge was the cost
of seller's forbearance of collecting the payment.8 9 Thus, the charge was
interest and the seller had to forfeit the entire two percent under section
24-2.90
In light of these prior decisions, the Swindell court's holding that
the usury savings clause could not shield the note from the usury statutes
is not surprising. The North Carolina courts and legislature consistently
have viewed usury statutes as protection for borrowers from lenders' op-
pression.91 As the Swindell court reasoned, a usury savings clause would
permit a lender to intentionally draft usurious contracts, and a bor-
rower's only protection would be his own knowledge of the usury stat-
utes.92 The clause would bring the interest and charges on the note
within the limits set by the legislature only if the borrower were to bring
it to the lender's attention. If the borrower did not know that the charge
was in violation of the law, the illegal charge would never be chal-
lenged.93 Furthermore, even if the borrower were to discover the statu-
tory violation, there would be no penalty imposed upon the overreaching
lender. Enforcing such a clause would undercut directly the protection
that the legislature has provided for the borrower by forgiving lenders for
85. Id. at 532, 180 S.E.2d at 829. "It becomes simply a loan which in law bears no inter-
est." Id.
86. 30 N.C. App. 272, 227 S.E.2d 120 (1976).
87. Id. at 274, 227 S.E.2d at 122. The statute states that the maximum charge of "inter-
est, finance charges or other fees" is a total of one and one-half percent. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 24-11 (1991).
88. A vendor may have one credit price and one cash price without violating the usury
laws. Carolina Indus. Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 338, 132 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1963).
89. Allen, 30 N.C. App. at 280, 227 S.E.2d at 126.
90. Id. at 280-81, 227 S.E.2d at 126.
91. See, e.g., Pinnix v. Maryland Casualty Co., 214 N.C. 760, 768, 200 S.E. 874, 879
(1939); Moore v. Woodward, 83 N.C. 531, 533 (1880); see supra notes 61-62 and accompany-
ing text. The North Carolina General Assembly has stated, "It is the paramount public policy
of North Carolina to protect... borrowers through application of North Carolina interest
laws." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2.1 (1991).
92. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 160, 409 S.E.2d at 896. See supra notes 52-53 and accompany-
ing text.
93. The majority of borrowers never know there is a violation of the usury statutes. Ami-
cus Curiae Brief for the North Carolina Clients Counsel at 12, Swindell (No. 70PA90).
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their overreaching.94 Thus, finding the usury savings clause to be invalid
conforms with existing law and policy by deterring lenders from taking
advantage of borrowers.
The Swindell court's requirement that the lender forfeit only the late,
payment fee, however, does not further the policy concerns underlying
the usury statutes. Section 24-2 provides the teeth of the general assem-
bly's protection for borrowers." Kessing and Allen provide precedent for
finding charges similar to the late fee to be interest for the purposes of
invoking the penalty statute.96 The Swindell court then, by holding that
the late payment fee, once invoked, became part of the "entire interest"
on the loan itself, could have required the forfeiture of both the stated
interest on the $112,500 principal and the five percent late payment fee.
97
The court instead divided the loan into two transactions, the loan and the
late payment fee.98 After finding the late payment charge to be usurious
interest itself, the court required forfeiture of the late fee only.99 The
Swindell holding, as compared with Kessing, provides less deterrence to a
lender.
For example, the remedy for usury is either a forfeiture of the inter-
est on a loan or the return of double the interest already paid. 100 If after
executing a note with monthly payments of $1500 and a late fee of five
percent, a borrower discovers the late fee is usurious, she would have
three avenues to challenge the usurious charge under the Swindell hold-
ing. First, the borrower could sue the lender for violating the late fees
94. The legislature has gone so far as to say that any usury statute that would interfere
with the protection of the borrower should not be enforced. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2.1 (1991).
95. Id. § 24-2 (1991). The forfeiture provision is "intended to induce an observance of the
statute." Moore v. Woodward, 83 N.C. 531, 533 (1880).
96. Section 24-2 provides a remedy for the "taking, receiving, reserving or charging a
greater rate of interest" than permitted by law. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1991) (emphasis
added). For the text of § 24-2, see supra note 6. The "interest" in Kessing was a requirement
that the borrower sell the lender a partnership share at a favorable price. Kessing v. National
Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 522, 531, 180 S.E.2d 823, 828 (1971); see supra notes 79-85 and
accompanying text. The "interest" in Allen was a service charge on past due accounts in open-
ended credit transactions. State Wholesale Supply v. Allen, 30 N.C. App. 272, 280, 227 S.E.2d
120, 126 (1976); see supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. Neither differs greatly from the
late payment fee in Swindell.
97. The remedy for charging a rate of interest greater than that allowed by law is "a
forfeiture of the entire interest" on the note. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1991). In Kessing, the
lender was forced to forfeit both the usuriously gained partnership share and the stated interest
on the loan. Kessing, 278 N.C. at 532, 180 S.E.2d at 829.
98. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 158, 409 S.E.2d at 895; see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying
text.
99. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 161, 409 S.E.2d at 897; see supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (1991). For the text of § 24-2, see supra note 6.
statute.° 1 If the borrower had never paid a late payment fee, her remedy
would be the lender's forfeiture of the right to collect such fees in the
future. Thus, the borrower, assuming she makes prompt payments,
would pay attorneys' fees to receive a useless remedy.
Second, the borrower could withhold a monthly payment and de-
fend against an action brought by the lender, on the grounds that the late
fee violates the statute.102 In this case, a court would rule that the lender
must forfeit the right to the late fee, but is entitled to the principal and
interest under the note. In other words, the borrower would be in the
same position as if she paid on time.
The third possible course of action for the borrower would be to
submit a late payment with the five percent fee. The borrower then could
sue to obtain double the interest paid. Under these facts, however, the
court could only award the borrower $150103 and order the forfeiture of
the lender's right to future late payments. After subtracting attorneys'
fees, such an action is not likely to be profitable enough for a borrower to
challenge the late payment charge. Thus, under the holding of Swindell,
few borrowers, once discovering a usurious late charge, will take advan-
tage of the protection provided by the statutes because there is little eco-
nomic incentive to do so." Without vigorous private enforcement,
1 0 5
the late fee statute will not deter a lender from charging a usurious rate.
Furthermore, the court's classification may have created a problem
separate from the lack of deterrence. In support of its position that the
late payment fee was a separate transaction, the court demonstrated that
the fee met the four elements of usury. The elements of usury, before
Swindell, were clearly established as: "[1] a loan or forbearance of
money, [2] an understanding that the money loaned will be returned, [3]
payment or agreement to pay a rate of interest greater than that allowed
by law, and [4] a corrupt intent to take a greater" rate than legally al-
lowed."0 6 Swindell broadened the first element's concept of forbearance
and loosened the required understanding in the second element from one
101. The basis for the suit today would be N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.1 (1991).
102. If the loan were secured pursuant to a mortgage or deed of trust, the borrower would
face the possibility of foreclosure as well.
103. Five percent of $1500 is $75, doubled to $150.
104. "On an incremental basis, a challenge to excessive late charges is too expensive for
individual borrowers to maintain." Amicus Curiae Brief for the North Carolina Clients Coun-
sel at 13, Swindell (No. 70PA90).
105. The majority of borrowers never know that there is a violation of the usury statutes.
Id. at 12. This coupled with lack of economic justification to sue will result in little private
enforcement.
106. Western Auto Supply Co. v. Vick, 303 N.C. 30, 37, 277 S.E.2d 360, 366, afl'd on
reh'g, 304 N.C. 191, 283 S.E.2d 181 (1981).
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that the "money loaned will be returned""1 7 to one that "the money owed
will bepaid."1 8 By subtly changing the second element, the court, con-
trary to the general assembly's intent, may have opened the door for at-
tacks of late payment charges not connected with notes.
Most jurisdictions have held that late payment fees on bills of any
sort are not subject to usury statutes." Even the North Carolina Court
of Appeals in State ex. rel. Utilities Commission v. North Carolina Con-
sumers Council"' held that a late fee on a public utility was not subject
to usury laws because the charge was not to compensate forbearance but
to avoid discrimination among customers by forcing the delinquent ones
to bear collection costs."' Outside this regulated area, however, the jus-
tifications for the fee are not as strong. For example, were a case to
appear in North Carolina with a contract between a customer and a
health club, calling for $10 per month dues with a $10 fee on each late
payment, 12 the elements of usury as applied by the Swindell court might
be broad enough to subject the contract to the usury statutes. 113 First,
the late payment fee, while not a loan as in Swindell, is not solely a pen-
alty to encourage prompt payment but also compensation for the for-
bearance of the party owed. Second, it is likely that a customer and
health club who sign a contract understand that the dues will be paid.
Third, a $10 late fee on $10 dues equals 100% interest, well above the
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 159, 409 S.E.2d at 895 (emphasis added). It is uncertain
whether the court in Swindell intentionally changed the second requirement. By relaxing the
element, though, the late payment fee fits more tightly into the requirement. Because the court
divided the loan into two separate transactions including the home loan for $112,500 and the
money to compensate for delayed payments, the lenders technically never loaned money to the
Swindells in the second transaction. Swindell, 330 N.C. at 158, 409 S.E.2d at 895. Therefore,
the Swindells could not return the late fee.
109. See eg., Ferguson v. Electric Power Bd., 378 F. Supp. 787, 790 (E.D. Tenn 1974)
(electric service bill); Smith v. Figure World Plus, Inc. 288 Ark. 355, 356, 705 S.W.2d 432, 433
(1986) (health club membership); In re Foreclosure of Ritter, 133 A.D.2d 988, 989, 521
N.Y.S.2d 140, 141 (1987) (water and sewer assessments); Wilson v. Dealy, 222 Tenn. 196, 200,
434 S.W.2d 835, 837 (1968) (employment agency fee); Tygrett v. University Gardens Home-
owners' Ass'n, 687 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (assessment by condominium home-
owners' association).
110. 18 N.C. App. 717, 198 S.E.2d 98 (1972), disc. rev. denied, 248 N.C. 124, 199 S.E.2d
663 (1973).
111. Id. at 721, 198 S.E.2d at 101 (citing Coffet v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 248 Ark.
313, 317, 451 S.W.2d 881, 883-84 (1970)).
112. These facts are based on Smith v. Figure World Plus, Inc., 288 Ark. 355, 705 S.W.2d
432 (1986); see supra note 109.
113. Such a scenario would not be governed by the late payment fee statute, which governs
such fees only on loans or notes. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.1 (1991). The transaction
would be under the statute setting the maximum rate for contract and fees. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 24-1.1 (1991).
maximum legal rate. 4 Fourth, the only corrupt intent that would have
to be shown is that the health club knew it was charging a $10 late fee.
Thus, by calling a late payment fee "compensation" and stretching the
second of the four usury elements,1 15 the court quite possibly has brought
more transactions under the usury statutes than the general assembly
intended.'
1 6
While the Swindell court did not alter the decision of the court of
appeals,"1 7 it furnished a statutory justification for the lower court's hold-
ing. Both the supreme court's methodology and its final decision, how-
ever, appear to be inconsistent with the concerns underlying the statutes.
In its reasoning, the court possibly enlarged the scope of transactions
covered by the usury laws beyond that intended by the legislature. In its
result, the court failed to deter the "rapacious lender.""' If the court
wanted to grant a small penalty for charging a usurious late fee, it simply
should have affirmed the court of appeals' decision. To provide true pro-
tection for the borrower, as the North Carolina courts and legislature
have done in the past, the better result would have been to include the
late fee, when invoked, in the "entire interest" on the loan. Charging a
late payment fee above the legal maximum rate would then result in the
forfeiture of all the loan's interest. Such a rule would encourage both
enforcement by borrowers and compliance by lenders.
S. GRAHAM ROBINSON
114. The maximum legal rate where the principal is less than $25,000 will roughly be the
noncompetitive rate for the six-month U.S. Treasury Bill plus six percent as of the fifteenth of
the previous calendar month or 16%, whichever is greater. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1 (1991).
115. See supra text accompanying note 39.
116. Leases and rental agreements on property are already governed by another statute
requiring that the late payment fee be less than five percent of the payment due. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 42-46 (Supp. 1991). There are other fees, however, that now may be open to attack
through use of the usury laws.
117. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
118. Carolina Indus. Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 340, 132 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1963);
see supra note 62.
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Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Electrical Co.: The North Carolina
Supreme Court Rewrites Subcontractors' Statutory Lien Rights*
Traditionally, North Carolina property owners have assumed that
the law required them to pay for construction work only once. That
assumption was based on the prevailing interpretation of the North Car-
olina statutes that provide for subcontractors' mechanic's liens.1 Ac-
cording to that interpretation, a subcontractor could not obtain a lien
against the owner's real property if the owner had already paid the con-
tractor for the work. In Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Electric Co.,2 how-
ever, the North Carolina Supreme Court abandoned tradition and
interpreted those statutes as providing such a lien; as a result, property
owners may have to pay twice for the same construction work.
To illustrate the application of the statutes at issue in Electric Sup-
ply, assume the following hypothetical: Owner hires Contractor to build
a concert hall. Contractor in turn contracts with Subcontractor' to per-
form all of the plumbing work on the construction project for $20,000.
Subcontractor buys the required plumbing supplies from Materialman4
on credit, amassing a bill of $10,000.1 The parties in this hypothetical
can secure their debts via various chapter 44A sections. First, section
44A-18 of the North Carolina General Statutes grants to each subcon-
tractor "who furnished labor or materials at the site of the improvement
... a lien on funds which are owed to [the party] with whom the...
subcontractor dealt and which arise out of the improvement on which
* After this Note was written, the statute which the Electric Supply court interpreted
was amended by the North Carolina General Assembly in an attempt to prevent some of the
negative consequences which this Note suggests will result from the Electric Supply holding.
Act of July 22, 1992, ch. 1010, § -, 1992 N.C. Sess. Laws -. The amendment leaves the
holding intact but requires the North Carolina General Statutes Commission to study the
statute, including the recent amendment and the issues involved in the Electric Supply case,
and make a recommendation to the 1993 North Carolina General Assembly. Id.
1. A mechanic's lien is "a claim created by state statutes for the purpose of securing
priority of payment of the price or value of work performed and materials furnished in erect-
ing, improving, or repairing a building or other structure." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 981
(6th ed. 1990).
The statutes which provide for subcontractors' mechanics liens are set forth in North
Carolina General Statutes chapter 44A, article 2, part 2. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44A-17 to -24
(1989).
2. 328 N.C. 651, 403 S.E.2d 291 (1991).
3. Chapter 44A refers to Subcontractor in this hypothetical as "first tier subcontractor."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-17(2) (1989).
4. Chapter 44A refers to Materialman in this hypothetical as "second tier subcontrac-
tor." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-17(4) (1989).
5. This example will be used throughout this Note for illustrative purposes and will be
referred to as the "Concert Hall" example.
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the... subcontractor worked or furnished materials."6 Section 44A-18
also provides a lower-tier subcontractor the right by subrogation to en-
force the lien rights of the parties above him in the construction chain so
that each subcontractor can obtain a lien on funds in the hands of the
owner.' To perfect this lien, the subcontractor must give written notice
to the "obligor." 8 If the obligor still owes funds when he receives the
notice, he must retain those funds, up to the amount claimed in the no-
tice, for the benefit of the claiming subcontractor,9 but if the obligor al-
ready has paid the total amount due when he receives notice, the
subcontractor will not have a lien on funds.10
To secure his debts, a subcontractor also may rely on section 44A-
23, the statute in question in Electric Supply. It provides that a subcon-
tractor "may, to the extent of his claim, enforce the lien of the contrac-
tor."" The contractor's lien, to which the subcontractor is subrogated
under section 44A-23, is a lien on the owner's real property "to the ex-
tent of his claim" at the time the claim of lien is filed. 2
For twenty years, the construction industry has construed section
44A-23's "to the extent of his claim" provision to mean to the extent of
the claiming subcontractor's claim of lien on funds against the owner,
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-18(I) (1989). Section 44A-18 allows Materialman to obtain a
lien on funds that Contractor owes to Subcontractor. It also enables Subcontractor to obtain a
lien on funds that Owner owes to Contractor. This Note will refer to the lien provided in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 44A-18 as a "lien on funds." For a more thorough discussion of a subcontrac-
tor's lien rights, see infra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-18(2), (3) (1989). Subrogation is the "substitution of one
person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right, so that he
who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its
rights, remedies or securities." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (6th ed. 1990). This right of
subrogation allows Materialman, to the extent of his lien on funds against Contractor, to en-
force Subcontractor's lien against funds which Owner owes Contractor.
8. "'Obligor' means an owner, contractor or subcontractor in any tier who owes money
to another as a result of the other's partial or total performance of a contract to improve real
property." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-17(3) (1989). The obligor for Materialman's lien is Con-
tractor, and the obligor for Subcontractor's lien is Owner.
9. Id. § 44A-20(a) (1989). If Contractor receives from Materialman a notice of lien stat-
ing that Subcontractor owes Materialman $10,000 when Contractor still owes any amount to
Subcontractor, Contractor must withhold for the benefit of Materialman $10,000 from any
future payment to Subcontractor.
10. Mace v. Bryant Constr. Corp., 48 N.C. App. 297, 305, 269 S.E.2d 191, 196 (1980);
Lewis-Brady Builders Supply v. Bedros, 32 N.C. App. 209, 211, 231 S.E.2d 199, 200 (1977). If
Contractor already has paid Subcontractor in full when he receives notice from Materialman,
he is under no obligation to Materialman, and Materialman does not have a lien on funds.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-23 (1989).
12. Id. § 44A-18(2) (1989). For a discussion of the contractor's lien, see Edmund T. Ur-
ban & James W. Miles, Jr., Mechanics' Liens for the Improvement of Real Property: Recent
Developments in Perfection, Enforcement, and Priority, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 283, 287-
351 (1976).
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rather than to the extent that the claiming subcontractor is owed money
by the contractor with whom he dealt regardless of whether the contrac-
tor is still owed any money for the project."3 In other words, section
44A-23 merely provides a method for a subcontractor to enforce his lien
on funds against the owner's real property, as provided by 44A-18(6), not
a lien separate and independent from the lien on funds.
1 4
The construction industry, according to the North Carolina
Supreme Court, has been operating under a false assumption. In Electric
Supply the supreme court held that section 44A-23 in fact provides sub-
contractors a lien on the owner's real property separate and independent
from a lien on funds provided in section 44A-18.11 Thus, a subcontrac-
tor's section 44A-23 lien is limited only by the amount the owner owes
the contractor.
1 6
So before the Electric Supply decision, Materialman in the foregoing
hypothetical1 could not obtain a lien against Contractor or Owner if
Contractor did not owe Subcontractor. This was true even if Owner
owed Contractor. A party's lien rights only extended so far up the con-
struction chain as payments were owing down the construction chain.
Therefore, the fact that Contractor did not owe Subcontractor created a
break in the chain of payments, preventing Materialman from obtaining
a lien against Contractor or any party above Contractor in the chain.
Under the Electric Supply court's interpretation of the statute, a break in
the payment chain does not affect a lien against Owner's real property.
Materialman may obtain such a lien even if Owner already has paid Con-
tractor for the work Materialman provided.
This Note examines the development of subcontractors' lien rights
in North Carolina and the policy behind the 1971 enactment of sections
44A-17 through 44A-23 of the North Carolina General Statutes.1 It
argues that the Electric Supply court reached the incorrect result by fail-
ing to consider important legislative history and by failing to analyze
thoroughly the uncertainty and the increase in construction costs that
13. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
14. The construction industry's interpretation means that if a subcontractor is not able to
obtain a lien on funds against the owner, he will not be able to enforce the contractor's lien
against the owner's real property. For a discussion of how the construction industry construed
the statutes, see infra note 89 and accompanying text.
15. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 660, 403 S.E.2d at 297.
16. According to the Electric Supply court's interpretation, even though a subcontractor is
not able to obtain a lien on funds against the owner, he still can obtain a lien on the owner's
real property. In some circumstances, this interpretation may require an owner to pay for the
same work twice. For an illustration, see infra note 86 and accompanying text.
17. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 57-102 and accompanying text.
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may result from its interpretation.19 The Note asserts that the legislative
history the court neglected to consider strongly supports the construction
industry's interpretation and shows that the negative consequences of the
court's decision are the very ills that the statutory scheme was designed
to cure.20 Finally, this Note recommends that the legislature revise the
statute to conform to the industry's longstanding interpretation.
21
In 1986, Winstons Venture I (Venture) hired Davidson and Jones
Construction Company (Davidson and Jones) to build a Comfort Inn
motel in Durham.22 Davidson and Jones hired Swain Electric Company,
Inc. (Swain) to install electrical systems, and Swain in turn contracted
with Electric Supply Company of Durham, Inc. (Electric Supply) to sup-
ply electrical materials.2 3 From December 9, 1986 to May 5, 1987, Elec-
tric Supply supplied materials valued at $20,718.11 to Swain.2" On May
18, after receiving no payment for these materials, Electric Supply filed
and served on Swain, Davidson and Jones, and Venture a notice of claim
of lien and a claim of lien.25 At this time, Davidson and Jones did not
owe any money to Swain, and Swain abandoned the job.26 On October 2,
1987, Electric Supply, enforcing its claim of lien, filed suit against Ven-
ture and Davidson and Jones, claiming all liens available to it under
chapter 44A of the North Carolina General Statutes.27
Because Davidson and Jones did not owe Swain any money at or
after the time that Electric Supply gave notice of claim of lien, Electric
Supply had no lien rights under section 44A-18.2" Nevertheless, Electric
Supply asserted that it had the right to enforce Davidson and Jones' lien
pursuant to section 44A-23, regardless of the lack of a lien on funds. It
read section 44A-23 as providing a subcontractor a lien separate and in-
dependent from a lien on funds, and not limiting a subcontractor's lien
rights to section 44A-18. Rejecting this interpretation, the trial court
adopted Davidson and Jones' interpretation that a subcontractor's lien
under section 44A-23 was dependent upon his having a lien on funds
against the owner, 29 and consequently, that Electric Supply had no lien
19. See infra notes 103-34 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 106-11, 126-27 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
22. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 652-53, 403 S.E.2d at 292-93.
23. Id. at 653, 403 S.E.2d at 293.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. Swain later filed bankruptcy. Id.
27. Id.
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-18(2) (1989).
29. The trial court's interpretation was in line with industry understanding, as discussed
infra note 89 and accompanying text.
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rights.30 The court of appeals, however, reversed,"' and a five-justice ma-
jority of the supreme court affirmed, holding that subcontractors have a
right of subrogation to the contractor's lien on property independent of a
lien on funds provided by section 44A-18.12
Justice Meyer, writing for the majority, initially recognized that
prior to the enactment of sections 44A-17 through 44A-23 in 1971, sub-
contractors had a right to a lien by subrogation to the contractor's lien
on the owner's real property, regardless of whether the party with whom
the subcontractor dealt was owed funds for the subcontractor's work.33
In analyzing whether the 1971 General Assembly intended to maintain
this "well-settled right" in addition to providing the new lien on funds,
the court found inconclusive the arguments of both parties with respect
to the plain meaning and the structure of the legislation34 and declined to
give any weight to legislative history presented in the amicus curiae Car-
olinas AGC, Inc. brief. 35 The court instead relied on an analysis of the
30. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 654, 403 S.E.2d at 293.
31. Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Elec. Co., 97 N.C. App. 479, 482, 389 S.E.2d 128, 131
(1990), aff'd, 328 N.C. 651, 403 S.E.2d 291 (1991).
32. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 660-68, 403 S.E.2d at 296-301.
33. Id. at 655 n.2, 403 S.E.2d at 294 n.2 (citing Parnell-Martin Supply Co. v. High Point
Motor Lodge, 277 N.C. 312, 316, 177 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1970); Atlas Powder Co. v. Denton,
176 N.C. 426, 432-33, 97 S.E. 372, 374-75 (1918); Powell v. King Lumber Co., 168 N.C. 632,
638, 84 S.E. 1032, 1035 (1915); Borden Brick & Tile Co. v. Pulley, 168 N.C. 371, 375, 84 S.E.
513, 514 (1915)). Applying the state of the law prior to 1971 to the Concert Hall hypothetical,
see supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text, if Contractor already had paid Subcontractor in
full when he received notice from Materialman, that would not affect Materialman's right to
enforce Contractor's lien on Owner's property. For a discussion of the law prior to 1971, see
infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text.
34. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 657-59, 403 S.E.2d at 295-96. In addition to its plain
meaning argument, Swain maintained that an analysis of the structure of the statute revealed a
legislative intent consistent with its position. Id. at 658-59, 403 S.E.2d at 295-96. Observing
that § 44A-18 and § 44A-23 "were both grouped by the legislature under article 2, part 2 of
chapter 44A" entitled "Liens of Mechanics, Laborers and Materialmen Dealing with One
Other Than the Owner," Swain asserted that this structure shows a legislative intent to create
separate liens. Id. at 658, 403 S.E.2d at 295-96.
Disagreeing with Swain's arguments regarding structure, defendants and amicus curiae
Carolinas AGC, Inc. pointed out that the subcontractor's right of subrogation is articulated
expressly only in § 44A-18; § 44A-18(6) provides that these subrogation rights are perfected as
provided in § 44A-23. Id. at 658, 403 S.E.2d at 295. The court also pointed out that § 44A-
18(2) and (3) use the phrase "extent of his claim" to describe the subcontractor's lien by subro-
gation to the rights of parties above it in the construction chain. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 44A-18 (1989)).
35. Id. at 656-67, 403 S.E.2d at 295. Amicus curiae Carolinas AGC, Inc. urged the court
to consider a memorandum written by the attorney who drafted the 1985 amendment to
§ 44A-23. Id. The memorandum, which explained the amendment, was presented to the
House Judiciary Committee that considered the amendment. Minutes, North Carolina House
Comm. on Judiciary III dated June 11, 1985. Section 44A-23 was amended as follows:
Sec. 4. G.S. 44A-23 is amended by adding after the second sentence of that section a
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policy objectives that the legislature intended the lien provisions to
achieve.36
First, the court focused on the North Carolina Constitution's provi-
sion for lien laws:37 "The General Assembly shall provide by proper leg-
islation for giving to mechanics and laborers an adequate lien on the
subject-matter of their labor."3 Justice Meyer emphasized that because
the construction industry operates on credit, an adequate lien is essential
to the health of the industry to encourage the extension of credit.39 The
court also placed great weight on the constitutional provision specifying
that the lien should be on "'the subject-matter of [his] labor.' "I Ac-
cording to Justice Meyer, the defendant's interpretation of legislative in-
tent as providing a lien system based largely on funds would not achieve
new sentence to read: "The lien is perfected as of the time set forth in G.S. 44A-10
upon filing of claim of lien pursuant to G.S. 44A-12."
Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 702, § 4, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929. The memorandum explained the
effect of the amendment on section 44A-23 as follows:
The subcontractor may enforce [his] lien on funds by enforcing the lien of the con-
tractor who dealt directly with the owner against the property. Thus, the lien of the
subcontractor against funds owed to the contractor creates a second lien, against the
owner's property. Unlike the lien in favor of the contractor, however, this lien can be
perfected at any time whether or not the work has been performed and whether or
not the owner owes anything for the work. By filing the notice of lien, the subcon-
tractor can create a cloud on the owner's title at any time. In practice, many subcon-
tractors file this lien notice whenever they begin work on a project.
House Bill 1144 would provide that the notice of lien filed by the subcontractor per-
fects the subcontractor's lien against any funds owed to the contractor but does not
perfect a lien against the landowner's property. A subcontractor could only perfect
the lien against the owner's property in the same way as a contractor: by filing a
claim of lien after the owner's obligation to the contractor becomes mature. The lien
would then relate back to the time the subcontractor first furnished labor or materi-
als at the site.
Memorandum from Martha Harris, staff attorney for the North Carolina Legislative Services
Office, to Representative Boyd 1-2 (May 28, 1985) [hereinafter Harris Memorandum] (explain-
ing the effect of the § 44A-23 amendment).
The majority admitted that the memorandum supported amicus curiae Carolinas AGC,
Inc.'s interpretation of the statute, but refused to consider the memorandum for two reasons.
First, the court would not consider the "internal deliberations of committees of the legislature
considering proposed legislation." Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 657, 403 S.E.2d at 295 (citing
North Carolina Milk Comm'n v. National Food Stores, Inc., 270 N.C. 323, 332-33, 154 S.E.2d
548, 555 (1967)). Second, the court stated that the "memorandum, submitted nearly fourteen
years after the passage of the statute under review, would be [in]sufficiently persuasive to over-
turn what, prior to 1971, was a well-settled right of the subcontractor of subrogation to the
contractor's lien." Id. at 657, 403 S.E.2d at 295.
36. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 659-60, 403 S.E.2d at 296-97.
37. Id at 659, 403 S.E.2d at 296.
38. N.C. CONST. art. X, § 3, cited in Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 659, 403 S.E.2d at 296.
39. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 659, 403 S.E.2d at 296.
40. Id. (quoting N.C. CONST. art. X, § 3) (emphasis in original).
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this constitutional mandate.41
The majority then considered the practical consequences of both in-
terpretations.42 Defendants and amicus curiae Carolinas AGC, Inc. ar-
gued that since construction contracts commonly require the contractor
to indemnify the owner, Swain's interpretation of the statute would place
the costs of a defaulting subcontractor on the contractor.43 They also
argued that contractors would be forced to protect themselves by requir-
ing first-tier subcontractors to post payment bonds, which in turn would
raise construction costs and drive smaller subcontractors out of the
industry.'
Swain, on the other hand, argued that contractors are in the best
position to bear the burden of defaulting subcontractors. 45 The court,
rejecting the defendants' argument, seemed to adopt plaintiff's theory:
"by exercising greater supervisory responsibility over the first-tier sub-
contractor [whom he hired], the contractor can avert or at least minimize
losses [and] the need for payment bonds."'46 The court added that the
use of lien waivers also can lessen the contractor's liability.47 In light of
these policy considerations, the court held that section 44A-23 provides
first-, second-, and third-tier subcontractors a lien on real property sepa-
rate and distinct from a lien on funds, 48 despite the possibility that the
41. Id. at 659-69, 403 S.E.2d at 296.
42. Id. at 659-60, 403 S.E.2d at 296-97.
43. Id. An expansion of the Concert Hall facts, see supra notes 3-5 and accompanying
text, illustrates this burden. Assume that the contract between Owner and Contractor con-
tains an indemnity clause that requires Contractor to pay Owner any amounts that Owner is
forced to pay on the construction project above the amount of the contract. Suppose Owner
pays Contractor for all of the plumbing work, Contractor in turn pays Subcontractor in full,
and then Subcontractor goes out of business before paying Materialman. Allowing Material-
man to obtain a lien on Owner's property after Owner already paid Contractor for all the
plumbing work forces Owner to pay for the plumbing supplies twice, because he would have to
pay Materialman directly in order to discharge the lien, but the indemnity clause requires that
Contractor pay that amount back to Owner; thus Contractor ultimately pays for the plumbing
supplies twice.
44. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 660, 403 S.E.2d at 297. "[A] payment bond is an under-
taking by [a] surety to pay unpaid subcontractors and suppliers." JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING, AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS § 37.07 (3d
ed. 1985); see also STEVEN M. SIEGFRIED, INTRODUCTION TO CONSTRUCTION LAW § 4.09
(1987) (discussing the use of payment bonds to protect against subcontractors' liens). If a
subcontractor is a bad credit risk, and therefore cannot obtain payment bonds, it may be im-
possible for him to stay in operation. Others will have higher operating costs that will raise
construction costs. See Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 660, 403 S.E.2d at 297 (conceding that
payment bonds raise construction costs).
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owner may have to pay the same debt twice.49
To support his position that a section 44A-23 is dependent on a sec-
tion 44A-18 lien, Justice Martin, joined in his dissent by Justice Webb,
argued that the statutory requirement that a subcontractor give actual
written notice of a claim of lien to the parties above him in the construc-
tion chain50 suggests a legislative purpose to establish a tiered lien system
that would "limit[ ] a subcontractor's lien rights to those of the parties
above him."5" Justice Martin also asserted that the plain meaning of sec-
tion 44A-23 clearly supports this interpretation, apparently taking the
position that section 44A-23's "'to the extent of his claim'" means "to
the extent of his claim of lien." 2 Unlike the majority, the dissent was
persuaded by the legislative history cited in amicus curiae Carolinas
AGC, Inc.'s brief.5 3 Justice Martin interpreted the legislative history as
a clear indication that section 44A-23 requires a subcontractor to perfect
a lien on funds as a condition to obtaining a lien on the owner's property
by subrogation. 4  Justice Martin then contended that, in addition to the
plain meaning and legislative history of the statute, policy considerations
49. The majority stated:
Therefore, even if the owner has specifically paid the contractor for the labor or
materials supplied by the specific unpaid subcontractor who is claiming the lien, that
subcontractor retains a right of subrogation, to the extent of his claim, to whatever
lien rights the contractor otherwise has in the project.
Id. at 661, 403 S.E.2d at 298. Whether Venture will be subject to double liability depends on
the timing of Venture's final payment to Davidson in relation to the commencement of the
lawsuit. The court remanded the case to the trial court for a finding on the timing question.
Id. at 662, 403 S.E.2d at 297. Because § 44A-23 provides that the lien is not perfected until the
lien claimant commences the enforcement action, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-23 (1989), Electric
Supply will have a lien only if the trial court determines on remand that Electric Supply com-
menced the action before Venture made its final payment to Davidson and Jones. Electric
Supply, 328 N.C. at 661,403 S.E.2d at 297. If the trial court so finds that Electric Supply has a
lien on Venture's property after Venture already paid Davidson and Jones for the supplies that
Swain provided, Venture will have to pay that amount again, directly to Electric Supply, in
order to discharge the lien.
50. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 662-63, 403 S.E.2d at 298 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44A-18, -19, -20, -23 (1989)).
51. Id. at 662-63, 403 S.E.2d at 298 (Martin, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 664, 403 S.E.2d at 299 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 44A-23 (1989)). If § 44A-23 means that a subcontractor can enforce a contractor's lien on
the owner's property only to the extent of the subcontractor's claim of lien on funds, he would
not be able to obtain a lien on the property unless he is able to obtain a lien on funds.
53. Id. at 664-66, 403 S.E.2d at 299-300 (Martin, J., dissenting). Justice Martin reasoned
that a court should consider any legislative history in determining the intent of a statute, and
that the Harris Memorandum, supra note 35, is relevant because the statute under review is the
current version of § 44A-23, not the 1971 version. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 664-66, 403
S.E.2d at 299 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing Burgess v. Your House, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209,
338 S.E.2d 134, 136-37 (1990)).
54. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 666-67, 403 S.E.2d at 300-01 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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mandate that the court adopt the defendant's interpretation.55 Accord-
ing to Justice Martin, the claiming subcontractor is in a better position to
protect his interest by promptly filing a notice of claim of lien. 6 The
contrast between the opinion held by the majority and that held by the
dissent reflects differing interpretations of statutory language, policy, and
legislative history.
In analyzing a subcontractor's lien rights under section 44A-23, the
Electric Supply court interpreted a right that began with the 1880 enact-
ment of North Carolina General Statutes section 44-6.51 As the majority
noted, 8 the North Carolina Supreme Court consistently interpreted sec-
tion 44-6 as providing subcontractors lien rights by subrogation on the
owner's property, regardless of a break in the chain of payments.5 9 This
original statutory scheme also required that the contractor, before receiv-
55. Id. at 667, 403 S.E.2d at 301 (Martin, J., dissenting).
56. Justice Martin reasoned:
Public policy dictates that the party who has the ability to protect himself from loss
should do so, and if he fails to so act in his own behalf it is not appropriate to require
an innocent party to pay twice in order to make the negligent party whole. So here,
where the second tier subcontractor fails to properly file his claim of lien against
funds owed to the first tier subcontractor or the general contractor it would be ineq-
uitable to require the owner or the general contractor to again pay the amount
claimed by the plaintiff, that sum already having been paid to the defaulting first tier
subcontractor. Plaintiff here delayed some five months, from December until May,
before giving notice of its unpaid claim. The law as well as equity protects the general
contractor and the owner in this instance and does not require either to again pay in
order to benefit the negligent second tier subcontractor.
Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
57. Act of March 29, 1880, ch. 44, § 1, 1880 N.C. Sess. Laws 89 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-6 (1965), repealed by Act of July 16, 1971, ch. 880, § 2, 1971 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1395). Section 44-6 provided:
All subcontractors and laborers who are employed to furnish or who do furnish labor
or material for the building, repairing or altering of any house or other improvement
on real estate, have a lien on said house and real estate for the amount of such labor
done or material furnished, which lien shall be preferred to the mechanic's lien now
provided by law, when notice thereof shall be given as hereinafter provided, which
may be enforced as other liens in this chapter, except where it is otherwise provided;
but the sum total of all the liens due subcontractors and materialmen shall not exceed
the amount due the original contractor at the time of notice given.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-6 (1965) (repealed 1971). The legislature enacted this statute, explicitly
granting lien rights to subcontractors, in response to the harsh decision in Wilkie v. Bray, 71
N.C. 205 (1874), that a subcontractor had no lien rights under the general lien statute unless
he could prove a contract with the owner. Id. at 206-07. See Charles S. Mangum, Jr.,
Mechanic's Liens in North Carolina, 41 N.C. L. REV. 173, 186 n.75 (1963); Urban & Miles,
supra note 12, at 352.
58. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 655 n.2, 403 S.E.2d at 294 n.2.
59. See, e.g., Parnell-Martin Supply Co. v. High Point Motor Lodge, 277 N.C. 312, 316,
177 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1970); Atlas Powder Co. v. Denton, 176 N.C. 426, 433, 97 S.E. 372, 374-
75 (1918); Powell v. Lumber, 168 N.C. 632, 638, 84 S.E. 1032, 1034 (1915); Brick Co. v.
Pulley, 168 N.C. 371, 375-76, 84 S.E. 513, 515 (1915).
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ing payment from the owner, furnish the owner an itemized statement of
amounts he owed to any subcontractor he employed.' After receiving
such notice, the owner had to withhold those amounts from any payment
to the contractor and pay them directly to the subcontractors.61 This
requirement was intended to protect the owner from the double liability
that would result from a subcontractor's enforcing a lien on the owner's
land after the owner, unaware of the unpaid subcontractor, already had
paid the contractor in full.
In Atlas Powder Co. v. Denton 62 the North Carolina Supreme Court
applied section 44-6 to facts similar to those in Electric Supply.63 When a
second-tier subcontractor gave notice of lien, the first-tier subcontractor
owed the plaintiff second-tier subcontractor $1,526.67; the contractor
owed the first-tier subcontractor $1,028.69; and the owner owed the con-
tractor $75,830.43. 64 The supreme court held that the extent of the sec-
ond-tier subcontractor's lien rights should be determined by the amount
the owner owed the contractor without regard to whether the first-tier
subcontractor owed funds to the second-tier subcontractor.65 Because
the owner's debt to the contractor exceeded the amount the first-tier sub-
contractor owed the second tier-subcontractor, the second-tier subcon-
tractor had a lien for the full $1,526.67.66 As a result, the owner was
twice liable for the sum of $497.98 (the difference between $1,526.67 and
$1,028.69): once for the payment to the contractor before the second-tier
subcontractor filed notice, and once for the direct payment to the second-
tier subcontractor to satisfy the lien.67
With the adoption of North Carolina General Statute sections 44A-
17 through 44A-24 in 197 1,68 the legislature completely rewrote subcon-
tractors' lien laws in order to clarify ambiguities and to correct problems
resulting from the development of construction contracts into compli-
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-8 (1965) (repealed 1971).
61. Id.
62. 176 N.C. 426, 97 S.E. 372 (1918).
63. Id. at 430-33, 97 S.E. at 374-75.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 433, 97 S.E.2d at 375. The supreme court reversed the trial court's holding that
the second-tier subcontractor's lien rights were limited to the rights of the first-tier subcontrac-
tor, which equaled $1,028.69. See id. at 429, 97 S.E.2d at 373.
66. Id.
67. See Urban & Miles, supra note 12, at 359. Urban states that the 1971 statutory
scheme eliminates these kinds of inequities by limiting a subcontractor's lien rights to the
rights of the party with whom he dealt. Id. If a court decided Atlas Powder Co. under the
current statute, he notes, the second-tier subcontractor's lien would have been limited to
$1,028.69. Id.
68. Act of July 16, 1971, ch. 880, §§ 1-1.1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1391-95 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44A-17 to -24 (1989)).
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cated transactions involving several tiers of subcontractors. 9 Section
44A-18(1) grants to first-tier subcontractors7° a lien on funds owed by
the owner to the contractor that arise out of the project on which the
first-tier subcontractor worked. Section 44A-18(2) grants to second-
tier subcontractors 72 a lien on funds owed by the contractor to the first-
tier subcontractor that arise out of the project on which the second-tier
subcontractor worked.73 Section 44A-18(2) also grants to the second-tier
subcontractor the right to be subrogated to the first-tier subcontractor's
lien on funds.74 Section 44A-18(3) provides similar rights to third-tier
subcontractors. 75 In essence, the structure of section 44A-18 insures that
each subcontractor's lien on funds is limited by the rights of each party
standing between himself and the obligor76 against whom the subcontrac-
tor is asserting his lien.
77
To perfect this lien, the subcontractor must file written notice to the
obligor.7 8 If the obligor makes a payment before he receives the notice,
the subcontractor will not have a lien on funds.79 If the obligor receives
notice while still owing funds, however, he has the obligation to retain
any funds subject to the lien.80
69. Memorandum of the Drafting Committee on Lien Laws of the North Carolina General
Statutes Commission 3-5 (1971) [hereinafter Drafter's Memorandum] (explaining and support-
ing the bill proposed to enact §§ 44A-17 through -24) (on file at the North Carolina Supreme
Court Library).
70. "'First tier subcontractor' means a person who contracts with a contractor to im-
prove real property." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-17(2) (1989).
71. Id. § 44A-18(l) (1989). For explanations of how the current statute works, see JOHN
R. MILLER ET AL., NORTH CAROLINA CONSTRUCTION LAW 205-10 (1990); Urban & Miles,
supra note 12, at 356-58.
72. "'Second tier subcontractor' means a person who contracts with a first tier subcon-
tractor to improve real property." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-17(4) (1989).
73. Id. § 44A-18(2) (1989).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 44A-18(3) (1989).
76. "'Obligor' means an owner, contractor or subcontractor in any tier who owes money
to another as a result of the other's partial or total performance of a contract to improve real
property." Id. § 44A-17(3) (1989).
77. Suppose in the Concert Hall example, see supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text,
Materialman serves Contractor and Owner with a notice of claim of lien on funds in the
amount of $10,000. When Contractor receives the notice, she owes Subcontractor only $8000.
When Owner receives notice, it owes Contractor only $6000. Materialman's lien against Con-
tractor is for $8000 since that is the amount that Contractor owes Subcontractor.
Materialman also can be subrogated to Subcontractor's right to a lien on funds against
Owner. Subcontractor's lien against Owner is for only $6000 since that is the amount that
Owner owes Contractor. Thus, Materialman is entitled to be subrogated to a lien on funds
against Owner in the amount of $6000.
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-18(6) (1989).
79. Id.
80. Id.; Mace v. Bryant Constr. Corp., 48 N.C. App. 297, 305, 269 S.E.2d 191, 196
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Section 44A-23 also permits certain subcontractors to secure a lien
on the owner's real property by subrogation to the contractor's lien:
A first, second or third tier subcontractor, who gives notice as
provided in this article, may, to the extent of his claim, enforce
the lien of the contractor created by Part I of Article 2 of this
Chapter. The manner of such enforcement shall be as provided
by G.S. 44A-7 through 44A-16. The lien is perfected as of the
time set forth in G.S. 44A-10 upon filing of claim of lien pursu-
ant to G.S. 44A-12. Upon the filing of the notice and claim of
lien and the commencement of the action, no action by -the con-
tractor shall be effective to prejudice the rights of the subcon-
tractor without his written consent.81
The contractor has lien rights against the owner's real property only to
the extent that the owner owes the contractor for work performed on the
property. 82 The contractor can file a claim of lien up to 120 days after
the last work is performed on the project.83 The subcontractor is subject
to the same time limitation in filing his claim of lien, because section
44A-23 subrogates the subcontractor to the lien rights of the
contractor.84
As previously discussed,8" section 44A-23 is subject to two possible
interpretations. As in the Electric Supply result, one may read section
44A-23's provision "to the extent of his claim" to mean to the extent that
the claiming subcontractor is owed money by the person with whom he
dealt, regardless of a break in the payment chain. Electric Supply illus-
trates that this position can subject the owner to potential double liabil-
ity.86 The court refused to interpret "to the extent of his claim" as
(1980); Lewis-Brady Builders Supply v. Bedros, 32 N.C. App. 209, 211, 231 S.E.2d 199, 200
(1977); see supra notes 9-10.
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-23 (1989).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-8 (1989). For a discussion of the contractor's lien, see Urban
& Miles, supra note 12, at 287-351.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-12(b) (1989).
84. See Urban & Miles, supra note 12, at 375-76; JOHN R. MILLER ET AL, NORTH CARO-
LINA CONSTRUCTION LAW AND MECHANIC'S LIENS 188-89 (1987).
85. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
86. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 660-61, 403 S.E.2d at 297.
An expansion of the Concert Hall facts, see supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text, illus-
trates this possibility. Suppose Owner pays Contractor for all of the plumbing work, Contrac-
tor in turn pays Subcontractor in full, and then Subcontractor goes out of business before
paying Materialman. Materialman will not be able to obtain a lien on funds against Owner
because of the break in the payment chain between Contractor and Subcontractor. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 44A-18(2) (1989).
Under the interpretation that § 44A-23 provides a separate and independent lien from the
§ 44A-18 lien on funds, Materialman could obtain a lien on Owner's property to the extent
that Owner still owes Contractor for other work on the project. Owner would then have to
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meaning to the extent of the claiming subcontractor's claim of lien on
funds, 7 an interpretation that the construction industry had held since
1971 when the statute was enacted. 8 Under this interpretation, the
amount for which a subcontractor could obtain a section 44A-23 lien was
limited by the extent to which the subcontractor could secure by subro-
gation up the construction chain a lien on funds in the hands of the
owner.
8 9
Although North Carolina courts had applied section 44A-23 in sev-
eral cases, no case resolved the issue of whether a section 44A-23 lien is
dependent on a section 44A-18 lien. In Lewis-Brady Builders Supply v.
Bedros,90 for example, the owner owed no funds to the contractor when
the first-tier subcontractor filed his notice; therefore, the first-tier subcon-
tractor had no right to a lien on funds.9 In addition, the first-tier sub-
contractor was not entitled to a lien on the owner's real property
pursuant to section 44A-23. 92 This holding suggests that the lien on real
property is dependent on the existence of a lien on funds,93 but it is com-
patible also with the theory that section 44A-23 is independent from sec-
tion 44A-18, because the contractor's lien to which a subcontractor is
subrogated under section 44A-23 also depends on the owner's owing
pay Materialman directly to discharge the lien, and would thereby pay twice for the plumbing
materials.
87. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 360-61, 403 S.E.2d at 297.
88. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
89. See MILLER, supra note 84, at 188-90 ("No funds-no lien"); Edmund T. Urban, Fu-
ture Advances and Title Insurance Coverage, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 329, 339-40 n.35
(1979) (observing that the legislature "intended ... that lien rights against real property be
limited in amount to amounts lienable under N.C.G.S. § 44A-18(2) & (3) although § 44A-23
doesn't literally read that way"); Urban & Miles, supra note 12, at 359 (citing Atlas Powder
Co. v. Denton, 176 N.C. 426, 97 S.E. 372 (1918)) (noting that "Powder would be decided
differently under the present statute"); Martha Retchin, Attorneys Analyze Impact of Subcon-
tractor's Lien Ruling, N.C. LAw. WKLY., June 3, 1991, at 1, 4 (noting that a subcontractor's
lien by subrogation is limited to the liens available to those above him).
The Concert Hill facts, see supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text, as previously devel-
oped, supra note 86, illustrates the significance of this distinction.
Under the interpretation that § 44A-23 provides a lien separate and independent from the
§ 44A-18 lien on funds, Materialman could obtain a lien on Owner's property to the extent
that Owner still owes Contractor. But the interpretation that § 44A-23 requires a lien on
funds and is merely a way of enforcing that lien precludes Materialman from obtaining a
§ 44A-23 lien on Owner's property.
90. 32 N.C. App. 209, 231 S.E.2d 199 (1977), cited in Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 667,
403 S.E.2d at 301 (Martin, J. dissenting).
91. Builders Supply, 32 N.C. at 211-13, 231 S.E.2d at 200-01.
92. Id.
93. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 663, 403 S.E.2d at 298 (citing Builders Supply, 32 N.C.
App. at 211, 231 S.E.2d at 200).
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money to the contractor.94 Builders Supply, therefore, did not hold ex-
plicitly that a subcontractor's right of subrogation under section 44A-23
depends on his possession of rights under section 44A-18. 91
In another decision interpreting these statutes, Mace v. Bryant Con-
struction Corp. ,96 the first-tier subcontractor filed a claim of lien on the
owner's real property on August 26, 1974, and provided notice of this
claim of lien to the owner on October 4, 1974.17 In examining the plain-
tiff's possible lien rights under section 44A-23, the court found that on
April 17, 1973, the contractor waived his lien rights against the owner.9"
Since the contractor waived his lien rights prior to the subcontractor's
filing his claim of lien under section 44A-23, there was no lien to which
the subcontractor could be subrogated. 99
Similarly, when the Mace court analyzed the plaintiff's possible lien
rights under section 44A-18, it found that the owner owed no funds to
the contractor at the time the plaintiff filed his notice of claim of lien with
the owner, and no funds became due thereafter."°° This finding led to the
conclusion that the first-tier subcontractor plaintiff also had no lien
rights under section 44A-18.' 1° The Mace holding can be read consist-
ently with both the majority's and the dissent's interpretations in Electric
Supply. If section 44A-23 subrogation is dependent upon a valid lien on
funds pursuant to section 44A-18 (the losing argument in Electric Sup-
ply), the plaintiff in Mace could not assert a lien pursuant to section 44A-
23 because he did not have a lien on funds."0 2 If, on the other hand, the
Mace court viewed section 44A-23 as providing a lien independent and
separate from a lien on funds (the holding in Electric Supply), the lien
waiver executed by the contractor would prevent the plaintiff from ob-
taining a lien pursuant to section 44A-23.
94. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
95. Since the Builders Supply court did not decide squarely the issue involved in Electric
Supply, it neither helps nor hurts the dissent's argument.
96. 48 N.C. App. 297, 269 S.E.2d 191 (1980). Both the majority and the dissent in Elec-
tric Supply cite Mace in support of their respective interpretations. Electric Supply, 328 N.C.
at 659, 403 S.E.2d at 296 (citing Mace, 48 N.C. App. 297, 269 S.E.2d 191 (1980)); Id. at 663,
403 S.E.2d at 298 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing Mace, 48 N.C. App. 297, 269 S.E.2d 191
(1980)).
97. Mace, 48 N.C. App. at 305, 269 S.E.2d at 195-96.
98. Id. at 304, 269 S.E.2d at 195.
99. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-23 (1989).
100. Mace, 48 N.C. App. at 305-06, 269 S.E.2d at 195-96.
101. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-18 (1989).
102. Mace, 48 N.C. App. at 305-06, 269 S.E.2d at 195-96. The Mace court rested its hold-
ing regarding the lack of a § 44A-23 lien on the contractor's waiver of his lien rights, id. at
304, 269 S.E.2d at 195, but this does not necessarily mean that the court might not have rested
its holding on the lack of a lien on funds had there been no lien waiver.
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Although prior case law had not resolved the issue the Electric Sup-
ply court faced, other factors that the court either considered insuffi-
ciently or not at all suggest that the court reached the wrong result.
These factors include legislative history,
10 3 higher construction costs, 104
and uncertainty in the law.105 First, the court neglected to examine im-
portant legislative history of section 44A-23. A 1971 memorandum writ-
ten by the General Statutes Commission to the General Assembly
explaining the new statutory scheme under consideration strongly sug-
gests that the legislative intent conformed to the industry's understand-
ing rather than to the Electric Supply court's interpretation.
10 6
Explaining section 44A-23, the memorandum states: "This section pro-
vides a first, second, or third tier subcontractor who has given notice as
provided in the article may, to the extent of his lien, enforce the lien of
the contractor.""0 7 The use of the word "lien" instead of "claim" sug-
gests that the drafters intended to limit a subcontractor's rights under
section 44A-23 to the extent of his ability to perfect a lien on funds.108
The General Statutes Commission, however, seems to use the words
"claim" and "lien" interchangeably throughout the memorandum. In
another section the memorandum describes these same subrogation
rights as being "to the extent of [the subcontractor's] claim."' 0 9 The
Drafter's Memorandum's10 use of the word "lien" instead of "claim" to
explain the extent of the subcontractor's section 44A-23 lien supports the
argument that the General Assembly intended a section 44A-23 lien to
depend on a section 44A-18 lien.'
In addition to its failure to consider legislative history, the Electric
103. See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 122-34 and accompanying text.
106. Drafter's Memorandum, supra note 69, at 13-14. No party to the Electric Supply case
cited this memorandum in its brief to the supreme court and there is no evidence in the opinion
that the court considered it.
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Dudley Humphrey, one of the authors of the statute, has commented that the Electric
Supply " 'decision is contrary to the intent'" of the statute. Retchin, supra note 89, at 4 (quot-
ing Dudley Humphrey).
109. Drafter's Memorandum, supra note 69, at 8-9. Since a lien is sometimes referred to as
"claim of lien," it is conceivable that one might refer to a lien as a "claim," but it is unlikely
that someone would use "lien" to refer to a claim that was not secured by a lien.
110. See supra note 69.
111. Other § 44A-23 legislative history is the Harris Memorandum, supra note 35, which
the Electric Supply court acknowledged as in accord with the industry interpretation but re-
fused to consider because it relates to a 1985 amendment. Electric Supply, 328 at 656-67, 403
S.E.2d at 295. That amendment concerned the timing of enforcement, not the relationship to
§ 44A-18, see supra note 35, so the court was correct in holding the memorandum irrelevant to
the issue in Electric Supply.
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Supply court's analysis of the construction-cost issue was inadequate. A
negative consequence of the holding in all likelihood will be higher con-
struction costs resulting from contractors' requiring payment bonds
more frequently. 112 The court's suggestion that greater supervision by
contractors will minimize the need for payment bonds1 3 is shortsighted
and unsound. In fact, the most practical way obligors can protect them-
selves is to require a payment bond. 1 4 The other solution would require
supervision at a level that would make it impossible for many subcon-
tractors to operate because the supervision necessary to protect obligors,
in the absence of a bond, probably would require proof from subcontrac-
tors that all of their debts related to the project have been paid before
payment is made.115 One problem with requiring subcontractors to
prove payment to their creditors is that most subcontractors do not have
the liquidity that would allow them to pay their own subcontractors
before receiving payment themselves;116 thus this form of supervision
would make it almost impossible for the subcontractor to stay in busi-
ness. Additionally, supervising subcontractors to the extent necessary to
prevent double liability would raise an obligor's job cost, thereby raising
construction costs.
1 1 7
In addition to payment bonds and increased supervision, the court
suggests the use of lien waivers as a means for contractors to protect
themselves against double liability,1 but this, too, fails to provide an
effective method to offset the additional risk the Electric Supply holding
places on contractors. Although a lien waiver executed by a contractor
forfeiting his lien rights against the owner also would cut off a subcon-
tractor's section 44A-23 rights,1 19 it will be unenforceable in many cir-
cumstances. To be enforceable, a lien waiver must be in exchange for
112. See Retchin, supra note 89, at 4; Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 660, 403 S.E.2d at 297
(conceding that an increased use of payment bonds would cause construction costs to rise).
113. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 660, 403 S.E.2d at 297.
114. Many subcontractors are not bondable because of an undeveloped credit record. Tele-
phone Interview with Greg C. Ahlum, Attorney at Johnston, Taylor, Allison & Hord (Sept.
26, 1991). For a discussion of payment bonds, see supra note 44.
115. Telephone Interview with Greg C. Ahlum, supra note 114; see also SWEET, supra note
44, § 26.02(c) (discussing the practice of requiring proof of payment).
116. In analyzing the need for an adequate lien, the majority recognized this lack of liquid-
ity, Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 659-60, 403 S.E.2d at 296-97, but failed to consider it in
relation to problems associated with forcing the obligors to exercise supervision sufficient to
protect themselves from double liability.
117. See SWEET, supra note 44, § 26.02(c) (recognizing the administrative burden involved
in requiring proof of payment).
118. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 660, 403 S.E.2d at 297.
119. Mace v. Bryant Constr. Corp., 48 N.C. App. 297, 304, 269 S.E.2d 191, 195 (1980).
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payment of a disputed claim.1 20 If a contractor gives an owner a lien
waiver solely to prejudice a subcontractor's rights, therefore, it will be
unenforceable for lack of consideration.
1 21
The Electric Supply court also failed to evaluate the inevitable un-
certainty that the construction industry will suffer due to the court's in-
terpretation of section 44A-23 and its suggestion that a contractor
protect himself by exercising greater supervision. For twenty years, the
industry interpretation allowed an obligor, if he had not received a notice
of claim of lien, to pay his debt in full without concern that there may be
unpaid subcontractors.1 22 After Electric Supply, a subcontractor who
has not performed work on the construction site for months could en-
force a lien against the owner's real property by subrogation 120 days
after the contractor has completed the project, even though the owner
and the contractor did not know there were any unpaid subcontrac-
tors.1 23 This possibility creates uncertainty for owners and contractors
concerning potential liabilities to unknown subcontractors which did not
exist under the more predictable system operating before Electric Supply.
Moreover, monitoring an obligee's activities in an attempt to prevent
double liability, in addition to being impractical and expensive, 2 4 cannot
assure that an obligor knows of all the subcontractors to whom the obli-
gee owes money. Therefore, an obligor remains open to double liability
because of subcontractors of which he is unaware. Instead of considering
the benefits of preventing such uncertainty, the court's policy analysis
favors the importance of protecting subcontractors. 125 If the court had
looked into the purpose behind the enactment of the legislation, however,
it would have discovered that the legislation was enacted to make the law
of construction liens more certain, 126 while also providing a method for
120. See All In One Maintenance Serv. v. Beech Mountain Constr. Co., 70 N.C. App. 49,
55-56, 318 S.E.2d 856, 860 (1984).
121. Id.
122. This system was based on the premise that the best party to notify others of a debt due
him is the party himself, the obligee. Prior to the enactment of the current subcontractor's lien
laws, before a party could be paid, he was required to inform his obligor of the identity of all
creditors, and the amounts of indebtedness, for all debts related to the project. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 44-8 (1965) (repealed 1971); United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 257 F.2d 570, 572
(4th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 363 U.S. 522 (1960). This system relied on the obligor to look after the
obligee's interests. The Electric Supply court's suggestion that contractors exercise more su-
pervision marks a return to a system that places on the obligor the responsibility to protect the
obligee. As between an obligee and an obligor, the better person to look after the obligee's
interests is probably the obligee. See Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 667, 403 S.E.2d at 301
(Martin, J., dissenting); supra note 56.
123. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
125. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 660, 403 S.E.2d at 297.
126. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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subcontractors to protect themselves.12 7
The Electric Supply court also created uncertainty in the law of sub-
contractors' liens by failing adequately to limit its holding. The major-
ity's reasoning rests largely on its belief that a lien system based solely on
funds would not fulfill the state constitution's requirement of an " 'ade-
quate lien.' ""2 Using this analysis, a subcontractor who has perfected a
lien on the owner's property arguably could contend that it is not a con-
stitutionally adequate lien unless it has priority over the deed of trust on
the property. 2 9 Although it is highly unlikely that a trial court would
reach this ridiculous result, 30 the opinion is not limited so as to preclude
it. Moreover, nothing in the court's holding prevents a subcontractor
from arguing that the time limits set forth in the statute for the perfection
and enforcement of his lien unfairly limit his constitutional right to an
adequate lien.
Further, after dispelling the perceived link between sections 44A-23
and 44A-18, the Electric Supply court failed to articulate the limits of a
subcontractor's section 44A-23 Hen. This leaves uncertain the implica-
tions of several lower-tier subcontractors attempting simultaneously to
enforce a section 44A-23 lien. It is unclear whether the court limited the
amount of section 44A-23 liens by the amount the owner owes the con-
tractor or only by the amount of each subcontractor's individual
claim.'31 The latter alternative may subject an owner's property to Hens
in excess of his liability to the contractor, as illustrated in the following
example:
Three second-tier subcontractors, each owed $40,000 by the
first-tier subcontractor, could each get liens on the owner's real
property for the full amount ($120,000 total) if the owner only
owes the contractor $50,000. Therefore the owner would have
to pay $70,000 more than he should under the contract.
32
The statute in effect prior to 1971 specifically guarded against this result
by providing that "the sum total of all the Hens due subcontractors and
materialmen shall not exceed the amount due the original contractor at
127. Subcontractors can protect themselves by filing a notice and a claim of lien on all
parties above themselves in the construction chain. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-18(6) (1989).
128. Electric Supply, 328 N.C. at 659, 403 S.E.2d at 296 (quoting N.C. CONST. art. X, § 3).
129. Telephone Interview with Dudley Humphrey, drafter of North Carolina General Stat-
utes Chapter 44A, Article 2, Part 2 (Sept. 16, 1991).
130. No bank would loan money on a project if it knew that a court could subrogate its
security to that of a subcontractor.
131. The question is whether the "his" in section 44A-23's language "to the extent of his
claim" refers to the claiming subcontractor or the contractor.
132. Telephone Interview with B. David Carson, Attorney at Petree Stockton (Aug. 16,
1991).
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the time of notice given." 3 ' Through the pro rata provision in section
44A-21, 134 the current statute also guards against the possibility that the
total amount of several liens on funds will exceed the total amount due.
Had the court interpreted the subrogation rights provided for in section
44A-23 as dependent on a lien on funds, the pro-rata provision would
have prevented entirely the possibility of this type of excess liability. The
ambiguity in the court's decision, however, renders section 44A-21 inef-
fective in most circumstances because a subcontractor arguably could ob-
tain full payment by section 44A-23 subrogation, instead of a pro rata
share under section 44A-21.
Soon after the North Carolina Supreme Court decided Electric Sup-
ply, the General Statutes Commission received mail expressing concern
about the potential problems created by the court's holding and began
planning to review the decision. 135 Because the previously discussed pol-
icy considerations and section 44A-23's legislative history suggest that,
properly interpreted, section 44A-23 is dependent on section 44A-18,
136
the commission should suggest to the North Carolina General Assembly
an amendment to section 44A-23 to adopt explicitly that interpreta-
tion. 137 Such an amendment would return clarity to the law of subcon-
tractors' liens by assuring an obligee written notice of any future debts
for which he may become liable. This added certainty would not come at
the expense of inadequate security for subcontractors, however, because
a subcontractor can obtain a lien against the owner through subrogation
by providing notice to all of the parties standing above the subcontractor
in the payment chain.
1 31
Without such an amendment, Electric Supply will force property
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-6 (1965) (repealed 1971).
134. Id. Section 44A-21 provides:
In the event that the funds in the hands of the obligor and the obligor's personal
liability, if any, under the previous section [G.S. 44A-20] are less than the amount of
valid lien claims that have been filed with the obligor under this Article the parties
entitled to liens shall share the funds on a pro rata basis.
Id. § 44A-21 (1989).
135. Swain Ruling May Lead to Statute Change, N.C. LAW. WKLY., November 11, 1991,
at 24.
136. See supra notes 106-34 and accompanying text.
137. The following amendment would achieve this result: Section 44A-23 is amended by
adding after the word "claim" in the first sentence the words: "of lien against the owner
pursuant to section 44A-18." The first sentence of the amended version would read: "A first,
second, and third tier subcontractor, who gives notice as provided in this article, may, to the
extent of his claim of lien against the owner pursuant to section 44A-18, enforce the lien of the
contractor created by Part I of Article 2 of this Chapter."
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-18(6) (1989). A subcontractor can file this notice whenever
he begins work on a project. Id. § 44A-18(5) (1989).
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owners and general contractors to face the possibility of paying twice for
the same work because a lower-tier subcontractor, with whom neither
dealt directly, can enforce a lien against the owner's property without
giving notice of a lien while the owner still owes for the work. Although
the court's decision, by enhancing a subcontractor's ability to secure its
debts, is consistent with the mechanic's lien's purpose of protecting sub-
contractors, it fails to balance adequately the competing interests of the
owners and contractors. The North Carolina General Assembly must
erect again the tiered system of liens that existed prior to Electric Supply
to restore stability to the construction industry in North Carolina and to
prevent our state's property owners from bearing inequitable uncertainty
and unforeseeable risks.
CHRISTOPHER J. BRADY
Edwards v. Edwards and the Award of Attorneys' Fees for
Breach of a Separation Agreement
It is now the policy in most states that parties may contract with
regard to virtually all issues incident to divorce, "so long as those agree-
ments ... are basically just and reasonable, and are largely free from
fraud, duress, undue influence, and other... 'bargaining naughtiness.' "I
In accordance with this majority rule, North Carolina's General Statutes
authorize a married couple to execute a separation agreement that is
legal and binding in all respects so long as it is "not inconsistent with
public policy."2 Contractual indemnification clauses providing for the
payment of attorneys' fees traditionally have been declared void as
against public policy in North Carolina, except where statutory authority
existed to impose them.' Recently, however, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals in Edwards v. Edwards held that such a clause, executed pur-
suant to a separation agreement, was not inconsistent with public policy
and thus was binding on the parties.4 This decision, because it so surpris-
ingly contradicts prior case law, introduces new questions for judicial
and legislative consideration.
This Note discusses past judicial treatment of recovery of attorneys'
fees, particularly pursuant to indemnification clauses, and identifies stat-
utory exceptions to the general rule prohibiting recovery.5 It highlights
the courts' previously limited opportunities to rule on the issue with re-
gard to separation agreements6 and analyzes the court's decision in Ed-
wards. The Note focuses on the possible existence of statutory
authorization7 and public policy considerations accompanying the deci-
sion.8 Moreover, it examines the implications of the decision on practice
in North Carolina and concludes that while Edwards may be a good deci-
sion on its facts, the opinion creates confusion as to the status of tradi-
tional North Carolina contract law.9
1. Sally B. Sharp, Semantics as Jurisprudence: The Elevation of Form Over Substance in
the Treatment of Separation Agreements in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REv. 319, 321-22
(1991) (citing Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REv. 485, 539 (1967)).
2. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1991).
3. See infra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
4. Edwards v. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. 706, 713, 403 S.E.2d 530, 534, disc. rev. denied,
329 N.C. 787, 408 S.E.2d 518 (1991).
5. See infra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
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Catherine Edwards and her husband Robert executed a separation
agreement on September 21, 1986. The defendant husband agreed to pay
the plaintiff wife rehabilitative alimony of $300 per month.10 Payments
were to begin October 1, 1986, and were to continue for six years or until
plaintiff's death or remarriage, whichever occurred first.11 In addition,
under a paragraph entitled "Indemnity," the parties specifically con-
tracted for attorneys' fees:
If either party.., for any reason fails to perform his or her
financial or other obligations to the other party or their child,
and as a result thereof incurs any expense, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, . . . the defaulting party shall indemnify and
hold the other harmless from any such expense.12
The defendant stopped making alimony payments in April 1989,
and the plaintiff initiated an action, seeking specific performance of the
separation agreement.1 3 The trial court entered judgment in the plain-
tiff's favor, awarding her partial payment of defendant's arrearage in ali-
mony and ordering specific performance of the $300 per month alimony
payments until defendant's obligation under the agreement was satis-
fied.' 4 The trial court found that the defendant had the present ability to
pay an additional $100 per month and ordered him to do so until the
alimony arrearage plus interest was paid and satisfied in full. 5 Finally,
the trial court held that, under the terms of the separation agreement, the
plaintiff was entitled to indemnification and recovery of reasonable attor-
neys' fees. 16
The defendant assigned three errors on appeal. 7 First, he argued
that the trial court had not made appropriate findings of fact as required
by law concerning his present ability to pay alimony arrearage before
entering its order for specific performance. 8 The North Carolina Court
of Appeals declined to reverse the trial court's judgment, holding that
proper procedure had been followed. 9
10. Plaintiff Appellee's Brief at 2, Edwards, 102 N.C. App. 706, 403 S.E.2d 530, disc. rev.
denied, 329 N.C. 787, 408 S.E.2d 518 (1991) (No. 89 CvD 2319).
11. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. at 708, 403 S.E.2d at 531.
12. Id. at 712, 403 S.E.2d at 533.
13. Id. at 707-08, 403 S.E.2d at 530-31.
14. Plaintiff Appellee's Brief at 3, Edwards (No. 89 CvD 2319).
15. Id.
16. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. at 713, 403 S.E.2d at 533.
17. Id. at 708, 403 S.E.2d at 531.
18. Id.
19. Id at 709, 403 S.E.2d at 531. When a defendant offers evidence tending to show his
inability to fulfill his obligations under a separation agreement or other contract, the trial judge
must make findings of fact concerning the defendant's ability to pay before ordering specific
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Second, defendant argued that the trial court's finding that he had
the present ability to pay alimony arrearage and prospective alimony was
in error because it underestimated his itemized monthly expenses by
$426.20 Although plaintiff countered that the mistake was purely clerical
and thus correctable under Rule 60 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure2 ' without affecting the judgment, the court of appeals dis-
agreea.22 The court reasoned that the mistake was of a substantial na-
ture and thus could not be permitted2" because it might have an effect on
the amount defendant reasonably could afford to pay.24
Finally, the defendant asserted trial court error in awarding attor-
neys' fees to the plaintiff because such costs are not allowable unless ex-
pressly authorized by statute.25  The court of appeals, in affirming the
trial court's judgment, focused on North Carolina General Statutes sec-
tion 52-10.1, which states that separation agreements are " 'binding in all
respects'" so long as they are "'not inconsistent with public policy.' "26
The court found the indemnity clause of the separation agreement not
inconsistent with public policy; thus, the agreement, executed pursuant
to the statute, was "binding in all respects," and the general rule disal-
lowing attorneys' fees unless statutorily authorized did not apply in this
performance. Cavenaugh v. Cavenaugh, 317 N.C. 652, 657, 347 S.E.2d 19, 23 (1986). In
Edwards, although the trial court stated that it would order specific performance prior to
hearing any evidence of defendant's present ability to pay, it then had a "lengthy exchange"
with both parties' attorneys concerning evidence it would hear to determine the issue. Ed-
wards, 102 N.C App. at 709, 403 S.E.2d at 531. After hearing that evidence, the court ordered
specific performance. Id. According to the court of appeals, the trial court's procedure com-
plied with prior case law because it heard all evidence and made all findings of fact before
ordering specific performance. Id
20. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. at 709, 403 S.E.2d at 532.
21. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(a).
22. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. at 710, 403 S.E.2d at 532.
23. See Rivenbark v. Southmark Corp., 93 N.C. App. 414, 419, 378 S.E.2d 196, 199
(1989).
24. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. at 710, 403 S.E.2d at 532. The court of appeals noted that
"the trial court's miscalculation of defendant's expenses relative to his monthly income is a
prejudicial error and therefore must be addressed by the trial court." Id. at 710-11, 403 S.E.2d
at 532.
25. Id. at 712, 403 S.E.2d at 533. The defendant also maintained that the trial court
specifically ordered him to take a home equity loan in order to make partial payment on his
alimony arrearage, an action which would impose liability on defendant's new wife for an
obligation that was his alone. Id. at 711, 403 S.E.2d at 533. The court of appeals concluded
that the trial court made only findings of the amount of defendant's assets and available credit
and then ordered defendant to pay certain sums based upon its findings. Id. at 712, 403 S.E.2d
at 533 ("Although defendant may choose to use a home equity loan for the lump sum payment
of arrearages, defendant is not prevented by the trial court's order from obtaining that amount
from other sources.").
26. Id. at 713, 403 S.E.2d at 533 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1991)).
situation.27 The court explained its decision by stating that "[t]o hold
otherwise would... [be to say] that parties cannot [voluntarily] contract
for indemnification for attorneys' fees unless specifically authorized to do
so by statute."2
Prior to the Edwards decision, the issue of attorneys' fees recovery
in civil actions or in special proceedings seemingly was well settled in
North Carolina jurisprudence: a successful litigant could not recover at-
torneys' fees, whether as costs or as damages, unless such a recovery was
authorized expressly by statute.29 More notably, North Carolina courts
consistently had refused to sustain an award of attorneys' fees absent
statutory authority, even in the face of a "carefully drafted contractual
provision indemnifying a party for such attorneys' fees as may be necessi-
tated by a successful action on the contract itself."
30
This longstanding prohibition against attorneys' fees recovery in
civil actions originated in Tinsley v. Hoskins, 3  an 1892 North Carolina
Supreme Court decision. In Tinsley, the court held void as against public
policy a promissory note provision imposing an obligation for "collection
fees" (i.e., attorneys' fees) in the event of collection of the note by legal
process. 32 The court viewed the provision as an oppressive penalty, a
"cover" for usury, and a promoter of litigation.33 That rationale was
applied subsequently to similar provisions found in other promissory
notes, 4 deeds of trust, and other security instruments.35 More recently,
27. IM at 713, 403 S.E.2d at 534.
28. Id.
29. Stillwell Enters. v. Interstate Equip. Co., 300 N.C. 286, 289, 266 S.E.2d 812, 814
(1980) (citing Hicks v. Albertson, 284 N.C. 236, 200 S.E.2d 40 (1972)).
30. Id. at 289, 266 S.E.2d at 814-15. North Carolina is one of few states which adheres to
this rule of law. See also White v. Associates Commercial Corp., 20 Ark. App. 140, 144, 725
S.W.2d 7, 9 (1987) (holding that in the absence of statutory authorization, attorneys' fees are
not recoverable unless specifically provided for as part of a promissory note); Quinn v. Godfa-
ther's Inv., 217 Neb. 441, 442, 348 S.W.2d 893, 894 (1984) (holding that attorneys' fees are
recoverable only if statutorily authorized). Most states adhere to the "American Rule" as
described by the Unted States Supreme Court: in the absence of a valid and applicable statute,
agreement, or stipulation authorizing the allowance of attorneys' fees, they are generally not
taxable against the losing party. Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing, 386 U.S. 714, 717-18
(1967). Indeed, in many southeastern jurisdictions, attorneys' fees are recoverable if author-
ized by statute or by a reasonable contract provision. See Kilmark v. Board of Regents, 175
Ga. App. 857, 870, 334 S.E.2d 890, 901 (1985); Duke Power Co. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 284 S.C. 81, 100, 326 S.E.2d 395, 406 (1985); Lannon v. Lee Conner Realty Corp.,
238 Va. 590, 594, 385 S.E.2d 380, 383 (1989).
31. 111 N.C. 340, 16 S.E. 325 (1892).
32. Id. at 341, 16 S.E. at 325.
33. Id.
34. See Howell v. Roberson, 197 N.C. 572, 573, 150 S.E. 32, 33 (1929); Finance Co. v.
Hendry, 189 N.C. 549, 557-58, 127 S.E. 629, 633 (1925); Brisco v. Norris, 112 N.C. 671, 677,
16 S.E. 850, 852 (1893).
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the courts have indicated that such clauses, absent statutory authoriza-
tion, are unenforceable without regard to the type of instrument in which
they appear.36
The North Carolina General Statutes provide several exceptions to
the established rule against recovering attorneys' fees and authorize such
costs in many situations.37 One far-reaching exception is found in North
Carolina General Statutes section 6-21.2, which allows attorneys' fees in
cases of "obligations to pay attorneys' fees upon any note, conditional
sale contract, or other evidence of indebtedness."38 The courts have inter-
preted "evidence of indebtedness" to mean "any printed or written in-
strument, signed or otherwise executed by the obligor(s), which
evidences on its face a legally enforceable obligation to pay money."3 9
The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that, based on this sec-
tion's legislative history," it believes the statute was intended to supple-
ment legal principles applicable to commercial transactions.4'
In the area of family law, the right of a spouse to recover attorneys'
fees in a divorce or alimony action is "so strongly entrenched in [North
Carolina's] practice as to be considered an established legal right."42
North Carolina General Statutes section 6-21(4) states that costs (includ-
ing reasonable attorneys' fees) shall be levied against either party or ap-
portioned among parties, in the discretion of the court, in actions for
divorce or alimony.43 However, before the Edwards decision, no court in
North Carolina had ruled specifically on one party's right to attorneys'
35. See Turner v. Boger, 126 N.C. 300, 302, 35 S.E. 592, 593 (1900); Williams v. Rich,
117 N.C. 235, 240, 23 S.E. 257, 259 (1895).
36. Stillwell Enters. v. Interstate Equip. Co., 300 N.C. 286, 290, 266 S.E.2d 812, 815
(1980) (pertaining to a lease agreement); see also Yeargin Constr. Co. v. Futren Dev. Corp., 29
N.C. App. 731, 734, 225 S.E.2d 623, 625 (pertaining to a construction contract), cert. denied,
290 N.C. 660, 228 S.E.2d 459 (1976).
37. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21 (1986) (allowing costs, in the court's discretion, to
be levied against parties in such matters as actions for surviving spousal or child support;
construction of a will or trust agreement; habeas corpus; application for the establishment,
alteration, or discontinuance of a public road, cartway, or ferry; compensation of referees and
commissioners for taking depositions; and for expenses incurred under various chapters of the
General Statutes).
38. Id. § 6-21.2 (1986) (emphasis added).
39. Stillwell Enters., 300 N.C. at 294, 266 S.E.2d at 817-18; see also State Wholesale Sup-
ply v. Allen, 30 N.C. App. 272, 277, 227 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1976) (stating that the phrase
signifies a written agreement or acknowledgment of debt).
40. Section 6-21.2 was enacted to amend certain provisions of the state's Uniform Com-
mercial Code and similar statutes. Stillwell Enters. 300 N.C. at 293, 266 S.E.2d at 816-17.
41. Id.
42. 2 ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 148, at 205 (3d ed. 1963); see
Yow v. Yow, 243 N.C. 79, 84, 89 S.E.2d 867, 872 (1955); Butler v. Butler, 226 N.C. 594, 597,
39 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1946).
43. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21(4) (1986); see also id. § 50-16.4 (1987) (stating that if a
2020 [Vol. 70
fees for the other's breach of a separation agreement.'
A 1987 case, Baird v. Baird,45 presented the issue for review, but the
court of appeals declined to disrupt the trial court's denial of such an
award based on the trial court's interpretation of the agreement in ques-
tion.46 In Baird, the plaintiff wife and defendant husband executed a
separation agreement containing a provision wherein a party finding it
necessary to sue for enforcement and prevailing in the action could exact
reasonable attorneys' fees from the defaulting party.47 When the plaintiff
brought suit seeking enforcement of the agreement, the parties agreed to
waive a jury trial and to permit the trial judge to make findings of fact.48
Because the matter subsequently was resolved by declaratory judgment,
the trial court declined to award plaintiff attorneys' fees, stating that the
matter was resolved "by construction of the agreement, not enforcement
of the agreement.., and [therefore] there [was] not a 'prevailing party'
within the meaning of the Separation Agreement."'49 The court of ap-
peals agreed with the trial court's reasoning.5 0
A year later in Brown v. Brown,'1 the court of appeals again upheld a
trial court's denial of the plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees based upon
an indemnification provision in a separation agreement.5 2 Because the
trial court dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action (alleging a material
breach by the defendant) for rescission of the agreement, there was no
basis, according to the court of appeals, to hold that the defendant had
dependant spouse is entitled to alimony pendente lite pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3
(1987), the court may enter an order for reasonable attorneys' fees).
44. See LEE, supra note 42, § 201, at 424 ("Attorney fees will not be awarded to a wife in
an action to enforce a separation agreement."). Notably, other jurisdictions draw their domes-
tic statutes more broadly than does North Carolina to allow the court to award attorneys' fees
as a result of any proceeding seeking relief under their provisions. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-324 (1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-119 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.16 (West
1982). Each of these statutes contains similar language, referring to proceedings under provi-
sions of "this chapter" or "this article," and some specify the section numbers covered by the
attorneys' fees provision. If North Carolina were to adopt such language, statutory authoriza-
tion for the award of attorneys' fees as the result of litigation involving separation agreements
would exist.
45. 86 N.C. App. 201, 356 S.E.2d 823 (1987).
46. Id. at 206, 356 S.E.2d at 826.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 203, 356 S.E.2d at 824.
49. Id. at 206, 356 S.E.2d at 826.
50. Id.
51. 91 N.C. App. 335, 371 S.E.2d 752 (1988).
52. Id. at 340-41, 371 S.E.2d at 755. The clause provided that a party defaulting on the
agreement would be responsible for the payment of attorneys' fees. Id.
1992] FAMILYLA4W 2021
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
violated the agreement. 3 No attorneys' fees were awarded, since neither
party was found to be in default, as required by the agreement.5 4 Thus,
as in Baird, Brown did not afford the appellate court with an opportunity
to rule on the issue. Both decisions, however, left open the possibility for
a court to grant attorneys' fees under a separation agreement clause in
the proper circumstances.
In order to understand the attorneys' fees decision in Edwards, it is
important to note that North Carolina courts consider a valid separation
agreement to be an enforceable contract between husband and wife.55
The rules governing the interpretation of contracts also generally apply
to separation agreements: Where the terms of such agreements are plain
and explicit, the court will enforce them as written.56 Furthermore, "a
court can properly order specific performance of only part of a contract if
it deems another portion unworkable."5"
Some scholars feel, however, that separation agreements are funda-
mentally different from other bargained-for exchanges, and that treating
spouses as strangers is not the answer to the inadequacies of the system.58
One commentator asserts that "the marketplace mentality is antithetical
to the partnership concept of marriage, the husband-wife relationship,
and the interests of society in fair results." 9 Particularly in the area of
family law, courts must strike a balance between allowing parties to settle
their differences amicably and protecting those who cannot preserve their
own rights.6°
Tradition, the interests of the affected groups, and the perceived in-
centive effects of fee-shifting rules all should play a role in determining
who should bear the costs of litigation.61 The general rule in this country
53. Id. Because the action was dismissed, the trial court made no findings of fact concern-
ing whether the agreement had in fact been violated. Id. at 338, 371 S.E.2d at 754.
54. Id. at 340, 371 S.E.2d at 755.
55. Blount v. Blount, 72 N.C. App. 193, 195, 323 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1984), disc. rev. denied,
313 N.C. 506, 329 S.E.2d 389 (1985).
56. Id.; see also LEE, supra note 42, § 201, at 423 (stating that a valid separation agree-
ment will be enforced as written, just like a contract).
57. Harris v. Harris, 307 N.C. 684, 688, 300 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1983).
58. Sally B. Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on
Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1399, 1459 (1984).
59. Id. at 1460.
60. See Carol S. Hebert, Note, Domestic Relations-Enforcement of Contractual Separa-
tion Agreements by Specific Performance-Moore v. Moore, 16 WAKE FOREs= L. REv. 117,
129 (1980).
61. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview,
1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 680.
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has been that each side should be responsible for its own lawyers' fees.62
This rule is based upon three theories: one should not be penalized for
defending or prosecuting a lawsuit; the poor might be discouraged from
filing lawsuits if they faced the threat of having to bear their opponent's
attorneys' fees; and determining reasonable fees would prove to be too
difficult.6 3 Many of these arguments work both ways, however, and sev-
eral rationales have been suggested which justify fee-shifting. Among
them are the ideas that fee-shifting does not punish the loser but that it
indemnifies the winner and makes her whole, that fee-shifting makes so-
cially desirable litigation economical, that it evens out the relative eco-
nomic strength of the parties, encouraging those who might not feel they
could afford litigation to pursue their rights, and that it compensates for
legal injury.64
The court in Edwards affirmed the lower court's award of attorneys'
fees to the plaintiff because it found that "the general rule disallowing
attorneys' fees unless statutorily authorized does not encompass [the] sit-
uation where the parties voluntarily contracted for indemnification."65
The separation agreement at issue, the court maintained, was valid under
North Carolina General Statutes section 52-10.1,66 and thus binding in
all respects because the agreement's indemnity clause was not inconsis-
tent with public policy.67 Arguably, the decision was an equitable one
because the parties freely negotiated the indemnity clause. Courts should
strive to uphold contracts as written.68 Many states hold that attorneys'
fees may be awarded to a successful litigant in the presence of a statute or
an enforceable contract providing for them.69 In addition, the defendant
easily could have avoided incurring such costs had he performed his part
of the bargain. Although the court's logic makes sense, the holding does
62. Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing, 386 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1967) (discussing the
"American Rule" that attorneys' fees are not generally taxable against the losing party).
63. Id. at 718.
64. See Rowe, supra note 61, at 653-66.
65. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. at 713, 403 S.E.2d at 534.
66. Section 52-10.1 provides in pertinent part: "[a]ny married couple is... authorized to
execute a separation agreement not inconsistent with public policy which shall be legal, valid,
and binding in all respects; provided, that the separation agreement must be in writing and
acknowledged by both parties before a certifying officer." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1991).
67. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. at 713, 403 S.E.2d at 533.
68. See Blount v. Blount, 72 N.C. App. 193, 195, 323 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1984), disc rev.
denied, 313 N.C. 506, 329 S.E.2d 389 (1985).
69. Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing, 386 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1967); see supra note 30
and accompanying text. In the area of family law, one recent Missouri Court of Appeals'
decision held that in a proceeding for the dissolution of marriage or for legal separation, the
terms of a separation agreement (except terms providing for custody, support, or visitation of
the children) are binding on the court unless unconscionable. Obermiller v. Obermiller, 795
S.W.2d 624, 625-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
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not follow from North Carolina precedent.70
North Carolina's courts have held consistently that in the absence of
a statute authorizing the award of attorneys' fees, contract provisions
which indemnify parties against such costs are invalid.71 As yet, separa-
tion agreements do not fall under a specific statutory exemption to this
well-established rule, and if courts are to consider them to be contracts,
separation agreements arguably should be treated like contracts under
prior case law.72
Plaintiff, in her appellate brief in Edwards, argued that the separa-
tion agreement fell within the "broad construction" given to North Caro-
lina General Statutes section 6-21.2 (authorizing attorneys' fees
provisions in notes and other evidence of indebtedness), 73 but the court
of appeals declined to adopt this rationale, and by its silence on the prop-
osition, indicated that it did not agree with the characterization of a sepa-
ration agreement as evidence of indebtedness. The statutory
authorization the court suggested was that of section 52-10.1: If the sep-
aration agreement was valid, whatever it contained was to be enforced,
including the indemnity clause. One problem with the court's argument,
however, is that legislation pertaining to similar family law actions ex-
pressly stipulates that attorneys' fees are recoverable and within the
court's discretion.7 4 It is therefore questionable whether the legislature
intended the language of section 52-10.1 to imply an exception to the
prohibition on attorneys' fees as costs properly awarded to a successful
litigant. In other jurisdictions, divorce and separation statutes are drawn
broadly to allow the court to provide for attorneys' fees in any proceed-
ing seeking relief under their provisions." While such language defi-
nitely would help the North Carolina Court of Appeals' argument,
North Carolina statutes are drafted more narrowly.
Moreover, although the court held that indemnity clauses in sepa-
70. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
71. See Stillwell Enters. v. Interstate Equip. Co., 300 N.C. 286, 289-90, 266 S.E.2d 812,
814-15 (1980).
72. In a recent Ohio Court of Appeals decision, a separation agreement clause purporting
to require payment of attorneys' fees in an action for breach was held unenforceable because of
public policy. Snyder v. Snyder, 27 Ohio App. 3d 1, 4, 499 N.E.2d 320, 323-24 (1985) (" 'Ohio
... prohibits the enforcement of express agreements for recovery of attorney's fees for breach
of a simple contract.' ") (quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Timbalier Towing Co., 497 F.
Supp. 912, 929 (N.D. Ohio 1980)).
73. Plaintiff Appellee's Brief at 9-10, Edwards (No. 89 CvD 2319).
74. See N.C. GEN. STAT. 50-16.4 (1987) (regarding attorneys' fees in divorce and alimony
proceedings); id. § 6-21(4) (1986) (same); id. § 50-13.6 (1987) (regarding attorneys' fees in
child custody and support proceedings).
75. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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ration agreement contracts are not inconsistent with public policy,76
North Carolina courts, when analyzing contracts outside the family law
context, traditionally have held otherwise." The courts generally view
such provisions as oppressive penalties that promote litigation.7" As has
been suggested, those concerns have come under recent criticism and
should be examined more closely, especially in the area of family law
where the contracts involved are negotiated under somewhat different
circumstances.79
Traditionally, attorneys' fees have been allowed in divorce and ali-
mony proceedings in order to place dependent spouses (normally wives)
on substantially even terms with adverse parties to the litigation. 0 Sepa-
ration agreements, which are "the vehicle by which the distributional
consequences of the overwhelming majority of divorces ...are con-
cluded,""1 arguably spawn proceedings quite similar to those pertaining
to divorce and alimony. A separation agreement may be considered an
arm's-length transaction by the North Carolina courts, but it is sur-
rounded with emotions not generally part of other personal contracts. A
wife who signs a separation agreement usually does so in reliance on her
husband's promise to support her. 2 She needs a method for enforce-
ment, and the fear of attorneys' fees might encourage her husband's com-
pliance with the agreement or, if nothing else, settlement without heavy
involvement in the legal system. In addition, a spouse whose rights were
being violated might gain courage to fight in court if she knew that her
costs could be defrayed. On the other hand, as the North Carolina
courts have commented, the promise of attorneys' fees might entice a
party without a valid complaint who otherwise could not afford to sue to
seek judicial intervention as a means of harassment.
The implications of Edwards on the legal system are unclear. In-
demnification clauses appear in many types of contracts and agreements
outside of domestic relations.8 3 The language the court uses to rational-
ize its decision is broad enough to be applied to virtually any situation:
76. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. at 713, 403 S.E.2d at 533.
77. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
78. Stillwell Enters. v. Interstate Equip. Co., 300 N.C. 286, 290, 266 S.E.2d 812, 815
(1980).
79. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
80. LEE, supra note 42, § 148, at 205.
81. Sharp, supra note 1, at 320.
82. Cf Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 258, 154 S.E.2d 71, 74-75 (1967) (holding that
where a wife withdraws her defense to a divorce action in reliance on a consent judgment, the
husband cannot later assert lack of power to enforce by contempt).
83. Some examples include lease agreements, employment contracts, and contracts for the
sale of property.
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"To hold [that the indemnification clause is inconsistent with public pol-
icy] would, in effect, hold that parties cannot [voluntarily] contract for
indemnification for attorneys' fees unless specifically authorized to do so
by statute."84 Such language in effect overrules established precedent in
all sorts of contract cases and renders North Carolina's statutes specify-
ing exceptions to the general prohibition against attorneys' fees meaning-
less. The court's sudden embrace of freedom of contract is not
necessarily bad, nor is it out of line with other jurisdictions in the coun-
try." It is, however, unanticipated by recent decisions and contradictory
to the precedent established in jurisdictions with case law and narrow
statutory provisions similar to those of North Carolina.
86
Although the court made no attempt to do so, if the Edwards deci-
sion is limited to its facts by subsequent panels, the decision signals a
recognition that separation agreements are by their nature quite distinct
from traditional arm's-length transactions. The decision brings North
Carolina law in line with those jurisdictions that consider separation
agreements and the proceedings they generate to be part and parcel of
divorce laws in general.8 7 Unless the North Carolina General Assembly
modifies the General Statutes or the courts limit the decision to its facts,
however, Edwards will create confusion and provide a convincing argu-
ment for those seeking to enforce indemnification clauses in all types of
contracts.
The decision in Edwards makes a good deal of common sense. The
parties negotiated and executed an agreement which provided indemnifi-
cation for both in the event of breach. The core demands of the agree-
ment were equitable and placed no undue burden on either party; Mr.
Edwards, therefore, easily could have avoided the indemnification clause.
Nonetheless, the decision to enforce the indemnification clause in the ab-
sence of express statutory authorization was without precedent and with-
out clear justification. The result can only be confusion in other areas of
traditional contract law, until and unless the General Assembly or the
courts clarify the ruling.
Lucy VANDERBERRY FOUNTAIN
84. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. at 713, 403 S.E.2d at 534.
85. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 30 and 72 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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From State v. Alston to State v. Hardy: A New Way ito Define
Constructive Force as an Element of Second-Degree Rape in
North Carolina
Imagine a situation in which a man and a woman have been in-
volved in a consensual sexual relationship for six months, throughout
which the man occasionally beats the woman. After the woman attempts
to break off the relationship, the man meets her on the street, grabs her
arm, and threatens to "fix" her face. The woman then follows the man
to an apartment where they talk about their troubled relationship. While
at the apartment the man leaves the room several times; the woman does
not leave. After talking for approximately an hour, the man has sex with
the woman after she has expressed her lack of consent. The woman cries
throughout the act. Upon leaving the apartment, the woman notifies the
police that the man has raped her. On a subsequent day, the man and
the woman engage in consensual sexual intercourse, which the woman
does not report initially because she is "embarrassed." Is this man guilty
of second-degree rape?1
First, what is second-degree rape? To convict a person of second-
degree rape in North Carolina, the State must show that the accused has
engaged in vaginal intercourse with another person by force and against
the will of the other person.' North Carolina courts have determined
that the terms "by force" and "against the will" of the female are synon-
ymous because any attempted distinction would be meaningless and
could confuse a jury.3 They have acknowledged, moreover, that the
force required for second-degree rape need not be physical; constructive
force is sufficient.4 The force requirement may be met, in other words, if
a victim submits to intercourse due to her fear of the accused, duress, or
mental coercion.
1. The facts described are from State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 312 S.E.2d 470 (1984).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3(a)(1) (1986). The statute also defines second-degree rape
as vaginal intercourse with a person who is "mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or
physically helpless" when the person performing the act knows or should reasonably know of
the defect, incapacity, or helplessness. Id. § 14-27.3(a)(2). This Note, however, will address
only § 14-27.3(a)(1).
3. State v. Carter, 265 N.C. 626, 630, 144 S.E.2d 826, 829 (1965).
4. Thus, when a victim was raped in the backseat of a car by three men and decided that
it was futile to resist due to their "superior strength," the supreme court held that constructive
force was present. State v. Hines, 286 N.C. 377, 379, 211 S.E.2d 201, 203 (1975). When a
victim did not physically resist simultaneous vaginal and oral intercourse with two defendants
because of her fear for the life of her daughter, who was in the next room, the supreme court
held that constructive force was present. State v. Yancey, 291 N.C. 656, 663, 231 S.E.2d 637,
642 (1977).
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Next arises the question of how to define constructive force. Deter-
mining when an accused has used constructive force to overcome a vic-
tim's lack of consent is difficult.5 A court must try to peer into the
victim's mind to determine whether she felt compelled to submit to inter-
course. It is not surprising that a so-called bright-line rule would emerge
in North Carolina for the purposes of defining constructive force.
What happens, however, when the North Carolina Supreme Court,
in an effort to define constructive force, creates a bright-line rule that
severs the symbiotic relationship between the two supposedly synony-
mous elements of second-degree rape-"by force" and "against the will"
of the female? The hypothetical facts discussed above are those of State
v. Alston,6 in which the supreme court established such a bright-line rule.
In Alston, the supreme court stated that although the intercourse
was against the will of the woman, it was not by force.7 In an effort to
determine what constitutes constructive force, the court fashioned a rule
stating that a woman must have more than a general fear of her attacker,
and that the attacker must instill this fear in the woman immediately
prior to the alleged rape so that her fear directly causes her to submit to
the intercourse alleged to be rape.8 Only then is constructive force pres-
ent. In other words, it is not enough that the woman generally was
afraid of the man due to his past violence toward her. The court, by
creating this new rule, separated the "by force" and "against the will"
requirements with the presumable intent of creating a more uniform defi-
nition of constructive force.9
This Note discusses the supreme court's reasoning in Alston as well
as four subsequent cases construing Alston. 10 This discussion includes
5. The requirement that sexual intercourse be accompanied by force or threat of force to
constitute rape provides a man with some protection against mistakes as to consent. A man
who uses a gun or knife against his victim is not likely to be in serious doubt as to her lack of
consent. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1098-99 (1986).
6. 310 N.C. 399, 312 S.E.2d 470 (1984).
7. Id. at 408, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
8. Id. at 409, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
9. Alston fits the pattern of what Susan Estrich would call the "non-traditional" rape.
Unlike the "traditional" rape (a stranger jumping out of the bushes, for example, putting a gun
to the victim's head, and raping her), the "non-traditional" rape is:
[w]here less force is used or no other physical injury is inflicted, where threats are
inarticulate, where the two know each other, where the setting is not an alley but a
bedroom, where the initial contact was not a kidnapping but a date, where the wo-
man says no but does not fight.
Estrich, supra note 5, at 1092.
10. See infra notes 15-75 and accompanying text.
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State v. Hardy,1I the most recent appellate court decision to discuss con-
structive force. The Note demonstrates the negative, and at times disas-
trous, consequences of the Alston rule,12 hereinafter referred to as the
"more than a general fear" rule. The Note asserts that the supreme court
could have avoided the adverse effects of the "more than a general fear"
rule by adopting a different one.13 The better rule would recognize that,
while a victim of constructive force must have more than a general fear
of her attacker, this fear may be a product of all the defendant's past
actions toward her, and not simply a product of his actions immediately
prior to the alleged rape.14
A substantive discussion of second-degree rape law in North Caro-
lina must begin with Alston; the Alston facts are set out above.' 5 The
defendant contended in Alston that the State did not show that the inter-
course was by force and against the victim's will.' 6 The supreme court
determined first that the State had shown sufficiently that the intercourse
was against the victim's will.17 Although she had not resisted the defend-
ant physically, physical resistance is not necessary to prove lack of con-
sent.' 8 The victim's testimony that she had told the defendant she did
not want to have intercourse with him and that she had submitted only
because she was afraid of the defendant was sufficient to show that the
intercourse was against her will, according to the court.' 9
The supreme court determined, however, that the State had not of-
fered enough evidence to show constructive force.20 The threat by the
defendant to "fix" the victim's face and the act of grabbing her arm on
the street, "although they may have induced fear, appeared to have been
unrelated to the act of sexual intercourse between [the victim] and the
defendant."'" The court made the distinction that the victim's fear of the
defendant was based on her experiences with him prior to the time of the
alleged rape.22 The court stated that only if the "totality of the circum-
stances gives rise to a reasonable inference that the unspoken purpose of
11. 104 N.C. App. 226, 409 S.E.2d 96 (1991). See infra notes 59-75 and accompanying
text.
12. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
16. State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 407, 312 S.E.2d 470, 475 (1984).
17. Id. at 408, 312 S.E.2d at 475.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 408, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 408-09, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
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the [defendant's] threat was to force the victim to submit to unwanted
sexual intercourse" could a jury find constructive force.23 Here the facts
gave rise to no such inference.24
The "more than a general fear" rule grew out of the court's decision
in Alston which suggested that if a defendant's actions prior to sexual
intercourse caused only a "general fear" in the victim, a fear that did not
directly cause the victim to submit to the unwanted intercourse, con-
structive force necessary to constitute second-degree rape was not pres-
ent. The rule presumably would apply only when a defendant does not
use physical force. The court reasoned as follows:
Under the peculiar facts of this case, there was no substantial
evidence that threats or force by the defendant on [the day of
the alleged rape] were sufficiently related to sexual conduct to
cause [the victim] to believe that she had to submit to sexual
intercourse with him or suffer harm. Although [her] general
fear of the defendant may have been justified by his conduct on
prior occasions, absent evidence that the defendant used force
or threats to overcome the will of the victim to resist the sexual
intercourse alleged to have been rape, such general fear was not
sufficient to show that the defendant used the force required to
support a conviction of rape.25
As a result of the State's failure to show the element of force required in
second-degree rape, the court remanded the case for the entry of a di-
rected verdict in favor of the defendant.26
Seven months later the North Carolina Court of Appeals applied the
"more than a general fear" rule to a very different set of facts. In State v.
Lester,27 the defendant was charged with the second-degree rape of his
daughter, with whom he had been engaging in intercourse since she was
eleven years old. 28 On the day in question, the defendant and his daugh-
ter were alone in their trailer. The defendant told his daughter to remove
her clothes, but she refused. When the daughter "'could tell on his face
that he was getting angrier,' " she complied with his demand, after which
the defendant had intercourse with her.29 On a later date, the defendant
told his daughter to disrobe while parked on the side of a road. She
initially refused, but when the defendant became angry, she complied.
23. Id. at 409, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 410, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
27. 70 N.C. App. 757, 321 S.E.2d 166 (1984), aff'd, 313 N.C. 595, 330 S.E.2d 205 (1985).
28. Id. at 759, 321 S.E.2d at 167.
29. Id.
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After intercourse, the defendant slapped his daughter, claiming that she
was involved with other boys.
30
The defendant argued that the State had failed to prove that the
intercourse with his daughter had been by force.3' The court of appeals
first determined that the State had presented sufficient evidence showing
the intercourse between the defendant and his daughter was against the
daughter's will.32 Citing Alston's "more than a general fear" language,
however, the court of appeals claimed that "[tihere is no evidence...
that defendant used either actual or constructive force to accomplish the
acts with which he is charged.",33 The court of appeals agreed that the
daughter would fear her father based on his previous behavior (which
included having intercourse with all of his other daughters, beating his
wife in the presence of the children, and pointing a gun at his children on
one occasion),34 but at the time of the intercourse, her fear was "insuffi-
cient to show that defendant forcibly raped his daughter., 35 The court
did not offer any further explanation for its decision. The supreme court
summarily affirmed the court of appeals' holding.36
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 761, 321 S.E.2d at 168.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 758-59, 321 S.E.2d at 167.
35. Id. at 761, 321 S.E.2d at 168. Cases like Lester are not unique to North Carolina. A
year before Lester, the Pennsylvania appellate court decided Commonwealth v. Biggs, 320 Pa.
Super. 265, 467 A.2d 31 (1983), in which a father engaged in intercourse with his seventeen-
year-old daughter. The defendant told his daughter that the Bible instructed her to provide for
his needs because her mother no longer could. The defendant also threatened his daughter
that he would show nude pictures of her to people if she told anyone. Id. at 267, 467 A.2d at
32. The appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction, stating that he had never used or
threatened force against his daughter. He obtained his daughter's consent through humilia-
tion, not force. Id. at 268, 467 A.2d at 32 (quoted in Estrich, supra note 5, at 1110-11).
36. State v. Lester, 313 N.C. 595, 330 S.E.2d 205 (1985).
In Lester, the State could have charged the defendant under North Carolina General
Statute § 14-27.7, which states:
[if a] defendant who has assumed the position of a parent in the home of a minor
victim engages in vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with a victim who is a minor
residing in the home.., the defendant is guilty of a Class G felony [punishable by
not less than two nor more than fifteen years in prison]. Consent is not a defense to a
charge under this section.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7 (1986) and editor's notes (emphasis added). The State instead
chose to charge the defendant with second-degree rape, presumably with the hope of obtaining
a longer prison term; second-degree rape is punishable for a term of not more than forty years
in prison. Id. § 14-27.3, editor's note. The State's plan obviously backfired. The results of
Lester suggest that the North Carolina General Assembly should create more equality in the
maximum prison terms for second-degree rape and intercourse with minors in the care of the
defendant. The latter arguably is not a less severe offense.
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In State v. Strickland,3 v the defendant used physical force to have
intercourse with the victim, and the supreme court refused to apply the
"more than a general fear" rule. In Strickland, the defendant and the
victim were neighbors for about nine years. The defendant came to the
victim's house one evening and asked to be let in, but the victim told him
to leave. When she tried to close the door, the defendant broke the
screen-door latch and forcibly entered the victim's house. He grabbed
the victim, put his hand over her mouth, dragged her into a bedroom,
and had intercourse with her.38
On appeal, the defendant argued that the State had not presented
sufficient evidence of force. Relying on Alston's "more than a general
fear" rule, he asserted that the victim had merely a general fear of the
defendant. 39 The court disagreed, stating without any further explana-
tion that the "'general fear' theory is applicable only to fact situations
similar to those in Alston."' The Court then distinguished Alston on the
grounds that in Strickland, the defendant had no prior sexual relation-
ship with the victim, forced his way into the victim's home, and grabbed
the victim and placed his hand over her mouth. 1 Although, as in Aiston,
the Strickland victim did not scream or fight, the court noted the victim's
testimony that she "couldn't fight with him" because the defendant
"[had] a hold of [her] at the time."'42
Justice Webb stated in dissent that he would concur with the major-
ity only if the court overturned Alston.4 3 Instead of distinguishing the
two cases, as the majority did, Justice Webb drew parallels. For exam-
ple, Justice Webb asserted that in neither case did the defendant use
more force than was necessary to have intercourse with the victim or
specifically say what he would do if the victim did not submit; and in
neither case did the victim physically resist. On this evidence, however,
Strickland could go to the jury while Alston could not.'
One month later, the North Carolina Supreme Court further at-
tempted to clarify its "more than a general fear" rule in State v. Ether-
idge.45 The defendant in Etheridge was convicted of a second-degree
37. 318 N.C. 653, 351 S.E.2d 281 (1987).
38. Id. at 654, 351 S.E.2d at 282.
39. Id. at 655, 351 S.E.2d at 282.
40. Id. at 656, 351 S.E.2d at 283.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 657, 351 S.E.2d at 283.
43. Id. at 662, 351 S.E.2d at 286 (Webb, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Webb, J., dissenting).
45. 319 N.C. 34, 352 S.E.2d 673 (1987).
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sexual offense for engaging in anal intercourse with his son.' A second-
degree sexual offense is similar to second-degree rape in that it requires
the offense to be by force and against the will of the victim; the force may
be constructive.47 The State showed that the defendant began engaging
in sexual activity with his son when the boy was eight.4" On the day in
question, when the boy was thirteen, the defendant went to his son's bed-
room and told him to disrobe. When the boy refused, the defendant an-
swered that he should "'[d]o it anyway.' " The defendant then
engaged in anal intercourse with the boy. Afterward, the defendant told
his son that he would hurt him if the boy told anyone about the
incident.5 0
The defendant, relying on Alston's "more than a general fear" rule,
asserted on appeal that both actual and constructive force were absent
from the encounter at issue.51 The supreme court disagreed, stating
"that Lester [involving intercourse between a father and daughter] car-
ried Alston far beyond its intended scope and that [the] defendant's reli-
ance on the two decisions is inappropriate under the facts of this case."52
In reaching its decision, the court stated that although it had sum-
marily affirmed the court of appeals, holding in Lester, it now "disa-
vow[ed] Lester's misapplication of the Alston 'general fear' rationale to a
case of intrafamilial sexual abuse."53 The court distinguished sexual ac-
tivity between a parent and a child, as in Etheridge, and sexual activity
between two adults who had been engaged in a consensual sexual rela-
tionship, as in Alston. 4 Asserting that the "youth and vulnerability of
children, coupled with the power inherent in a parent's position of au-
thority, creates a unique situation of dominance and control in which
explicit threats and displays of force are not necessary to effect the
46. Id. at 37, 352 S.E.2d at 675.
47. North Carolina General Statute § 14-27.5(a) states that
[a] person is guilty of a sexual offense in the second degree if the person engages in a
sexual act with another person (1) by force and against the will of the other person;
or (2) Who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, and
the person performing the act knows or should reasonably know [this].
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.5(a) (1986). A "sexual act" is defined as "cunnilingus, fellatio, anal-
ingus, or anal intercourse." Id. § 14-27.1(4). As to why the State did not charge the defendant
under North Carolina General Statute § 14-27.7, which concerns a sexual act with a minor
residing in the same home and allows no defense for consent, see supra note 36.
48. Etheridge, 317 N.C. at 36, 352 S.E.2d at 675.
49. Id. at 37, 352 S.E.2d at 675.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 45, 352 S.E.2d at 680.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 47, 352 S.E.2d at 681.
54. Id.
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abuser's purpose," the court expressly overruled Lester."5
Again, as in Strickland, Justice Webb dissented. He asserted that
I do not see how we could have a clearer holding [than Alston]
that, although a victim may be justifiably afraid of a person and
may testify that she only submitted because of a fear of what he
might do if she did not submit, there still must be evidence of
force or of a specific threat if she does not submit in order for
the jury to find there was force. I do not believe this is consistent
with reality but it is the way I believe Alston has to be read. 6
Justice Webb criticized the majority for distinguishing between the son's
fear in Lester and the fear of the victim in Alston. While he agreed that a
parent is an authority figure for a child, and a child often may fear dis-
obeying his parent's will, Justice Webb found it incongruous that the
"victim in Alston had an equal fear [of her attacker] and yet this Court
held there had to be a specific threat."5" According to Justice Webb,
there was no difference between the victim's situation in Alston and the
son's situation in Etheridge.
5 8
The most recent case attempting to define constructive force as an
element of second-degree rape in North Carolina is State v. Hardy. 9
During the summer of 1989, the defendant in Hardy lived with his wife
and stepchildren, including his fifteen-year old stepdaughter.' The de-
fendant approached his stepdaughter one night while she was walking to
the store with her sister and told her that he "wanted" her.61 He next
asked the victim "'would [she] tell,'" but she did not respond.62 No
intercourse occurred at this time. The victim testified at trial that she
ignored the defendant's statement because he was "'kind of high.' "63
Later in the summer, the defendant went into the victim's bedroom
at night on five or six different occasions after he had been drinking alco-
hol. He would climb into bed with her without speaking, except to say
"shh," and would have intercourse with her.64 The victim would not say
anything to the defendant, nor would she fight him.65 When asked at
55. Id.
56. Id. at 51-52, 352 S.E.2d at 684 (Webb, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 52, 352 S.E.2d at 684 (Webb, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Webb, J., dissenting).
59. 104 N.C. App. 226, 409 S.E.2d 96 (1991).
60. Id. at 228, 409 S.E.2d at 97.
61. Id.
62. Id. (alteration in original).
63. Id. The defendant also walked into his stepdaughter's bedroom one night, but noth-
ing transpired because her mother awoke. Id. at 228-29, 409 S.E.2d at 97.
64. Id. at 229, 409 S.E.2d at 97.
65. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 5, Hardy (No. 90 CRS 1783-1788).
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trial why she did not fight, she responded, "Well, I figured lie would hurt
me."' 66 When asked if the defendant had ever hurt her before, the victim
responded, "Not that I know of."
67
The victim further testified that she had seen the defendant fight
with her mother, but that she never had seen him hit anyone in a violent
manner.61 She also testified that the defendant had told her that her
mother would throw her out and not believe her if she told anyone about
the intercourse. The defendant gave the victim money to remain silent,
instructing her not to tell her mother how she got the money.6
9
The jury convicted the defendant of three counts of rape in the sec-
ond degree.7" On appeal, the defendant contended that the State had
failed to show that the alleged intercourse was by force.7" Fe attempted
to distinguish his case from Etheridge by stating that the son in Etheridge
was only eight when sexual abuse began, and the abuse continued for a
number of years. Moreover, the Etheridge defendant threatened to hurt
his son if he told anyone.7" The defendant in Hardy, however, never said
anything to the victim except "shh," nor did the victim ever explicitly
reject the defendant's advances. While admitting the father-stepdaughter
relationship between himself and the victim, the defendant contended
that Etheridge did not stand for the proposition that this relationship in
itself was enough to establish rape by force and against the will of the
victim.
73
The court of appeals, relying on Etheridge, disagreed, stating that
"constructive force can be reasonably inferred from the circumstances
surrounding the parent-child relationship."'74 By viewing the totality of
the circumstances, the court asserted that it was "reasonable to conclude
that by removing her underwear and physically climbing in on top of the
victim, either silently or with a 'Shh,' the defendant's actions 'carried a
great deal more menace than is apparent on the surface.' "7
66. Id. at 9.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 5.
69. Hardy, 104 N.C. App. at 229, 409 S.E.2d at 97.
70. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 3, Hardy (No. 90 CRS 1783-1788). The state could
not have brought a charge of statutory rape against the defendant because the victim was not
under thirteen years of age. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2 (1986). See also supra note 36 (ex-
plaining why the State did not charge the defendant with having intercourse with a minor
residing in his home).
71. Hardy, 104 N.C. App. at 231, 409 S.E.2d at 98.
72. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 8, Hardy (No. 90 CRS 1783-1788).
73. Id.
74. Hardy, 104 N.C. App. at 232, 409 S.E.2d at 99.
75. Id. (quoting State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 48, 352 S.E.2d 673, 681 (1987)).
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In examining how the supreme court and court of appeals have at-
tempted to define constructive force in this line of cases, it is evident that
the "more than a general fear" rule is flawed. There are three problems
in particular with the rule. First, due to its limited scope which considers
only those actions by a defendant immediately prior to the intercourse
alleged to be rape, it requires courts to exclude many factual situations
from coverage by the rule.76 As new fact situations arise, courts will
have to make more exceptions until they eventually swallow the rule.
Would not a new rule, one that could apply equally to Alston and Ether-
idge, work better?
A second problem is that the supreme court has limited the "more
than a general fear" rule to the facts in Alston." This raises the pressing
question of how similar to Alston the facts of a case must be for the rule
to apply. Does the court intend to apply Alston only to substantially
similar fact patterns, to any situation where a consensual relationship
existed prior to the alleged rape, or to any case not involving child-vic-
tims? This ambiguity brings the courts back to the original problem-
how to define constructive force. Ironically, the reason the supreme
court created the "more than a general fear" rule was to establish a con-
sistently applicable bright-line rule. This purpose is subverted by the la-
tent ambiguities surrounding the rule.
The final and most significant problem is that the Alston rule is vul-
nerable to attack on traditional doctrinal grounds. Susan Estrich, a
noted commentator and victim of rape, asserts that
[t]he court's unwillingness to credit the victim's past experience
of violence at the hands of the defendant stands in sharp con-
trast to the black letter law that a defendant's knowledge of his
attacker's reputation for violence or ownership of a gun is rele-
vant to the reasonableness of his use of deadly force in self-
defense.78
Estrich criticized the Alston court for failing to recognize what is perhaps
the most common reaction of women to rape. It is not difficult to under-
stand, according to Estrich, why a woman such as the Alston victim, who
was beaten repeatedly during a "consensual" relationship, and finally at-
tempted to leave the defendant, only to be threatened by him and told
that he had a "right" to intercourse, would not fight.79 To say that the
76. The flaw is exemplified in Etheridge, where the supreme court stated that the "more
than a general fear" rule would not apply to intrafamilial sexual intercourse. Etheridge, 319
N.C. 34, 47, 352 S.E.2d 673, 681 (1987).
77. State v. Strickland, 318 N.C. 653, 656, 351 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1987).




defendant did not use force against the victim is to "create a gulf between
power and force, and to define the latter solely in schoolboy terms."80
Because of the weaknesses inherent in the "more than a general
fear" rule, the subsequent cases have produced some strained reasoning
at best, and disastrous results at worst. All of the cases construing Al-
ston-Lester, Strickland, Etheridge, and Hardy-could have been de-
cided correctly had the supreme court initially stated the rule as to
constructive force differently.
In fashioning a better rule, it is reasonable for the court to require
that, when constructive force is at issue, a victim have more than a gen-
eral fear of her alleged rapist. This requirement would assure that the
victim felt truly overcome by her attacker.8" The problem, however,
with the Alston rule as stated by the supreme court, is not the require-
ment that the victim have more than a general fear. The flaw, rather, lies
in requiring that the victim's fear be based upon only the defendant's
actions immediately prior to the intercourse alleged to be rape. A better
rule would allow a fact-finder to find constructive force if the victim
could have more than a general fear of the defendant based upon all of
his previous actions toward the victim.
This suggested rule's utility is illustrated by applying it to the cases
discussed above. The Alston defendant had beaten the victim on previous
occasions, and several hours before the alleged rape, grabbed her arm
and threatened to "fix" her face. The supreme court, however, suggested
that, because the defendant beat the victim in the past and grabbed her
arm several hours before the intercourse took place, a fact-finder was not
to consider such actions in determining whether the victim felt more
than a general fear of the defendant. The new rule would permit a fact-
finder to consider all of the defendant's prior actions toward the victim.
Regardless of whether this would produce a different result, the fact-
finder would be better able to reach a just result were it armed with such
information.
The new rule could also have avoided the tragic result which the
"more than a general fear" rule produced in Lester. The defendant had
engaged in sexual intercourse with all of his daughters for years, and had
been having intercourse with the victim in the case since she was eleven
years old. The victim had seen her father beat her mother with such
force that, on one occasion, the defendant knocked out his wife's false
80. Id. at 1112. Justice Webb appeared to agree with this assessment when he stated in
his dissent in Etheridge that he did "not believe [Alston] is consistent with reality." 319 N.C.
at 52, 352 S.E.2d at 684 (Webb, J., dissenting).
81. See supra note 5.
1992) 2037
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
teeth. On another occasion, the defendant threatened to kill his wife if
she ever told anyone about his sexual intercourse with his children.82 He
did not, however, use physical force to have sex with his daughter on the
day of the intercourse in question.83 If the appellate court had been able
to apply the revised rule-that more than a general fear on the part of
the victim could be based on all of the defendant's prior actions-the
court would likely have affirmed the defendant's conviction in Lester.
Presumably, had the defendant in Lester slapped his daughter once
before having intercourse with her, or grabbed her, for example, the
court would have ruled differently. That such incidental facts could so
affect a case's outcome suggests a weakness in the "more than a general
fear" rule.
Two years later in Strickland (where the defendant broke into the
victim's apartment, put his hand over her mouth, and dragged her into a
bedroom, and then claimed on appeal that the victim had no more than a
"general fear" of the defendant),84 the supreme court stated that the
"[more than a] 'general fear' theory is applicable only to fact situations
similar to those in Alston."85 The new rule similarly would not apply to
Strickland because the defendant used physical force against his victim.
Strickland, however, serves to illustrate the second problem with Al-
ston's "more than a general fear" rule-the problem of deciding how
similar a case must be to the facts of Alston before a court can apply the
Alston rule. Because the court distinguished Strickland from Alston in
two ways *- that no consensual sexual relationship existed between the
parties and that the defendant used physical force 6 -it is ambiguous as
to how much emphasis the court placed on either factor.
The supreme court could have decided Strickland by stating simply
that, since the defendant used physical force, the Alston "more than a
general fear" rule did not apply. Instead it added that no prior sexual
history existed between the parties. This suggests that, if a woman alleg-
edly is raped by a man with whom she has or had a sexual relationship,
the State will always have a more difficult time proving the required
force. Strickland represents the notion that courts are uncomfortable
permitting a fact-finder to find constructive force in a case involving two
adults who have had a consensual sexual relationship. The danger of
82. State v. Lester, 70 N.C. App. 757, 758-59, 321 S.E.2d 166, 167 (1984), aff'd, 313 N.C.
595, 330 S.E.2d 205 (1985).
83. Id. at 759, 321 S.E.2d at 167.
84. State v. Strickland, 318 N.C. 653, 654-55, 351 S.E.2d 281, 282-83 (1987). See supra
notes 37-44 and accompanying text (discussing Strickland).
85. Strickland, 318 N.C. at 656, 351 S.E.2d at 283.
86. Id. at 656-57, 351 S.E.2d at 283.
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convicting an innocent defendant is considered a more viable possibility.
The court's line-drawing in Strickland illustrates the court's desire and
need for a bright-line rule. The rule, however, must be better articulated
than the one established in Alston.
In Etheridge,8 7 the supreme court created a separate category of in-
trafamilial sexual abuse, in which the State's burden to prove construc-
tive force would be lessened. The court created an exception to the
"more than a general fear" rule rather than overruling Alston and creat-
ing a new, more liberal definition of constructive force.88 Here, as in all
of the previously discussed cases, the new rule would have better served
the court's purpose by permitting a fact-finder to reach the correct result
without the need of an exception.
It is important to recognize that, without a revised rule, lower
courts may themselves take the lead in liberalizing the "more than a gen-
eral fear" rule, and perhaps even force the supreme court to follow suit
or face creating grave inconsistencies. The North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals' holding in Hardy89 may exemplify this possibility. It is clear that
on one level, the court of appeals was simply following instructions from
Etheridge to treat intrafamilial sexual abuse as a class distinct from other
situations involving rape, and to interpret more liberally what acts con-
stitute constructive force.
On a different level, however, the court of appeals expanded the defi-
nition of constructive force. Even though both Hardy and Etheridge in-
volved intrafamilial sexual abuse, there were factual differences between
the two cases. In Hardy, for example, the victim was fifteen when inter-
course transpired; the abuse occurred over one summer only; the victim
never resisted the defendant, either verbally or physically; the defendant
never spoke to the victim immediately prior to intercourse except to say
"shh;" the victim never saw the defendant behaving violently; she ac-
cepted money from the defendant to keep quiet; and she was not related
by blood to the defendant.90 In Etheridge, the son was eight when abuse
began; the abuse continued for five years; and the defendant was abusive
toward his family.91
Perhaps guided by such distinctions, the court of appeals in Hardy
found constructive force between the defendant and his step-daughter,
arguably performing the most liberal application of the constructive force
87. 319 N.C. 34, 352 S.E.2d 673 (1987). See supra notes 45-58.
88. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 47, 352 S.E.2d at 681.
89. 104 N.C. App. 226, 232, 409 S.E.2d 96, 99 (1991). See supra notes 59-75 and accom-
panying text.
90. Hardy, 104 N.C. App. at 231-32, 409 S.E.2d at 99.
91. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 36-37, 352 S.E.2d at 676-77.
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requirement to date.92 In the future, absent a revised rule, the appellate
courts may decide to extend even further this liberal definition of con-
structive force to include non-intrafamilial sexual abuse. This in turn
revives the problem of inconsistency in defining constructive force, pre-
cisely what the supreme court tried to prevent when it laid down the
"more than a general fear" rule in Alston.
Justice Webb's vehement dissents in Strickland and Etheridge offer
additional support for changing Alston's "more than a general fear" rule,
albeit in an indirect manner. In Strickland, for example, Justice Webb
focused on the factual similarities in Alston and Strickland while the ma-
jority focused on the differences. It is true that Strickland involved phys-
ical force, and the victim had not been engaged in a consensual sexual
relationship with the defendant. But, according to Justice Webb, in
neither case did the defendant use more force than was necessary to have
intercourse with the victim; in neither case did the victim physically re-
sist; and in neither case did the defendant say what he would do to the
victim if she resisted.
93
Such parallels are both tenuous and ambiguous. What did Justice
Webb mean, for example, when he stated that in neither case did the
defendant use more force than was necessary to have intercourse? Per-
haps Justice Webb was aware that his parallels were tenuous, and per-
haps he intended them to be so in order to illustrate that the "more than
a general fear" rule is not consistent with reality. Taken literally, Justice
Webb said that if the court is going to let the Alston defendant go free, it
should also let the Lester, Strickland, and Etheridge defendants go free.
It seems unlikely Justice Webb advocates this result. By suggesting such
disagreeable results, however, he draws sharp attention to his view of the
"more than a general fear" rule: it cannot produce results consistent
with reality.
The "more than a general fear" rule developed in Alston is problem-
atic. It forces a court to create distinctions that are arbitrary at best, and
completely inconsistent with reality at worst. The supreme court at-
tempted to achieve consistency in defining the elusive concept of con-
structive force in second-degree rape cases when it created the "more
than a general fear" rule. The rule, however, is so limited as to make
consistent application impossible. It is unclear at this point when a lower
court should apply the rule. It is also unclear how the rule works.
Which actions by the defendant, for example, should be taken into ac-
92. Hardy, 104 N.C. App. at 232, 409 S.E.2d at 99.
93. State v. Strickland, 318 N.C. 653, 662-63, 351 S.E.2d 281, 286 (1987) (Webb, J.,
dissenting).
[Vol. 702040
1992] CRIMINAL LAW 2041
count when determining if constructive force may be present-actions
that occurred one day before the intercourse, one hour before, five min-
utes before? All the cases addressed in this Note would have been de-
cided correctly had the court created a new rule sooner-one that
permits courts to look at all of a defendant's past actions toward his vic-
tim.
MARY LUNDERGAN HAHN
The Truth About Polygraph Evidence in Criminal Trials:
The Implications of State v. Mitchell
For the truth is a terrible thing. You dabble your foot in it and it
is nothing. But you walk a little farther and you feel it pull you
like an undertow or a whirlpooL First there is the slow pull so
steady and gradual you scarcely notice it, then the acceleration,
then the dizzy whirl and plunge to blackness. For there is a
blackness of truth, too. I
Our legal system engages partially in the search for truth.' One
component of the system's search for truth is the evaluation of witness
credibility. Perhaps this concern prompted Professor Wigmore's noted
statement: "If there is ever devised a psychological test for the valuation
of witnesses, the law will run to meet it."
3
The law, however, has not run to meet the polygraph. Polygraph
evidence has been one of the most controversial forms of evidence in
criminal and civil trials.' Many doubt the reliability of polygraph exami-
nations.' Coupling this reliability concern with the possibility for jury
misuse of polygraph evidence, many courts and scholars have concluded
that polygraph evidence should be excluded.6 At least one commentator
1. ROBERT P. WARREN, ALL THE KING'S MEN 343 (Bantam Books 1981) (1946).
2. See, e.g., Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudence or "Juriscience"?, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 525, 526-27 (1984) ("Both science and law seek truth, but they seek different truths in
different ways."). The ascertainment of truth is not, however, an exclusive goal of the system.
Ultimately, "[l]aw seeks justice," a quest which involves more than a scientific search for truth.
See id. at 527.
3. 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 875, at 237 (2d ed. 1923).
4. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206, at 628 (Edward Cleary et al. eds., 3d ed. 1984)
("The courts have not greeted the modem methods of lie detection with enthusiasm."). For a
general discussion of the controversies surrounding polygraph evidence, see id. at 625-31.
5. See, e.g., Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that esti-
mates of accuracy of polygraph examinations "range from seventy percent to ninety-five per-
cent," and noting that other factors complicate those estimates); MCCORMICK, supra note 4,
§ 206, at 626-29; Michael Abbell, Polygraph Evidence: The Case Against Admissibility in Fed-
eral Criminal Trials, 15 AM. CRIM. L. Rnv. 29, 33-50 (1977); Note, Lie Detectors in the Work-
place: The Need for Civil Actions Against Employers, 101 HARV. L. REv. 806, 807-13 (1988)
(noting inaccuracy of the polygraph). But see Barry Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evi-
dence in 1975: An Aid in Determining Credibility in a Perjury-Plagued System, 26 HATINGS
L.J. 917, 974 (1975) ("The reliability and validity of the polygraph technique and its probative
value as evidence of credibility can no longer be doubted.").
6. See Brown, 783 F.2d at 1395-97; MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 206, at 630 (describing
a "two-pronged" attack on polygraph evidence); Abbeli, supra note 5, at 50-59 (noting the
danger of misleading a jury); Jerome H. Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence:
An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 727-28 (1961) (concluding that polygraph
evidence should be excluded); but see Note, The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, 73
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would reject polygraph evidence regardless of its probative force or accu-
racy because of due process and moral concerns,7 echoing the concern
that the truth may have a dark side.8
The Supreme Court of North Carolina appeared to lay to rest the
issue of admissibility of polygraph evidence in 1983, when it held that
polygraph evidence would not be admissible in any trial under any cir-
cumstances.9 Yet the 1991 decision of State v. Mitchell10 makes it
abundantly clear that the bright line drawn by the court in 1983 has not
eliminated controversy. In Mitchell the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina decided that references to polygraph exams taken by the defendant
and two prosecution witnesses in a criminal trial were not a basis for
overturning the defendant's convictions for murder and conspiracy to
murder. "
An understanding of Mitchell is vitally important to trial courts,
prosecutors, and the criminal defense bar in North Carolina.12 This
Note will examine Mitchell against the backdrop of the court's prior rul-
ings regarding the admissibility of polygraph evidence."1 It will then as-
sess the significance of Mitchell with an eye toward delineating the
proper scope that Mitchell should be given at criminal trials. 4 The Note
concludes that although Mitchell was decided properly by the court, the
overly-broad reasoning in Mitchell creates the potential for further ero-
sion of the court's decision to exclude polygraph results from evidence,
and dramatically illustrates the dangers of engaging in unnecessary, al-
ternative holdings.1 5
In early 1987, Robert Mitchell began an extramarital affair with
Karen Jones, who was married to John Jones. 6 In August 1988, Mitch-
ell approached Dennis Davis and asked Davis to kill John Jones because
COLUM. L. REv. 1120, 1144 (1973) (concluding that polygraph evidence should be admitted
"under strict court supervision").
7. Helen Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARv. L. Rv. 683,
687, 688-89, 701-02 (1956).
8. See supra note I and accompanying text.
9. State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 645, 300 S.E.2d 351, 361 (1983).
10. 328 N.C. 705, 403 S.E.2d 287 (1991).
11. Id. at 708-12, 403 S.E.2d at 289-91.
12. Of course, Mitchell will have some impact upon the use of polygraphs in civil trials, as
did Grier. See Grier, 307 N.C. at 645, 300 S.E.2d at 361 (prohibiting polygraph evidence at
civil and criminal trials). But references to polygraph examinations usually arise in the crimi-
nal context, because Grier endorsed the use of polygraphs in criminal investigations. Id.
13. See infra notes 47-71 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 72-97 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
16. Mitchell, 328 N.C. at 706, 403 S.E.2d at 288.
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Mitchell was in love with Karen Jones.17 Davis agreed to kill John Jones
for a price,18 and he carried out the murder on October 15, 1988.19 After
the killing, Mitchell became concerned that he would be a prime sus-
pect.2 ° Mitchell enlisted the aid of Walker McCollum, a co-worker, by
asking him to "cover" Mitchell for $2,000.1 The SBI interviewed Mc-
Collum, and he told the agents that he had borrowed money from Mitch-
ell to pay child support.2 The SBI learned from McCollum's mother,
however, that she had provided McCollum with the money to pay his
child support.2 3 When confronted by the SBI, McCollum agreed to co-
operate in their investigation of Mitchell.24 McCollum subsequently
wore a recording device to two meetings with Mitchell at which Mitchell
made incriminating statements.25 On January 23, 1989, the State in-
dicted Mitchell for murder and conspiracy to commit murder.26 A jury
convicted Mitchell on both the conspiracy and the first-degree murder
charges; he received a life sentence.27
During the course of Mitchell's trial, three references were made to
polygraph examinations administered by the SBI. Karen Jones made the
first of these references. Under cross-examination by defense counsel,
she testified as follows:
Q: You have also talked with the SBI, have you not?
17. Id.
18. Id. Davis originally quoted Mitchell a price of $10,000 for killing John Jones. Id.
Although the opinion is not clear about the final price for the murder, see id. at 706-07, 403
S.E.2d at 288-89, Davis apparently ultimately agreed to do the job for $4,700 plus a saddle
worth approximately $1,200. See id; see also Brief for the State at 3, Mitchell (No. 26A90)
(discussing the price negotiations between Davis and Mitchell); Defendant-Appellant's Brief at
2-3, Mitchell (No. 26A90) (same).
19. Mitchell, 328 N.C. at 706-07, 403 S.E.2d at 288. The circumstances surrounding the
murder were as follows: Davis's girlfriend, Connie Singietary, went to the Jones's house
around midnight on October 15. Id Singletary told Mr. Jones that she was having car trouble
and requested his assistance. Id. Mr. Jones drove Singletary to her car in his truck. Id. at
707, 403 S.E. 2d at 288. Upon arrival at her car, Jones got out of the truck and Davis shot
him. Id Jones managed to get back in the truck, whereupon Davis shot him again through
the driver's side window. Id Davis then ignited the truck with a jar of gasoline. Id. The
next day, a county sheriff's detective and an SBI agent discovered the burned body and truck.
Id
20. Id. at 707, 403 S.E.2d at 289.
21. Id Mitchell wanted McCollum to "tell anybody who asked that he had borrowed
money from" Mitchell. Brief for the State at 5, Mitchell (No. 26A90). The State characterized
this phase of the crime as "The Cover-Up." Id.
22. Mitchell, 328 N.C. at 707, 403 S.E.2d at 289.
23. Id. at 707-08, 403 S.E.2d at 289.
24. Id. at 708, 403 S.E.2d at 289.
25. Id




Q: And the SBI accused you of being involved in this, did they
not?
A: No.
Q: Didn't you tell Mr. Mitchell that they were telling you that
you were involved?
A: I took a polygraph.2"
In addition, when questioned by the judge concerning events following
her husband's death, Jones twice mentioned that she had taken a poly-
graph examination.2 9 Jones never explicitly mentioned the results of that
examination.
The other two references to polygraph examinations involved taped
conversations between McCollum and Mitchell. In one taped conversa-
tion played in open court, McCollum stated both that he had taken an
examination and that he had failed that examination while disseminating
Mitchell's cover story.30 The third occasion was another recording
played in open court in which the defendant referred to having taken a
polygraph exam and stated that the SBI wanted him to take another.31
28. Id. at 709-10, 403 S.E.2d at 290.
29. Id. at 710, 403 S.E.2d at 290.
30. Id. at 709, 403 S.E.2d at 289. The pertinent portion of the taped conversation con-
tained the following exchange:
McCOLLUM: Boy, what in the hell are you doing?
MITCHELL: What you say?
McCOLLUM: Chicken, them mother fuckers been back to the house.... I got off
work and they was there. They coming down hard, Cat. They been down there, they
been to Mama's, wanted to know what she had done with the money that she bor-
rowed the day I went to court. I don't know what the hell I'm going to do. Trying
to say David, David is trying to say that I'm the one that carried you down there and
set it up, and Cat, you know.
MITCHELL: I don't believe David said that. I swear I don't.
McCOLLUM: Man, god damn, man that ain't right to start with you know.
MITCHELL: Well, I know that.
McCOLLUM: But, you know, I don't know what in the hell-I don't know what is
coming up. They are talking about the grand jury because Ifailed my damnedpoly-
graph. Wanting to get the grand jury, trying to throw it up to me. I don't know if
they are trying to scare me or what.
Id. at 708-09, 403 S.E.2d at 289 (emphasis added) (expletives deleted in opinion restored per
Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 14-15, Mitchell (No. 26A90)).
31. Id. at 709, 403 S.E.2d at 290. The pertinent portions of this conversation referred to
McCollum's polygraph examination as well as the polygraph examination administered to
Mitchell:
McCOLLUM: Well, I'm gone, Cat. I just wanted to know and you in on -
MITCHELL: They going to know we talked. What the hell? God dammit, if they
talk to you or they talk to me I will tell them you told me about going to take the test
and all.
McCOLLUM: The polygraph and all?
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Mitchell appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina," argu-
ing that it was reversible error for the trial court to have admitted the
references to polygraph examinations.33 The supreme court unani-
mously disagreed with Mitchell's contention and affirmed his
convictions.34
Writing for the court, Justice Frye determined that the appropriate
standard for appellate review in the case was the plain error rule because
the defendant had failed to object to any of the polygraph references at
trial.35 Under the plain error rule, "the appellate court must be con-
vinced that absent the alleged error, the jury probably would have
reached a different verdict.",
3 6
Given the court's decision to apply the plain error rule, Justice Frye
forecast the court's ultimate disposition:
The State contends that it presented direct evidence at trial that
MITCHELL: Uh-huh.
McCOLLUM: Boy, they throwed that son of a bitch in -
MITCHELL: Just tell them -just tell them, god dammit, that I apologized to you
for having to go through all that shit. (Inaudible). I heard that a good while and
then they ain't said a fucking word about it. Well, they did. The last thing they said
about it, asked me would I be willing to take another one. I said yes. I told the truth
on the first one and I'll tell it on the next one.
Id. at 709, 403 S.E.2d at 289-90 (emphasis added) (expletives deleted in opinion restored per
Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 15-16, Mitchell (No. 26A90)).
32. Mitchell was allowed to bypass the court of appeals on the appeal of his conspiracy
conviction, id. at 706, 403 S.E.2d at 288, because he was entitled to seek direct review of his
first-degree murder conviction in the supreme court as a matter of right. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
7A-27(a) (1989).
33. Mitchell, 328 N.C. at 708, 403 S.E.2d at 289.
34. Id. at 712, 403 S.E.2d at 291.
35. Id. at 711, 403 S.E.2d at 290. The plain error rule establishes an exception to North
Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b), which bars appellate claims that are not based on
an objection or motion to strike at trial. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b); see State v. Black, 308 N.C.
736, 740-41, 303 S.E.2d 804, 806-07 (1983). The exception found in the plain error rule is
derived from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which provides that "[p]lain errors or
defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the atten-
tion of the court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); see Black, 308 N.C. at 740, 303 S.E.2d at 806.
36. Mitchell, 328 N.C. at 711, 403 S.E.2d at 290. Justice Frye also quoted extensively
from Black in defining the standard:
[T]he plain error rule.., is always to be applied cautiously and only in the excep-
tional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is
a "fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements
that justice cannot have been done," or "where [the error] is grave error which
amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused," or the error has " 're-
sulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial' " or where
the error is such as to "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings" or where it can be fairly said "the instructional mistake had a
probable impact on the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty."
Id. (quoting Black, 308 N.C. at 740-41, 303 S.E.2d at 806-07 (citations omitted)).
established that Dennis Davis was hired by defendant to com-
mit the murder in question and that Davis killed John Jones.
Neither the State nor defendant offered any evidence to the
contrary. The State argues that the evidence complained of by
defendant merely involved statements of peripheral witnesses
and did not have any effect upon the outcome of the trial. We
are inclined to agree.37
The court manifested more than a mere inclination when it con-
cluded that, "considering the evidence in its entirety and assuming error
arguendo, we are not convinced, absent the alleged error, that the jury
probably would have reached a different verdict. Thus, plain error has
not been shown.""8 The court was satisfied that the evidence against
Mitchell was so overwhelming that, even if it was error to have admitted
the references to polygraph examinations, Mitchell still would have been
convicted.39 But the court was not content to rest its holding solely on
plain error grounds; it alternatively found no error in admitting the ref-
erences to polygraph examinations.'
Considering Jones's testimony concerning her polygraph examina-
tion, the court noted that the prohibition of evidence of polygraph results
in State v. Grier41 did not preclude use of polygraph examinations during
the investigation of a crime.4' Moreover, the court believed that "the
mere mention of polygraph testing does not necessitate appellate re-
lief."43 With respect to the tape in which McCollum admitted that he
failed a polygraph examination, the court could not "see how the admis-
sion prejudiced defendant. The apparent effect of McCollum's admission
would be to cast doubt upon his veracity as a witness for the State, thus
weakening, rather than strengthening, the State's case against defend-
ant. "I Curiously, although noting that Mitchell had made reference to
taking a polygraph examination, the court failed to discuss the defend-
ant's own reference to having taken a polygraph test.45 Apparently, the
court believed this reference was no more onerous than that of Jones,
37. Id. at 710, 403 S.E.2d at 290. Interestingly, this statement was made before the court
settled on the plain error rule, which may suggest that the court intuitively decided the out-
come and then backtracked into the rationale.
38. Id. at 712, 403 S.E.2d at 291.
39. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing application of plain error
rule to facts of Mitchell).
40. See infra notes 41-46 (discussing the Mitchell court's alternative holding).
41. 307 N.C. 628, 645, 300 S.E.2d 351, 361 (1983).
42. Mitchell, 328 N.C. at 711, 403 S.E.2d at 291 (citing Grier, 307 N.C. at 645, 300 S.E.2d
at 361 (1983)).
43. Id. (citing State v. Harris, 323 N.C. 112, 371 S.E.2d 689 (1988)).
44. Id. at 712, 403 S.E.2d at 291 (emphasis added).
45. See id. at 709, 403 S.E.2d at 289.
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which the court appeared to view as a "mere mention" of an investiga-
tory polygraph with no prejudicial effect.46
The court's decision to rest its disposition of the case on more than
plain error grounds provides some insight into the justices' interpretation
of Grier's absolute prohibition against the introduction of polygraph re-
suits in evidence. In order to understand whether Mitchell alters Grier,
and, if so, to what extent, one must examine the history of polygraphs in
North Carolina trials.
Before 1975 North Carolina courts traditionally refused to admit
any polygraph results into evidence. 7 In 1975, however, the law began to
change with the court of appeals' decision in State v. Steele.4" In Steele,
the court of appeals held that polygraph evidence could be admitted if
the parties stipulated to its admissibility and certain conditions were
met. 9 In 1979 the supreme court approvingly cited Steele. 0 Thus,
North Carolina began to flirt with the idea that polygraph results might
be admissible under some circumstances.51
This flirtation ended abruptly with the Grier decision in 1983. In
Grier the supreme court ruled that "in North Carolina, polygraph evi-
dence is no longer admissible in any trial."52 The court found two com-
46. See id. at 711, 403 S.E.2d at 291.
47. State v. Jackson, 287 N.C. 470, 480, 215 S.E.2d 123, 129-30 (1975); see also State v.
Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 637, 300 S.E.2d 351, 356 (1983) (Prior to 1975, "[p]olygraph evidence
was simply not admissible for any purpose.").
48. 27 N.C. App. 496, 219 S.E.2d 540 (1975).
49. Id. at 499-502, 219 S.E.2d at 543-44. The other conditions included the trial judge's
discretion to refuse to admit such results in evidence because of doubt regarding the examiner's
qualifications or concerns about the conditions surrounding the examination; the ability of the
party ultimately opposing admission to cross-examine the examiner; and the requirement that
the judge issue a cautionary instruction. Id. at 500, 219 S.E.2d at 543; see also Grier, 307 N.C.
at 638-39, 300 S.E.2d at 357 (discussing Steele).
50. State v. Milano, 297 N.C. 485, 499-500, 256 S.E.2d 154, 162 (1979), overruled by
Grier, 307 N.C. at 645, 300 S.E.2d at 361.
51. For a discussion of the North Carolina law relating to polygraph evidence on the eve
of Grier, see Robert M. DiGiovanni & Leigh L. Puryear, Note, Evidence: Developments in
North Carolina Law, 1982, 61 N.C. L. REV. 1126, 1143-45 (1983).
52. Grier, 307 N.C. at 645, 300 S.E.2d at 361. Grier involved an appeal from first-degree
rape and first-degree burglary convictions. Id. at 629, 300 S.E.2d at 351. The defendant took
two polygraph examinations, the first of which was deemed inconclusive, the second of which
he failed. Id. at 630-31, 300 S.E.2d at 352-53. Defense counsel sought to cross-examine the
polygraph examiner on the inconclusive results of the first test, but the trial judge refused to
allow the line of questioning because the judge held that the stipulation entered into by the
parties "provided that inconclusive results would not be admissible for any purpose." Id. at
631, 300 S.E.2d at 353. The supreme court differed with the trial judge's interpretation of the
stipulation, id. at 634-35, 300 S.E.2d at 355, but went on to address whether such evidence
should ever be admitted. See id. at 637-45, 300 S.E.2d at 356-61.
An interesting issue related to Grier is the constitutionality of excluding polygraph evi-
dence introduced by the defendant in a criminal trial. See Debra S. Katz, Note, State v. Dean:
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pelling reasons justifying its flat prohibition of polygraph evidence. First,
the court was concerned with the inherent unreliability of the polygraph
examination in accurately measuring deception."3 Indeed, the court
noted that "we have never retreated from our basic position that poly-
graph evidence is inherently unreliable."'54 Any attempt either to explore
the defects of polygraph examinations at trial or to require the trial judge
to police the polygraph proceedings would be too burdensome or it
would invite the "spectre of trial by polygraph.""5 Second, the court
believed that polygraph results might be misused by a jury; for too many
jurors the result of a polygraph examination would be conclusive as to
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 6 The court approvingly cited a
federal court opinion that noted "[w]hen polygraph evidence is offered in
evidence at trial, it is likely to be shrouded with an aura of near infallibil-
ity, akin to the ancient oracle of Delphi.... [T]he jurors' traditional
responsibility to collectively ascertain the facts and adjudge guilt or inno-
cence is preempted."57 The court did not feel that even a cautionary
instruction by the judge could cure polygraph evidence of its possible
prejudicial effect on the jury. 8
The Grier court thus relied upon the unreliability of polygraph ex-
aminations and the likelihood of jury misuse of such examination results
in prohibiting the introduction of polygraph results into evidence. This
approach parallels that of many commentators.59 More important, this
approach follows the structure of the North Carolina Rules of
A Compulsory Process Analysis of the Inadmissibility of Polygraph Evidence, 1984 Wis. L. REv.
237 (1984). Katz contends that Wisconsin's blanket prohibition of polygraph evidence may
violate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by preventing a defendant from presenting a
defense. She suggests a case-by-case approach weighing the State's justifications for excluding
evidence and the defendant's right to present evidence, and determining the probable reliability
of the polygraph for that particular defendant. Id. at 274-75. Cf Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S.
44, 61-62 (1987) (holding a per se exclusion of a defendant's posthypnosis testimony violative
of the "right of a defendant to testify on his own behalf").
53. Grier, 307 N.C. at 640-43, 300 S.E.2d at 358-59.
54. Id. at 642, 300 S.E.2d at 359; see also DiGiovanni & Puryear, supra note 51, at 1145
(noting the pre-Grier "court's continuing skepticism of the trustworthiness of polygraph tests
and consequent reluctance to find such evidence admissible").
55. Grier, 307 N.C. at 642-43, 300 S.E.2d at 359-60.
56. See id. at 643-45, 300 S.E.2d at 360.
57. Id. at 643-44, 300 S.E.2d at 360 (citing United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168
(8th Cir. 1975)). Interestingly, the Grier decision also quoted language in Alexander which
indicated that the Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected the Steele holding. Id at 644, 300 S.E.2d
at 360.
58. Id.
59. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing "two-pronged" attack on poly-
graph evidence).
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Evidence.'
Despite the strong language and bright-line prohibition in Grier, the
issue of polygraph evidence in criminal cases has not disappeared in
North Carolina. Because Grier allowed investigatory polygraph exami-
nations,61 references to polygraph examinations made during the investi-
gation phase of a criminal proceeding become likely as investigators or
witnesses who were subjected to polygraph examinations testify. The
supreme court faced such a reference in the 1988 case State v. Harris.
62
Harris involved a failure to declare a mistrial after an investigator men-
tioned that he had asked the defendant to take a polygraph examina-
tion.6" The court found the investigator's statement ("I asked both of
them if they would agree to take a - polygraph test") 64 to be "neutral on
its face" because it did not imply whether the test was ever given, and if
so, what the results were. 65 The court refused to indulge the defendant's
"bald assertion" that a jury would likely infer that he must have failed
his polygraph examination because he was on trial.6 Moreover, the
court noted that defense counsel then cross-examined the witness, re-
vealing that the defendant had volunteered to take the polygraph exami-
nation, but did not because the investigator did not set up the test.67
Also, the trial judge issued a cautionary instruction to the jury.
6 8
Thus, Harris held that a neutral reference to an investigatory poly-
graph that the jury later learned was never administered to the defendant
60. The Rules of Evidence were not effective in their current form until July 1, 1984. See
Act of July 7, 1983, ch. 701, § 3, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 666, 684. Although the rules were not
effective until after Grier, the court's opinion closely tracks the structure of those rules. For
example, the court's evident concern with the unreliability of polygraph examinations implies
that the court did not believe that polygraph evidence would "assist" the jury in determining
the truthfulness of a witness, a belief which would render such evidence inadmissible under
Rule 702. See N.C. R. EVID. 702 (predicating admission of expert or scientific testimony
upon the ability of the expert or scientist to "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue"). Similarly, the court's focus on the likelihood ofjury misuse of
such evidence would raise concerns under Rule 403, which excludes otherwise relevant evi-
dence if it tends to mislead the jury, to create prejudice or confusion, or to waste time. See
N.C. R. EviD. 403. Indeed, federal courts have availed themselves of the similar Federal
Rules of Evidence in addressing the admissibility of polygraph examination results. See, e.g.,
United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1531, 1535-37 (1lth Cir. 1989) (en banc); id. at
1541-42 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d
1389, 1394-97 (9th Cir. 1986).
61. See State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 645, 300 S.E.2d 351, 361 (1983).
62. 323 N.C. 112, 371 S.E.2d 689 (1988).
63. Id. at 124, 371 S.E.2d at 697.




68. Id. at 126, 371 S.E.2d at 697.
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(despite his willingness to take the examination), coupled with a curative
instruction from the trial judge regarding the irrelevancy of polygraph
examinations, was not adequate grounds for a mistrial. The court did
not purport to announce any broad rule relating to references to investi-
gatory polygraphs; instead, the court seemed concerned solely with refer-
ences to polygraph examinations from which the jury might draw an
inference regarding the results. This conclusion is consistent with both
Grier, which prohibited the introduction of polygraph examination re-
sults into evidence, and with several other state court decisions in juris-
dictions that prohibit the introduction of polygraph examination
results.69 The conclusion is also consistent with North Carolina law
before 1975.70 Moreover, the Harris court's conclusion finds some sup-
port in the Rules of Evidence.71
At first glance, the Mitchell court's holding that the references to
Jones's and Mitchell's polygraph examinations did not constitute error
69. Several jurisdictions that prohibit the introduction of polygraph examination results
into evidence have found no error where evidence that the accused or a witness had taken a
polygraph examination was admitted, provided the results of such a polygraph were not re-
vealed. Johnson v. State, 166 So. 2d 798, 804-05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); People v. Sam-
mons, 17 Ill. 2d 316, 320, 161 N.E.2d 322, 324 (1959); McQueen v. Commonwealth, 669
S.W.2d 519, 523 (Ky.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 893 (1984); Lusby v. State, 217 Md. 191, 194-95,
141 A.2d 893, 894-95 (1958); Pittman v. State, 236 Miss. 592, 597-98, Ill So. 2d 415, 417
(1959); Commonwealth v. Garland, 475 Pa. 389, 397, 380 A.2d 777, 781 (1977); Common-
wealth v. Upchurch, 355 Pa. Super. 425, 433, 513 A.2d 995, 998-99 (1986), appeal denied, 514
Pa. 630, 522 A.2d 558 (1987); State v. Collins, 60 Ohio App. 2d 116, 123, 396 N.E.2d 221, 226
(1977). Nevertheless, some courts in jurisdictions prohibiting the introduction of polygraph
results have found it error to admit references to polygraph examinations, because of the dan-
ger that a jury will infer that the defendant's trial is partially the result of his failing the
polygraph examination. See Stack v. State, 234 Ga. 19, 23-25, 214 S.E.2d 514, 517-18 (1975),
overruled by State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 239 S.E.2d 324 (1977); State v. Perry, 274 Minn.
1, 13, 142 N.W.2d 573, 580 (1966).
70. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 515, 524, 184 S.E.2d 282, 288 (1971) ("There
was no evidence, before the jury, as to... the result of the [polygraph] test.... There is no
merit in this assignment of error.").
71. Recall the similarities between the current Rules of Evidence and the Grier opinion.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text. In Harris, the polygraph reference could not be
categorized as expert or scientific evidence offered for the purpose of determining a witness's
truthfulness. Instead, Harris involved an uninvited, non-expert opinion, placing the reference
outside of the scope of Rule 702. See N.C. R. EVID. 702; see also supra note 60 (discussing
relationship of Rule 702 to Grier). Still, the testimony in Harris does not seem to be relevant
under Rule 401, and thus should not be admitted under Rule 402. See N.C. R. EvID. 401,
402. The Harris court sidestepped the issue of relevance (probably because the judge issued a
curative instruction, see supra note 68 and accompanying text), and focused on an analysis
comparable to Rule 403, which excludes evidence likely to mislead a jury or cause prejudice.
See N.C. R. EviD. 403. By noting that the reference was "neutral," see supra note 65 and
accompanying text, and possibly beneficial to the defendant, see supra note 67 and accompany-
ing text, the court apparently believed that the evidence hardly could mislead the jury to the
prejudice of the defendant. Thus, Rule 403 concerns would not justify reversal of the trial
judge.
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seems to be dictated by Harris. Neither the defendant nor Karen Jones
explicitly stated the results of the polygraph examinations, and the court
cannot indulge in the "bald assertion" that, because the defendant hap-
pens to be on trial, he must have failed his examination while the prose-
cution witness must have passed hers.72 Nevertheless, this assertion is
stronger in Mitchell than in Harris. First, Mitchell indicated that the
SBI asked him to submit to another polygraph examination, 3 which
could imply that he failed the first test, or, at a minimum, that the results
were inconclusive.74 Second, and more important, Jones's first statement
that she took a polygraph came in response to defense counsel's questions
concerning whether the SBI thought she was involved in the murder con-
spiracy. In this context, Jones's statement appears less neutral and
more exculpatory of her own possible involvement in the crime. As a
witness for the prosecution', such a possible exculpatory inference obvi-
ously would benefit her credibility.76 Thus, the statements in Mitchell
contained possible inferences; they were not as neutral as the statement
in Harris.7 7 Moreover, because defense counsel failed to object to the
evidence, there was no opportunity for a curative instruction in Mitch-
ell.78 Additionally, unlike Harris, one could not infer that the polygraph
references in Mitchell exculpated the defendant.79 Indeed, the critical
distinction between Harris and Mitchell is that in Harris the jury learned
no polygraph was ever given, whereas the jury in Mitchell learned that
two polygraph examinations were given, and could infer their results
from the context of the questioning.
If Jones's and Mitchell's statements raised possible inferences about
the results of polygraph examinations, the recording of McCollum's ad-
mission that he failed a polygraph examination'0 provided the results
72. See Harris, 323 N.C. at 125, 371 S.E.2d at 697.
73. Mitchell, 328 N.C. at 709, 403 S.E.2d at 290.
74. Alternatively, the request could merely imply that the SBI wished to double-check the
defendant's prior examination; however, the ultimate conclusion, that there is more to Mitch-
ell's argument than the "bald assertion" of Harris, still seems relatively uncontroversial.
75. See Mitchell, 328 N.C. at 709-10, 403 S.E.2d at 290.
76. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine reached a similar conclusion, finding prejudicial
error when a victim in a rape and sodomy prosecution stated during direct examination that
she had undergone a polygraph examination, because the statement could have been perceived
as corroborative of her testimony. State v. Edwards, 412 A.2d 983, 984-86 (Me. 1980). The
court reached this conclusion despite having held, much as the Harris court did, that "[a]
reference to a lie detector test in a criminal trial is not ground for reversal if the result of the
test cannot be inferred .. . ." Id. at 985; see Harris, 323 N.C. at 125, 371 S.E.2d at 697.
77. For a discussion of Harris, see supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
78. Naturally, the trial judge could have issued a curative instruction sua sponte.
79. See Harris, 323 N.C. at 125, 371 S.E.2d at 697.
80. Mitchell, 328 N.C. at 708-09, 403 S.E.2d at 289.
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outright. The Mitchell court explained away this problem by contending
that McCollum's failure could only "cast doubt upon his veracity as a
witness for the state."81 The court, however, ignored the context of Mc-
Collum's testimony. McCollum made the statement about failing the
polygraph when discussing the cover story Mitchell had created. His
failure would not impeach his own credibility as a witness as much as it
would make his prior cover-up statements appear to be part of a fabric of
deception woven by the defendant.8 2 Thus, McCollum's failure would
strengthen, not impeach, his credibility as a witness: it would make his
allegations that Mitchell had concocted a cover-up more believable. To
assert that the evidence of McCollum's polygraph examination failure83
really prejudiced the State is to indulge in a fanciful re-creation of the
context in which the jury heard those polygraph results.
In sum, Mitchell involved evidence, such as Jones's and Mitchell's
statements, which on its face appears to meet Harris's limitation of
Grier.84 But when viewed in the proper context, and when contrasted
with the exculpatory inferences that the Harris jurors could have made,
these statements lose much of their facial neutrality. Moreover, McCol-
lum's testimony revealed to the jury polygraph examination results,
which, given their context, raised probable inferences prejudicial to the
defendant. Mitchell seriously undercuts Grier by taking the Harris ex-
ception to an extreme: polygraph evidence that Grier barred may be
brought in through the back doors of Harris and Mitchell.
This interpretation may be unduly pessimistic. The tone of the
Mitchell opinion strongly suggests that the application of the plain error
standard of review had more to do with the disposition of the case than
any active hostility toward Grier.85 The court voiced little concern that
81. Id. at 712, 403 S.E.2d at 291.
82. Mitchell advanced this argument before the court when he contended that McCol-
lum's polygraph failure reinforced "McCollum's testimony that [Mitchell] had in fact gotten
him to lie about having borrowed money to explain funds missing from the redeposit of
[Mitchell]'s large withdrawal of funds from savings." Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 19,
Mitchell (No. 26A90).
83. Whether McCollum ever did in fact fail a polygraph examination is not stated in the
opinion or the briefs filed by the parties. Whether McCollum ever took a polygraph exam is,
however, immaterial. When the jury was informed, via the recordings, that McCollum had
failed a polygraph examination purportedly administered while McCollum was disseminating
Mitchell's cover story to the SBI, the consideration under Grier, which concerned jury misuse
of polygraph evidence, arose. See State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 643-45, 300 S.E.2d 351, 360
(1983).
84. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text (discussing Harris's articulation of the
limits of Grier).
85. In this respect, Mitchell is in accord with many cases in which a defendant failed to
object at trial to a polygraph reference in a jurisdiction that otherwise bars the admission of
polygraph results. Such errors are routinely found not to be prejudicial or reversible. See
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the references to the polygraph examinations incriminated the defend-
ant.86 From the removed perspective of an appellate court bench, the
facts of Mitchell do not create obvious prejudice toward the defendant:
two people indicated they had taken polygraphs but neither made the
results of that examination explicit, and a witness for the State admitted
to having failed a polygraph examination. 7 Only when inquiring into
the context in which the references were made is the error of Mitchell
apparent.
In light of the incorrect result in Mitchell, are the limitations on
Grier enunciated in Harris and Mitchell valid? On the one hand, limita-
tions on Grier may not be in the long-term interest of justice.8 On the
other hand, it is impractical to overturn a conviction whenever a refer-
ence to a polygraph examination occurs.89 Additionally, many such ref-
erences do not raise problems for a defendant; indeed, some references,
such as those in Harris, may actually exculpate the defendant.9" To cre-
ate an automatic rule overturning any conviction obtained when there
was reference to a polygraph examination would be unwarranted. In-
deed, while some states that exclude polygraph examination results from
evidence find error when any reference to a polygraph examination is
made, most do not.9
Accepting that we must tolerate some polygraph references, could
Mitchell have been decided differently so as to make the limitation on
Grier clearer and more just? Of course, the court could have altered the
People v. Parrella, 158 Cal. App. 2d 140, 147, 322 P.2d 83, 88 (1958) (refusing to find prejudi-
cial error in a case involving error said to be invited by the defense because the other evidence
of guilt was overwhelming ); see also State v. Temple, 192 Neb. 442, 442-44, 222 N.W.2d 356,
357-58 (1974) (finding reference to a polygraph test not reversible error); State v. Williams,
279 N.C. 515, 524, 184 S.E.2d 282, 288 (1971) (same).
86. See Mitchell, 328 N.C. at 711-12, 403 S.E.2d at 290-91.
87. Mitchell did, however, suggest that the evidence might have been interpreted differ-
ently had McCollum's polygraph examination failure - which tended to reinforce his story
that he was helping Mitchell cover up the murder - not been admitted. Defendant-Appel-
lant's Brief at 19, Mitchell (No. 26A90). Given that the supreme court unanimously decided
against Mitchell, and given its particular emphasis on the plain error rule, it seems that the
court found no substance to this argument.
88. This view also assumes that Grier's hostility toward polygraph evidence is an appro-
priate concern for justice. Justice is not necessarily promoted by the absence of polygraph
evidence for those who do not believe that it is a "loose cannon on the deck" of a trial. See
Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 19, Mitchell (No. 26A90).
89. Given the court's endorsement of investigatory polygraphs, see State v. Grier, 307
N.C. 628, 645, 300 S.E.2d 351, 361 (1983), it is likely that polygraphs often will be used in
criminal investigations. As witnesses inadvertently may make reference to such examinations,
such references may be frequent.
90. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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plain error rule in light of the Grier holding, as the defense suggested. 92
Apparently, such an alteration was unpalatable to the court. The court
may have found it illogical to alter the standard of review for a particular
type of error; such an asymmetrical holding might confuse the law re-
garding appropriate standards for appellate review. Moreover, without
protection of the plain error rule, the court might have been forced to
overturn the convictions of a party it thought was clearly guilty.
Another option would have allowed the court to dispose of the case
in the same manner while ensuring that Grier was not undercut. The
court simply could have assumed error arguendo under Grier and still
have found no plain error. This result would have preserved the spirit of
Grier without altering the defendant's convictions.
If the court felt compelled to address the Grier issue despite the
availability of an easy affirmance under the plain error rule, the least it
could have done was decide that issue with some clarity and logic. The
simplest, most obvious way for the court to have addressed the poly-
graph evidence issue in Mitchell would have been to address the error in
light of the Rules of Evidence. As noted earlier, the Grier and Harris
rulings paralleled the structure of the Rules of Evidence. ]By explicitly
applying the structure of those rules to Mitchell, the court could have
started its inquiry by focusing on the type of references involved. Since
the polygraph references did not involve expert testimony offered to es-
tablish the truthfulness of a witness or party, the interaction of Rules 702
and 403, to which Grier implicitly spoke,9 3 would not be the focus of
inquiry. Rather, a standard analysis of Rules 401-403, which was im-
plicitly involved in Harris,94 should have guided the court's inquiry.
Under Rule 401, the testimony received in Mitchell would be of minimal
relevance at best.95 Conversely, the possibility for misleading the jury in
92. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 19, Mitchell (No. 26A90) ("Whatever the standard of
review applicable to the instant issue, surely that standard must be modified where the evi-
dence in question is so unreliable that parties may not stipulate to its introduction.").
93. See supra note 60.
94. See supra note 71.
95. One may contend that the references were relevant to the context of events involved in
the trial. For example, McCollum and Mitchell's references were part of conspiratorial con-
versations. See supra notes 30-31. Similarly, Jones's references to polygraph examinations
could be slightly relevant to the timing of investigatory events. See Mitchell, 328 N.C. at 711,
403 S.E.2d at 291. Yet it would be very difficult to contend that those references could not be
redacted or stricken without sacrificing the jury's ability to understand the facts of the case.
Thus, whatever contextual relevance these references possess is slight. Moreover, if the unreli-
ability of the polygraph renders its results inadmissible when offered by an expert because of a
failure to "assist" the jury, see supra note 60, it can hardly be contended that any possible
implication that a jury might draw from a lay witness's reference to such examinations be-
comes more relevant.
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Mitchell did exist.9 6 Thus, the court should have found error by follow-
ing the logic of Rule 403, 9 7 or at least recognized the countervailing in-
terests involved in admitting the evidence.
Unfortunately, the court, by finding both no error in admitting the
evidence and no plain error, may have painted with too broad a brush.
Yet Mitchell defines the law as it now stands in North Carolina: refer-
ences to polygraph examinations, when not offered by experts to prove
the truthfulness of a witness, are not erroneously admitted if such refer-
ences do not prejudice the defendant.98 Although this holding may be
relatively non-controversial, what is disturbing is the court's lack of rigor
in examining the possibility of prejudice to the defendant. Hopefully,
trial courts will not misinterpret the supreme court's carelessness in
Mitchell as a major retreat from Grier. The court's holding in Mitchell
should be interpreted as a confusing overlap between the application of
the plain error rule and Grier's prohibition of polygraph evidence.
Given that Grier has not been overruled explicitly by the court,99 trial
courts should continue to rely on its existence in deciding cases, and may
find it fruitful to view Grier and its progeny as structurally similar to the
Rules of Evidence."°
Similarly, defense counsel should never, without making a timely
objection in the familiar language of the Rules of Evidence,1"1 allow the
admission of evidence regarding the administration of a polygraph exam-
ination to any witness or the defendant. By lodging a timely objection,
the plain error rule will be inapplicable 1 2 and the defendant's opportu-
nity for reversal will be enhanced greatly.
10 3
96. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text (discussing possibility for misleading
jury to prejudice defendant).
97. See N.C. R. EVID. 403 (excluding evidence likely to mislead a jury, confuse issues,
create prejudice, or waste time).
98. One may view Harris and Mitchell as two prongs of a single limitation on Grier.
While Harris states that a reference to a polygraph examination that does not implicitly or
explicitly divulge the results of the examination is not error, see supra notes 62-71 and accom-
panying text (discussing Harris), Mitchell goes further, holding that the results must prejudice
the defendant before error exists. See Mitchell, 328 N.C. at 712, 403 S.E.2d at 291.
99. Indeed, the Mitchell court speaks favorably of Grier, reinforcing the notion that the
court was not attempting to alter Grier substantially. See Mitchell, 328 N.C. at 711, 403
S.E.2d at 291.
100. See supra notes 60, 71, & 93-97.
101. The objection obviously should be couched both in terms of relevancy and danger of
misleading the jury.
102. See supra notes 35-36.
103. In addition to objecting to the introduction of any evidence referencing polygraph
testing, defense counsel, if aware of polygraph examinations during the investigation of the
crime, should consider filing a motion in limine to prevent the prosecution from asking any
questions directly calling on a witness to mention a polygraph examination. Similarly, defense
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Notwithstanding the confusion introduced by Mitchell, Grier re-
mains good law. The supreme court should clarify the confusion Mitch-
ell injects into the law at the earliest possible moment, taking advantage
of settled principles found in the Rules of Evidence. More important, the
court should be careful about engaging in unnecessary, alternative hold-
ings in the future lest it create confusion in other areas of the law. Too
much of this carelessness risks plunging lawyers and judges into a black-
ness in which no one can discern the law.
GUSTAVUS A. PURYEAR IV
counsel may ask the trial judge to remind the prosecutor to admonish any witness from men-
tioning polygraph testing. Prosecutors seeking such a motion or admonition may be treated
less favorably because of constitutional concerns. See supra note 52 (discussing possible consti-
tutional infirmities surrounding blanket prohibition of defense-introduced polygraph
examinations).
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Hands Off! New North Carolina General Statutes
Section 115C-390 Allows Local School Boards to Ban
Corporal Punishment
[A first-grade teacher] hit 6-year-old Jerry... more than 100
times Thursday with a yardstick on the backs of his legs, bottom,
and hands .... 'The teacher] told them she would give them
five licks for each problem they got wrong... He doesn't want to
go [to school]... He thinks because the other children were
cheering and telling where to spank him... [that] the other kids
hate him.",
Corporal punishment in public schools is an American tradition.2
Grounded in social and religious norms and permitted by the common-
law doctrine of in loco parentis,3 corporal punishment in schools is a
commonly practiced method of discipline,4 and persists despite the gen-
1. 1 Wrong Math Answer = 5 Spanks, MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.), May 21,
1991, at 16.
2. Irwin A. Hyman & Eileen McDowell, An Overview, in CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION 3, 5 (Irwin A. Hyman & James H. Wise eds., 1979) (noting that a
schoolhouse built in 1793 in Sunderland, Massachusetts had a whipping post built into the
schoolhouse floor). See generally John Manning, Discipline in the Good Old Days (1959), re-
printed in CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, supra, at 50-61 (an anecdotal
history of corporal punishment in America).
This Note deals with the issue of corporal punishment in schools. The appropriateness of
parental use of this form of punishment is outside the scope of this Note. Any reference in this
Note to corporal punishment is intended to apply only to its use in schools.
3. See infira notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
4. The Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights estimates that nearly 900,000
students received corporal punishment in the 1987-88 school year. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCA-
TION, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 1988 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL CIVIL
RIGHTS SURVEY app. b, at 1. Twenty-two thousand of those incidents occurred in North
Carolina. 20 School Systems Ban Corporal Punishment, CHILDREN FIRST (N.C. Child Advo-
cacy Inst., Raleigh, N.C.) Fall 1991, at 1, 3 [hereinafter 20 School Systems] (noting a signifi-
cant decline from 66,000 incidents in 1983-84).
On a local level in North Carolina, the Charlotte/Mecklenburg school system recorded
228 paddlings during the 1990-91 school year. Id. at 1. Wake County schools reported about
1,500 incidents of corporal punishment in 1986, but after the implementation of a stringent
reporting policy, that number decreased to just seven cases in 1990-91. Id. at 3. Of the school
systems sampled in the federal survey, several systems reported rates higher than the state
average of 2.7%: Tyrell, 11.7%; Haywood and Elkin, 7.3%; Lincoln, 5.7%; Robeson, 5,5%;
Stokes, 4.8%; Avery, 5.4%; Madison, 4.2%; Yadkin and Harnett, 3.7%; Winston-Salem/For-
syth and Jones, 3.3%; Goldsboro, 3.2%; Caswell, 3%; and Orange, 2.7%. Id.
While the statistics reflect the magnitude of the situation, anecdotal evidence reveals the
personal danger posed by the use of corporal punishment in schools. In Charlotte, North
Carolina, a ten-year-old boy required medical attention after a principal spanked him in a
boiler room while an assistant held the boy's hands. Id. at 1. A first-grade teacher in New
Hanover, North Carolina, punished six students for giving wrong answers in class by whipping
them with a yardstick; some students received over a hundred licks. See supra note I and
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eral belief that it is an ineffective and often harmful method of
discipline.'
Over the last five years, however, the trend in America has moved
toward statutory bans on corporal punishment in public schools. Cur-
rently, twenty-three states have statutes prohibiting corporal punishment
in public schools.6 This represents a dramatic increase from only six ju-
risdictions in 1987.7 Additionally, by the summer of 1991, all but one of
the states that did not ban corporal punishment allowed local education
boards to prohibit the practice in their districts." Many large districts
nationwide have taken advantage of this authority to enact local bans.9
The one state not allowing local boards to prohibit the use of reason-
able force to maintain discipline was North Carolina.10 In June 1991,
however, the North Carolina General Assembly amended section 115C-
390 of the North Carolina General Statutes to give local school boards
the autonomy to "restrict or prohibit" corporal punishment."1
accompanying text. See generally ADAH MAURER, PADDLES AWAY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT IN SCHOOLS 17 (1981) [hereinafter MAURER, PADDLES
AWAY] (" 'Corporal punishment... is far from extinct. In a number of places... the brutali-
zation of children appears to be a part of the core curriculum.' ") (citing Nat Hentoff, Corporal
Punishment, CIVIL LIBERTIES, Nov. 1971; Adah Maurer, It Does Happen Here, in CORPORAL
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 219 [hereinafter Maurer, It Does
Happen] (describing instances of corporal punishment in modem schools); Mariellen F. Scott
& Perry A. Zirkel, Education 101: Methods and Materials of Corporal Punishment, 36 EDUC.
L. REP. (West) 267, 267-70 (1987) (describing various methods of corporal punishment).
5. While many opponents view the use of corporal punishment as harmful per se, others
base their opposition on the high number of instances of abuse and unintentional physical or
emotional harm that often results. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
6. Arizona Bans Corporal Punishment, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT UPDATE (N.C. Child
Advocacy Inst., Raleigh, N.C.) Jan. 1992, at 2. States prohibiting the use of corporal punish-
ment generally allow force that is reasonable and necessary to: (1) quell a disturbance, (2)
provide self-protection, (3) protect the pupil or others from physical injury, or (4) prevent
damage to property. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302(4)(a) (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A:6-1 (West 1989).
7. Natalie L. Clark, Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victims and Perpetuat-
ing Violence, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 263, 270 n.22 (1987) (noting that only Maine, Massa-
chusetts, New Jersey, Hawaii, Maryland, and the District of Columbia had banned corporal
punishment) (citing LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 526 (Robert M. Horowitz & Howard A.
Davidson eds., 1984)).
8. See Minutes, North Carolina House Committee on Education (June 6, 1991) (statement
of Sen. Howard Lee).
9. See Adah Maurer, The Case Against Physical Punishment in Schools, in CORPORAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE SCHOOLS: ITS USE IS ABUSE 16, 17 (John R. Cryan ed., 1981) [hereinaf-
ter Maurer, The Case Against].
10. See Act of June 16, 1959, ch. 1016, § 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 1042, 1042 (current
version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11SC-390 (1991)).
11. The full text of the amended statute reads:
Except as restricted or prohibited by rules adopted by the local boards of education,
principals, teachers, substitute teachers, voluntary teachers, and teacher assistants
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This Note will discuss briefly the statutory change and its legislative
history. After reviewing the social and legal justifications for corporal
punishment in schools, the Note will discuss the case law concerning
corporal punishment, first reviewing North Carolina cases, followed by a
brief review of federal case law. The Note then will address the issue of
local versus state control of public education, suggesting that, although
section 115C-390 may be an appropriate first step, a statewide ban should
be enacted in North Carolina. Finally, the Note will discuss the signifi-
cance of the statute to local school boards, state school children, and
litigation in the field.
The statutory change is rather straightforward. Reflecting estab-
lished common law12 originally codified in 1959,13 former section 115C-
390 permitted the use of reasonable force to "restrain or correct pupils
and maintain order."14 While the General Assembly could have banned
the use of corporal punishment as a disciplinary tool, it opted instead to
delegate the issue to local school boards. Thus, the amended version of
section 115C-390 does not prohibit the use of corporal punishment; it
merely permits local school boards to do so.15
This was not the first effort to change North Carolina's reasonable
force provision, but prior legislative attempts to ban corporal punishment
in the state's public schools proved unsuccessful. In 1975 Representative
Margaret Keesee introduced a bill proposing a corporal punishment ban
in schools. 6 A House committee, however, rejected the proposal.
17
Similarly, in 1985 a local option bill1 failed in the House by three
votes.1 Rather than allow the corporal punishment issue to die, how-
and student teachers in the public schools of this State may use reasonable force in
the exercise of lawful authority to restrain or correct pupils and maintain order.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-390 (1991) (effective July 1, 1991).
12. See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
13. Act of June 16, 1959, ch. 1016, § 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 1042, 1042 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-390 (1991)).
14. Id.
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-390 (1991). The amendment deleted the last sentence in the
old statute prohibiting local school boards from banning the use of reasonable force and added
an introductory clause expressly permitting prohibitions by local boards. Id. For the full text
of the amended statute, see supra note 11.
16. John S. Niblock, Corporal Punishment in the North Carolina Public Schools: A
Chronology 1 (1991) (prepared by the North Carolina Child Advocacy Institute, Raleigh,
N.C.).
17. Id.
18. H.B. 861, General Assembly of North Carolina, 1985 Session.
19. Niblock, supra note 16, at 1.
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ever, the House approved a study committee.2" The study committee
considered recommending a total ban or a local control option, but it
concluded that teachers and school officials needed adequate discipline
alternatives before corporal punishment "as a last resort" could be elimi-
nated.21 The study committee nonetheless officially recommended due
process safeguards substantially similar to the amendments to section
115C-391 passed in 1987.22
Then in 1991, at the request of an undergraduate class at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Senator Howard Lee of Chapel
Hill introduced a bill calling for local control.23 Although many of the
proposal's supporters opposed corporal punishment in general,24 none of
the legislative history suggests the measure was intended to circumvent
the General Assembly's past reluctance to ban corporal punishment. In
fact, Senator Lee made it clear in committee that "the intent of the bill
was to provide flexibility to local school units."25  While such attempts
to eliminate corporal punishment are not new to North Carolina, change
is difficult for a practice so ingrained through social, religious, and legal
traditions. Early colonial schools prided themselves on the strict disci-
pline required for developing character and morality.26 This disciplinary
20. Act of July 18, 1985, ch. 790, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 1319, 1319 (incorporating by
reference the resolution authorizing a Legislative Commission Research Study).
21. REPORT OF THE 1985 LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION STUDY COMMITTEE ON
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 12 (1986).
22. Id. at 13. The committee reported that it would like to consider a total ban of corpo-
ral punishment and recommended that local boards and state education authorities work to
train school personnel in alternative discipline methods. Id. at 14.
For a summary of the due process standards required by § 115C-391, see infra note 54.
23. Act of June 12, 1991, ch. 269, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws- (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-390 (1991)). See 20 School Systems, supra note 4, at 1.
24. Major professional organizations opposing corporal punishment include the National
Education Association, the American Medical Society, the American Bar Association, the Na-
tional PTA, the North Carolina PTA, the North Carolina Medical Society, the North Caro-
lina Pediatrics Society, and the North Carolina Child Advocacy Institute. Niblock, supra note
16, at 1, 2; see also American Psychological Association, A Statement on Corporal Punishment
(1975), reprinted in CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE SCHOOLS: ITS USE IS ABUSE, supra note
9, at 5 (noting the ineffectiveness and counterproductivity of corporal punishment and stating
its opposition to its use).
25. Minutes, North Carolina House Committee on Education (June 6, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Howard Lee). Counsel to the Senate Committee on Education summarized the bill by
saying it would allow local school boards to make their own decisions regarding corporal
punishment. Minutes, North Carolina Senate Committee on Education (May 8, 1991) (state-
ment of Mary Thompson, legal counsel to the committee).
26. Irwin A. Hyman & Delores M. Lally, Corporal Punishment in American Education: A
Historical and Contemporary Dilemma, in CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE SCHOOLS: ITS
USE IS ABUSE, supra note 9, at 9. Early North Carolina schools clearly endorsed this philoso-
phy. See Murphey's Report (Dec 19, 1816), in CHARLES L. COON, THE BEGINNINGS OF PUB-
LIC EDUCATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1790-1840, at 105, 107-
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focus reflected values rooted firmly in the Judeo-Christian religious tradi-
tion.27 Along with Old Testament teachings encouraging the use of cor-
poral punishment,28 the Christian teaching of total depravity further
bolstered the practice.29
Legal traditions reinforced these societal and religious norms3 °
through the doctrine of in locoparentis.3 1 Although several state statutes
rely on the doctrine,32 its application to the teacher-student relationship
in modem public schools is of questionable validity. 3 Today, the
mandatory nature of public education and the decreased likelihood that a
given parent would corporally punish her child, or choose to delegate
that authority to a school official, suggest that a teacher may not stand in
the place of a parent and administer corporal punishment. 4 Modem
justification for using force to discipline rests on the state's interest in
maintaining the control necessary to educate children properly. 35 For-
mer Section 115C-390 of the North Carolina General Statutes, authoriz-
ing the use of reasonable force to maintain discipline, reflected this shift
08 (1908) ("[I]n [primary] schools the precepts of morality and religion should be inculcated,
and habits of subordination and obedience formed.").
27. See Hyman & Lally, supra note 26, at 9.
28. See Proverbs 13:24 ("He that spareth his rod hateth his son: but he that loveth him
chasteneth him betimes.") (King James).
29. Hyman & Lally, supra note 26, at 9. The term "beating the devil" out of children
arises from this Calvinistic concept of total depravity, that humankind is born into sin. Id.
Indeed, Christian Fundamentalists are often zealous supporters of corporal punishment. Id.;
see MAURER, PADDLES AWAY, supra note 4, at 69-70.
30. Cynthia D. Sweeney, Comment, Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: A Violation
of Substantive Due Process?, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1246 (1982) ("For over two hundred
years, Anglo-American law has allowed school officials to punish disobedient students with
physical force.").
31. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453. The doctrine originated in Eng-
land as legal justification for teachers who used corporal punishment to discipline student
behavior in and out of school. Perry A. Zirkel & Henry F. Reichner, Is the "In Loco Parentis"
Doctrine Dead?, 15 J.L. & EDUC. 271, 273-76 (1986). Literally translated, in loco parentis
means "in place of the parent." EDWARD C. BOLMEIER, LEGALITY OF STUDENT DISCIPLI-
NARY PRACTICES 9 (1976). With regard to teacher liability for injuries to a student, the pre-
vailing view limited liability to situations where the actions constituted willful or wanton
conduct or where the teacher was negligent. Id. at 10-11; see also Drum v. Miller, 135 N.C.
205, 216-17, 47 S.E. 421, 426 (1904) (following the prevailing view).
32. See, eg., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, para. 24-24 (Smith-Hurd 1989); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 13-1317 (1991).
33. BOLMEIER, supra note 31, at 29; cf. State v. Pittard, 45 N.C. App. 701, 703, 263
S.E.2d 809, 811 (holding that in loco parentis is not a defense for a day-care worker charged
with corporal punishment), disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 378, 267 S.E.2d 682 (1980).
34. See Thomas A. Gunn, Note, "In Loco Parentis" and Due Process: Should These Doc-
trines Apply to Corporal Punishment?, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 678, 679 (1974); Sweeney, supra
note 30, at 1247 & n.14.
35. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 300-01 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975)
(mem.); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147(2) (1977) ("[A school official] is
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away from the common-law doctrine to reliance on codified state
interests.
Early North Carolina case law, dating back to 1837, focused on set-
ting the limits for reasonable corporal punishment. In State v. Pender-
grass3 6 the lower court convicted a schoolmaster of assault and battery
for whipping a "six or seven"-year-old girl with a switch.37 The North
Carolina Supreme Court, applying a two-part test, determined that a
teacher may be held criminally liable for corporal punishment where (1)
its use causes or was intended to cause permanent injury, or (2) the pun-
ishment was inflicted with malice.38
While Pendergrass established the standard for criminal actions, in
Drum v. Miller39 the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the ap-
plicable standard for damages in a civil suit stemming from a teacher's
use of corporal punishment. The defendant in Drum, a public school
teacher, threw a pencil at a student who turned his head from his lesson
book." The pencil struck the student in the eye, causing permanent
sight loss. 1 The Drum court followed the malicious intent or permanent
injury standard set forth in Pendergrass, but expanded the permanent
injury prong to include liability where a teacher failed to use ordinary
care and permanent injury was the foreseeable result. 2 The negligence
language in Drum suggests a subtle shift toward the reasonable force
standard eventually codified in 1959.41
privileged to apply such reasonable force ... as he reasonably believes to be necessary for [the
child's] proper control, training or education, [unless the parent prohibits the use of force.]").
Addressing the doctrine of in loco parentis as adopted expressly in the state's corporal
punishment statute, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that "in light of the
present day standards and legislative enactments in the child abuse area [the doctrine] cannot
be interpreted as permitting corporal punishment of public school children by means of a
paddle, whip, stick or other mechanical devices." Smith v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.,
170 W. Va. 593, 599, 295 S.E.2d 680, 687 (1982).
36. 19 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 365 (1837) (per curiam).
37. Id. at 365. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction because of
faulty jury instructions. Id. at 367-68.
38. Id.
39. 135 N.C. 205, 47 S.E. 421 (1904).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 205, 47 S.E. at 422.
42. Id. at 216-17, 47 S.E. at 426. Utilizing this standard, the court reversed the trial
court's finding that the teacher was not liable. Id. at 218, 47 S.E. at 426.
43. The reasonableness language in Drum was substantially adopted in Gaspersohn v.
Harnett County Board of Education, 75 N.C. App. 23, 28-29, 330 S.E.2d 489,493-94, disc. rev.
denied, 314 N.C. 539, 335 S.E.2d 315 (1985). In Gaspersohn, a student requested corporal
punishment in lieu of an in-school suspension. After initially refusing, the assistant principal
cut the number of licks from nine to six, and asked the student after three licks if she wanted to
continue. Id. at 25, 330 S.E.2d at 491. The court rejected a proposed instruction that "corpo-
ral punishment should never be used as a first line of punishment except in cases in which the
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Although substantially codifying the Pendergrass and Drum stan-
dards, former section 115C-390 also precluded expressly local rules or
regulations "which prohibit[ ] the use of [reasonable] force."' 44 The
North Carolina Court of Appeals held in Kurtz v. Winston-Salem/For-
syth County Board of Education45 that this provision did not preclude
stringent regulations concerning the administration of corporal punish-
ment.46 The school board in Kurtz fired a teacher for repeatedly ad-
ministering corporal punishment in violation of the board's regulations.47
The court of appeals affirmed the school board's action and its right to
regulate the use of corporal punishment.48 In the hands of a principal
opposed to corporal punishment, regulations such as those in Kurtz may
provide a de facto ban on the practice.49
The North Carolina reasonable force standard survived federal con-
stitutional scrutiny in Baker v. Owen.50 The Baker court held that,
although "the Fourteenth Amendment concept of liberty embraces the
right of a parent to determine and choose between means of discipline of
act of the student is so antisocial or disruptive in nature as to shock the conscience." Id. at 29,
330 S.E.2d at 494.
The Gaspersohn court, while understandably ruling against a plaintiff who repeatedly re-
quested corporal punishment, indicated that punitive damages may be appropriate for the ma-
licious administration of corporal punishment. Id. at 34-35, 330 S.E.2d at 497.
44. Act of June 16, 1959, ch. 1016, § 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 1042, 1042 (current version
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-390 (1991)).
45. 39 N.C. App. 412, 250 S.E.2d 718 (1979).
46. Id. at 418, 250 S.E.2d at 722. Although Kurtz was decided before passage of the 1987
amendment to § 115C-391, which provided due process requirements in accord with Baker v.
Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 302-03 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975) (mem.), the Winston-
Salem/Forsyth County School Board had an extensive policy concerning the administration of
corporal punishment. The policy provided: "(1) [Corporal punishment should only be admin-
istered in] the principal's office by the principal or teacher with an adult witness present; (2)
Pupils may not be struck or slapped about the face or head; (3) The parents of the child shall
be notified." Kurtz, 39 N.C. App. at 417, 250 S.E.2d at 721. A second board regulation fur-
ther provided that: (1) corporal punishment should be used only after other disciplinary meth-
ods have failed; (2) students must be told beforehand that certain conduct could result in
corporal punishment; (3) the punishment should not be administered when the official is angry
or upset; and (4) a paddle is the only acceptable means of administering corporal punishment.
Id. at 418, 250 S.E.2d at 722.
47. Kurtz, 39 N.C. App. at 412, 250 S.E.2d at 719 (the official charges were inadequate
performance, insubordination, and failure to comply with board-prescribed corporal punish-
ment guidelines).
48. Id. at 418-19, 250 S.E.2d at 722.
49. See also Baxter v. Poe, 42 N.C. App. 404, 412, 257 S.E.2d 71, 76 (affirming the firing
of a teacher of handicapped children for repeated use of corporal punishment despite a policy
imposed by the principal against the use of force), disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 293, 259 S.E.2d
298 (1979).
50. 395 F. Supp. 294, 296 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975) (mem.).
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children,"5 1 the compelling state interest in maintaining order in the
classroom outweighs the parent's interest.5 2 Finding, however, that a
"child has a legitimate interest in avoiding unnecessary or arbitrary in-
fliction of [corporal punishment,]"15 3 the court set forth minimum proce-
dural due process rights for students.54 The court also held that this
particular application of corporal punishment (the child was paddled
twice) did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment.
5
The United States Supreme Court's definitive decision concerning
corporal punishment came in Ingraham v. Wright,5 6 where the Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment applies to the prac-
tice of corporal punishment in schools. The Ingraham Court determined
that the Eighth Amendment only applies to criminals.5 7 The Court also
held that, although students have a Fourteenth Amendment right to be
free from unjustified intrusions of bodily integrity, state common-law
civil and criminal remedies protect this due process right.5 8 Ingraham
51. Id. at 299; cf Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that a
state statute requiring public school attendance violated Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process rights); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923) (striking a state law
prohibiting foreign language instruction).
52. Baker, 395 F. Supp. at 300-301. The holding in Baker enabled school officials to use
corporal punishment even if a parent asked the school not to use it on her child. Id.
53. Id. at 302.
54. Id. at 302.03. The minimum requirements, subsequently incorporated into the North
Carolina statute, see supra note 22 and accompanying text, are: (1) corporal punishment
should not be used as a first line of discipline, or without prior notice that certain action could
result in corporal punishment (unless the behavior "shocks the conscience"), (2) corporal pun-
ishment must be administered in the presence of another school official, who should be in-
formed of the reason for the punishment, and (3) a parent is entitled, upon request, to a written
explanation of the reasons for the punishment and the name of the witness. Baker, 395 F.
Supp. at 302-03.
55. Baker, 395 F. Supp. at 303 (declining to decide whether the Eighth Amendment actu-
ally applies to the punishment of school children).
56. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
57. Id. at 659-71. But see Linda S. Eads, Separating Crime From Punishment: The Con-
stitutional Implications of United States v. Halper, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 929, 968-69 & n. 155
(1990) (suggesting that the Supreme Court may rethink its refusal to apply the Eighth Amend-
ment to the teacher-student relationship).
58. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 677. The Court's holding rested largely on its belief that cor-
poral punishment is rarely severe. Id. Justice Powell, author of the Ingraham opinion, be-
lieved from his personal experience that any real abuse of corporal punishment would be
corrected quickly by parental pressure on local school authorities. Michael B. Mushlin, Un-
safe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect,
23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RaV. 199, 243 n.234 (1988) (citing The Search for the Constitution,
Interview with Justice Lewis Powell (PBS broadcast, June 25, 1987)).
State court remedies are often ineffective in protecting procedural due process. Ellen K.
Solender, Family Law: Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 39, 47-48
(1990). The Eighth Circuit held in Rubek v. Barnhart, 814 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1987), that
2066 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
did not address whether egregious instances of corporal punishment
could violate substantive due process rights."9
Several circuits, however, including the Fourth Circuit, recognize a
federal substantive due process claim for instances of corporal punish-
ment that "shock the conscience."' While these actions remain popular
because they yield higher damages than common-law remedies and pro-
vide for the recovery of attorneys' fees under section 1983 claims, it often
proves difficult to show that the punishment "shocks the conscience." '6
Against this backdrop of legislative and judicial reluctance to in-
fringe on corporal punishment in schools, new section 115C-390 affords
local school boards the opportunity to act on their own. Only seven
months after the passage of new section 115C-390, over one-third of
North Carolina's school children live in school districts where corporal
punishment is banned. 2 The increase in local regulations signals a de-
creasing use of corporal punishment;61 local bans also will assist certain
victims seeking civil remedies or criminal penalties and facilitate termi-
substantive due process rights may be implicated where a school official shows "a reckless
disregard for or deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights." Id. at 1284.
59. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 679 n.47.
60. Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that where a teacher
caused a cut lip, broken nose and fractured teeth, a jury might find the discipline was intended
to cause harm, but dismissing all claims against the principal and school board); Garcia v.
Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 653 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding potential violation of substantive due pro-
cess where the teacher held nine-year-old girl upside down by the ankles while the principal hit
her on the legs with a paddle), cert denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607,
613-15 (4th Cir. 1980) (applying the "shocks the conscience" test to the punisher, but denying
any vicarious liability claims).
The fifth circuit appears split on the issue. See Cunningham v. Beavers, 858 F.2d 269, 272
(5th Cir. 1988) (apparently confusing substantive and procedural due process in holding that
no substantive due process claim exists where the state provides common-law remedies for
excessive punishment) (citing Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep. Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d 1243, 1245
(5th Cir. 1984)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067 (1989). But see Woodard, 732 F.2d at 1246 ("Cor-
poral punishment is a deprivation of substantive due process when it is arbitrary, capricious, or
wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learn-
ing.").
For a discussion of substantive due process claims and the "shocks the conscience" test,
see J. Michael McGuinness & Lisa A. McGuinness Parlagreco, The Reemergence of Substan-
tive Due Process as a Constitutional Tort: Theory, Proof and Damages, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV.
1129, 1147-52 (1990).
61. See, e.g., Brooks v. School Bd. of Richmond, 569 F. Supp. 1534, 1536 (E.D. Va. 1983)
(requiring that the punishment be "inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless
or unwise excess of zeal" to sustain a substantive due process claim).
62. Paddling Ban Protects 33%, CHILDREN FIRsT (N.C. Child Advocacy Inst., Raleigh,
N.C.), Winter 1992, at 3. Twenty-four of 134 school districts have corporal punishment bans,
but these include several of the largest districts in the state, so that approximately 360,000 of
the state's 1,100,000 school children are protected. Id.
63. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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nation actions against abusive teachers. 64 Hopefully, the decision to
adopt a local autonomy statute represents a first step toward a statewide
ban in North Carolina.65
The trend in both federal and state government is toward increasing
local autonomy.66 Many argue that schools under local control are more
responsive to the concerns of parents and that involved parents create
better schools. 67 On a federal-state level, this belief in the value of local
control led Justice Powell to deny a federal claim in Ingraham.68 Unlike
the state-federal government relationship, however, the state does not
have only those powers given to it by local units. On the contrary, local
boards "have only those powers expressly conferred by the General As-
sembly or implied from.., express grants of authority. '69
The policy of allowing local authorities to decide for themselves sug-
gests the General Assembly believes each locality either knows what is
best for itself or is the best agency to make the sensitive corporal punish-
64. See infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
65. It is not entirely clear that § I15C-390 was intended as an initial step toward a state-
wide ban. Although the Legislative Research Committee saw this as the ultimate goal when
considering the proposed local option bill in 1986, see supra notes 21-22, a 1989 proposal to
allow 16 local school districts to ban corporal punishment as "pilot projects" failed a House
vote. Niblock, supra note 16, at 2.
66. On the federal level, this growing concern for local autonomy can outweigh the First
Amendment interest in freedom of expression, Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456,
2461-63 (1991), and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection. See William
L. Christopher, Note, Ignoring the Soul of Brown: Board of Education v. Dowell, 70 N.C. L.
REv. 615, 634-35 (1992) (noting the increased weight placed on the benefits of local autonomy
as opposed to judicial supervision in school desegregation cases). But see H.R. 1522, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (proposing that schools using corporal punishment be ineligible for
federal funds).
Recent North Carolina legislation provides for increased autonomy of local boards. E.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-98(b) (1991) (giving local boards exclusive authority over the selec-
tion and procurement of supplementary instructional materials); see also Michele L. Harring-
ton, Note, State v. Whittle Communications! Allowing Local Boards to Turn On "Channel
One" 70 N.C. L. REv. 1929 (1992) (analyzing a recent supreme court decision allowing local
school authorities to decide whether or not to subscribe to controversial news program).
Some commentators argue, however, that between state and local governments, the trend
in educational decisionmaking is toward increased state authority. Philip K. Porter & Michael
L. Davis, The Value of Private Property in Education: Innovation, Production, and Employ-
ment, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 397, 414 (1991).
67. See Christopher, supra note 66, at 634.
68. In a television interview, Justice Powell said that his experience with local school
systems convinced him that local school officials and parents groups were better able to deal
with corporal punishment abuses. See supra note 58.
69. Laurie Mesibov, Local Boards of Education, SCH. L. BULL., Spring 1988, at 12, 13
(delineating the powers given to North Carolina school boards by the General Assembly); see
also Stephen R. Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Stu-
dent Conduct and Status: A NonconstitutionalAnalysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373, 384-87 (1969)
(discussing the sources of school board authority).
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ment decision.7" While the former does not provide a sufficient rationale
for instituting a local autonomy option, the latter suggests that local au-
tonomy may be appropriate. Local authorities may not know what is
best for their district. Studies show that education authorities who
strongly support corporal punishment soon become strong opponents of
the practice themselves once a ban is implemented. 71 But the argument
that local boards are better situated to make the decision has greater
merit. In addition to a long tradition of local autonomy,72 local school
boards are generally more responsive to local concerns since they are
members of the local citizenry and are elected through popular
elections.73
Although corporal punishment cannot be separated from discipline,
arguably a purely local concern, the element of student safety should
bring the issue under the supervision of the General Assembly.74 Thus,
the corporal punishment issue is not one that should be delegated blindly
to local school boards. Instead, the General Assembly should monitor
both systems that do not prohibit corporal punishment and those that
have passed local bans. If those districts under local bans do not show a
corresponding increase in discipline problems, 7 or if those districts that
continue the practice rate worse than districts which have banned it in
academic or vandalism statistics, the General Assembly should consider
enacting a statewide ban.
It is also possible that the effects of corporal punishment bans will
be inconclusive. Nevertheless, many would argue that a statewide ban is
the next logical step in the protection of North Carolina's school chil-
dren. The reasonable force provision of section 115C-390, still in effect
70. See Pamela Tobin, Casenote, Expanding the State Secretary of Education's Review of
Local School Boards' Decisions to Dismiss Employees-Belasco v. Pittsburgh Board of Educa-
tion, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 361, 362 (1987) (noting that corporal punishment is a sensitive issue
between school boards and parents groups); cf Maijorie Morris, Capps Members to Fight Pad-
dling, THE SANFORD HERALD (Sanford, N.C.), Nov. 19, 1991, at IA, 10A (describing the
fight by a group of Lee County parents to get the school board to ban corporal punishment).
71. Education professionals in systems where the practice is prohibited rarely agree that
corporal punishment is required as a last resort, a position advanced often by principals and
teachers. See Maurer, The Case Against, supra note 9, at 16 (noting that teachers in Ottawa,
Canada, overwhelmingly favored corporal punishment before its prohibition, but five years
later not one educator in the system favored the practice).
72. See Goldstein, supra note 69, at 384.
73. Id.
74. This approach analyzes corporal punishment under the rubric of student safety and
the right to bodily integrity rather than treating it as a local disciplinary issue.
75. If the rationale behind corporal punishment is that the risk of harm is outweighed by
the benefit of improved discipline, then if eliminating corporal punishment does not cause a
decline in discipline, the "benefit" does not outweigh the risk. Of course, this simple equation
may not be dispositive due to the many other factors that affect discipline.
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in those local districts that have not passed a local ban, was upheld in
Baker because the state's interest in maintaining discipline outweighed
the constitutional right to bodily integrity.76 Even if the state interest
outweighs the constitutional right, permitting corporal punishment, even
through a local option statute, does not further that state interest.77
Many commentators argue today that corporal punishment is an in-
effective disciplinary tool, causing more behavioral problems than it
cures.78 Second, corporal punishment may produce many harmful side-
effects-physical, sexual, emotional, and racial-that result even from its
judicious application. 9 Many believe that the application of corporal
punishment is not and never could be judicious.8
Whether local or statewide, the effect that a corporal punishment
ban will have on the amount of corporal punishment, either directly as a
prophylactic rule or indirectly through its effect on litigation, must be
76. See Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 300-02 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975)
(mem.).
77. This analysis is similar to the rational-relationship test used by the Baker court in
analyzing the student's due process claim. The state statute in this minimum scrutiny test
almost always is found to be reasonably related to the state interest. That there may be a
possible basis for the state's decision to authorize corporal punishment, however, is not the
issue; rather, one should determine whether corporal punishment is an effective disciplinary
tool and, if it is, whether its harmful side-effects outweigh any benefit it may provide. While a
minimum scrutiny analysis may be the proper judicial approach, certainly the General Assem-
bly should focus on the best, rather than the minimally acceptable, alternative.
78. MAURER, PADDLES AWAY, supra note 4, at 20-21; Hyman & Lally, supra note 26, at
8.
79. In PADDLES AWAY, Maurer discusses in depth each of the alleged side-effects of cor-
poral pujnishment: painful and lasting physical damage to young children, especially to the
bottom, MAURER, PADDLES AWAY, supra note 4, at 31-37; sexual abnormalities in both the
punisher and recipient, id. at 45-50; reinforcement of institutionalized racism, id. at 51-68; and
violence and vandalism, id. at 82-92; see also Maurer, The Case Against, supra note 9, at 16, 18-
24 (arguing that corporal punishment increases aggression and sexual aberrations while de-
creasing the possibility of effective discipline and learning); John Lamberth, The Effects of
Punishment on Academic Achievement: A Review of Recent Research, in CORPORAL PUNISH-
MENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 384, 391 (finding that "extreme punishment
in any form is counterproductive to good academic achievement and the development of posi-
tive attitudes toward school").
80. Anthony F. Bongiovanni, An Analysis of Research on Punishment and Its Relation to
the Use of Corporal Punishment in the Schools, in CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 351, 355-360. But see Lansing K. Reinholz, A Practical Defense
of Corporal Punishment in the Schools, in CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCA-
TION, supra note 2, at 342, 343-347 (arguing for the use of corporal punishment as a "last
resort"); Hyman & Lally, supra note 26, at 11 ("[Mlost educators still believe that corporal
punishment should be available as a 'last resort.' ").
For a survey of U.S. attitudes on corporal punishment by region, see Eileen McDowell &
Robert H. Friedman, An Analysis of Editorial Opinion Regarding Corporal Punishment: Some
Dynamics of Regional Differences, in CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION,
supra note 2, at 329, 330-33.
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examined. The impact that permitting local bans will have on the
number of instances of corporal punishment is unclear. Even before the
recent amendment of section 115C-390 local school boards were able to
restrict its use severely. Following Kurtz, local school officials clearly
possessed the authority to regulate stringently corporal punishment to
the point of a defacto ban."1 Thus, those local boards concerned about
the problems of corporal punishment had already virtually abolished its
use. 2 Even so, the statistics suggest the use of corporal punishment in
schools remains substantial.8 3 Thus, a statewide ban would have the
largest impact on those districts that have not enacted restrictive regula-
tions such as those approved in Kurtz.
Additionally, a corporal punishment ban, local or statewide, not
only will provide a remedy for victims of corporal punishment who can-
not overcome the current "reasonable force" standard, but also will pro-
vide a deterrent effect against teachers who use corporal punishment,
either moderately or abusively.84 In the absence of a corporal punish-
ment ban, victims of unreasonable force who can prove their case already
have a remedy in state tort law, criminal law, and even federal law. 5 A
corporal punishment ban, although having no effect on federal claims86
or state law claims where the victim can prove unreasonable force, will
assist two types of victims: 1) victims of excessive force who cannot
81. For a discussion of Kurtz, see supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text; see also 20
School Systems, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that the Wake County school system had 1,500
reported incidents of corporal punishment in 1986, but the district reported only seven inci-
dents in the 1990-91 school year after the board passed stringent regulations in 1988).
82. Although such regulations may not assist persons bringing civil or criminal actions
against a teacher, they are effective in a board's termination proceeding against a teacher. See
Baxter v. Poe, 42 N.C. App. 404, 416, 257 S.E.2d 71, 78, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 293, 259
S.E.2d 298 (1979); Kurtz v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ., 39 N.C. App. 412,
418, 250 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1979).
83. See supra note 4.
84. The benefit of eliminating even moderate use is twofold: many feel that any use of
corporal punishment is ineffective and harmful, see supra note 79 and accompanying text, and
even if moderate use is not harmful, eliminating its use as an option will prevent possible
escalation into abuse. See Maurer, The Case Against, supra note 9, at 22-23 (arguing that a
certain percentage of corporal punishment escalates inevitably into abuse).
85. While those seeking redress in state law must only show the punishment was unrea-
sonable, those seeking federal relief in North Carolina's federal district courts and the Fourth
Circuit must show the punishment "shocks the conscience." See supra note 60 and accompa-
nying text.
86. The federal standard, if a particular circuit recognizes one, is not affected by local
rules or regulations for administering corporal punishment, so a federal claim is not enhanced
when a teacher violates local procedural rules. Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 522 (3d Cir.
1988) (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Constitutional standards do not vary from school
district to school district[.j"); Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep. Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d 1243, 1245
(5th Cir. 1984). Additionally, a local ban does not have a substantial impact on a school
board's liability for federal claims, since federal substantive due process claims against school
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prove that the force was unreasonable; and 2) victims of reasonable
force.
State tort and criminal actions against teachers for unreasonable
force are rarely successful. 7  The definition of "unreasonableness" in
North Carolina presents a high hurdle for plaintiffs seeking redress. 8 A
corporal punishment ban, however, will eliminate the defense of reason-
able force.8 9 Thus, victims of excessive force who cannot prove the force
was unreasonable only need to show (1) the punishment took place and
(2) damages.90 While a victim of reasonable force has the same opportu-
nity to prove the same two elements, it appears unlikely that such a vic-
tim can prove recoverable damages. Nevertheless, a ban also will deter
corporal punishment by eliminating the reasonable force defense in crim-
inal prosecutions.9"
Additionally, a local or statewide ban will assist school board termi-
nation proceedings against teachers who use corporal punishment.92 In-
deed, the threat of termination may be the most effective deterrent
against a school official's use of corporal punishment. The increased like-
lihood of a civil, criminal, or termination action will provide an effective
deterrent against the use of corporal punishment.
Corporal punishment's use cannot be separated from its abuse.
boards are dismissed consistently. Metzger, 841 F.2d at 521; Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607,
615 (4th Cir. 1980).
State legislation can open the door to more federal claims only if it denies traditional
common law tort remedies. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-82 (1977).
87. Scott & Zirkel, supra note 4, at 270. State common law tort claims require at least
unreasonableness, which North Carolina's jury instructions describe as punishment causing or
tending to cause permanent injury, or inflicted with malice. See Gaspersohn v. Harnett
County Bd. of Educ., 75 N.C. App. 23, 29, 330 S.E.2d 489, 493-94, disc rev. denied, 314 N.C.
539, 335 S.E.2d 315 (1985).
88. See supra note 43.
89. Under § 115C-391 a teacher may still use the defense that force was used reasonably
to quell a disturbance, to obtain possession of weapons or other dangerous objects, or to pro-
tect persons or property. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391 (1991). While affording this defense to
teachers is necessary for their protection and the protection of students, it was not necessary to
provide expressly for this in § 115C-391. The common-law defenses of self-defense and justifi-
cation protect the use of reasonable force in these situations.
90. This makes a corporal punishment action a simple assault and battery claim without
the defense of reasonableness.
91. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33(a) (1986 & Supp. 1991) (simple assault and battery); id.
§ 14-33(b)(3) (assault and battery against a child under age of twelve); id. § 14-318.2, - 318.4
(1986) (child abuse).
92. Under the reasonable force statute, termination actions are generally the only success-
ful type of action against teachers who use corporal punishment. Scott & Zirkel, supra note 4,
at 270; see Baxter v. Poe, 42 N.C. App. 404, 416, 257 S.E.2d 71, 78, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C.
293, 259 S.E.2d 298 (1979); Kurtz v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ., 39 N.C.
App. 412, 418, 250 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1979).
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Over one-third of the state's school children attend school systems that
have banned corporal punishment. All North Carolina school students,
however, are entitled to protection from this harmful practice.
JON M. BYLSMA
McCormick v. A T & T Technologies, Inc. and Section 301
Preemption: The Fourth Circuit Makes a Federal Case
Out of Workplace Torts
Where should unionized employees turn when their employer's con-
duct causes injury? An evolving reversal of jurisdictional roles in the
legal resolution of labor-management disputes has confused the choice of
legal forums. Ever since the Depression, union members faced with em-
ployer wrongdoing rejected unfavorable state tort laws in favor of arbi-
tration, established by collective bargaining agreements, and the federal
courts.' In the last ten years, however, state tort law has grown more
sympathetic to workers. State law also offers several advantages over
federal labor law: the right to jury trial,2 longer statutes of limitations,
and the availability of punitive and emotional distress damages.' Be-
cause of these key differences, when both federal and state law are avail-
able for resolution of an employee's claim the question of which law
applies bears heavily on the outcome of the suit.4
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act established
federal jurisdiction over suits for breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment.5 This grant of jurisdiction has been expanded judicially into a pre-
emptive force. State contract law may not be applied in the area covered
by section 301.6 This preemptive power is "complete," converting a state
law contract claim into one arising under federal law.7 In other words,
section 301 preemption not only invalidates state law contract claims,
1. See Angel Gomez III, Preemption and Preclusion of Employee Common Law Rights
by Federal and State Statutes, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 45, 46-47 (1989); Rebecca H. White, Sec-
tion 301's Preemption of State Law Claims: A Model for Analysis, 41 ALA. L. REv. 377, 390-92
(1990).
2. See Gomez, supra note 1, at 46-47.
3. See White, supra note 1, at 390-91; Thomas Yamachika, The Law of Federal "Com-
plete Preemption": A New Brand of Federal-State Conflict, 41 LAB. L.J. 337, 343 (1990).
4. In McCormick v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992), the disposition of the plaintiff's case turned solely on the
question of whether the statute of limitations from federal labor law or state tort law should
apply. Id. at 534 (en bane).
5. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1988). Section 301 reads in pertinent part: "Suits for violation of contracts between an em-
ployer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce...
may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties
2.. Id.
6. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968).
7. Id. at 560. For discussions of "complete" preemption, see Eric J. Moss, Note, The
Breadth of Complete Preemption: Limiting the Doctrine to Its Roots, 76 VA. L. REv. 1601,
1611-18 (1990); see infra notes 44 & 59-61 and accompanying text.
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but also controls the forum by giving the defendant the power to remove
a state law claim to federal court.' These principles of preemption are
well-established when state contract law and section 301 conflict, but are
less clear when the plaintiff brings a tort claim. When two parties' work-
ing relationship is defined thoroughly, as in a collective bargaining agree-
ment, is aberrant conduct by the employer a basis for a tort suit or is it
solely a breach of contract? If the conduct may be covered by the agree-
ment, is the agreement then the only yardstick by which the conduct may
be measured in determining the employee's relief?
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Mc-
Cormick v. AT & T Technologies, Inc.9 tried to define the scope of section
301 complete preemption of tort claims. The Fourth Circuit held that
"wrongful or negligent" employer conduct alleged in an employee's state
law tort action could be evaluated only in light of the power given the
employer by the collective bargaining agreement. 10 Once contract inter-
pretation is implicated, section 301 preempts the state law tort claim.11
The McCormick court, however, did not indicate the limits of this logic.
It remains unclear whether a union-member plaintiff now can allege a
tort claim that does not implicate the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement and thereby avoid section 301 complete preemption.
This Note surveys the United States Supreme Court's development
of section 301 preemption law,12 focusing on the doctrine's effect on liti-
gation strategy13 and its still-uncertain application in lower courts. 14 The
Note analyzes the impact of the McCormick decision on state law tort
claims,15 and concludes that the McCormick court's view of a tort
claim's dependence on interpretation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment is disconcertingly broad and is inconsistent with the United States
Supreme Court's approach to section 301 preemption.16
In mid-September of 1986, William McCormick left his job at AT &
T Technologies, Inc., purportedly because of illness. 7 When he did not
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988).
9. 934 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992).
10. Id. at 535-37 (en bane). In effect, the court held that "wrongful or negligent" equals
"wrongful or negligent under the circumstances, including the agreement," and therefore the
employee's claim can be resolved only by interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
(en banc).
11. Id. (en bane).
12. See infra notes 57-95 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 96.
15. See infra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
17. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 533 (en bane).
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return to work for two weeks, the Richmond, Virginia company notified
him that unless he reported for work by September 30 his employment
would be terminated.18 McCormick did not return and, in a letter dated
October 1, AT & T terminated his employment retroactively to Septem-
ber 22.19 The next day a supervisor, Cameron Allen, cleaned out Mc-
Cormick's locker, retrieving company-issued tools and disposing of
personal items. 2° Allen was informed later that day that AT & T em-
ployees had found and read a personal letter of McCormick's that Allen
had discarded.21 On October 3, McCormick returned to work and was
reinstated, only to leave that evening, this time permanently, when a co-
worker made a "personal remark" about the discarded letter.22
McCormick was a member of the Communications Workers of
America, and a collective bargaining agreement between the union and
AT & T governed his employment.23 Although the agreement provided
for grievance hearings and dispute arbitration, McCormick did not exer-
cise those rights.24 Instead, he filed suit fourteen months later in a Vir-
ginia court, alleging that AT & T had violated state tort law in its
conduct toward him.25 AT & T removed the suit to federal court.26 The
district court, finding that section 301 preempted McCormick's state law
claims and that removal was proper, denied McCormick's motion to re-
mand. With McCormick's suit now recharacterized as a section 301
action, the district court held that the six-month statute of limitations
applied to section 301 barred his claim.28 Accordingly, AT & T's motion
'for summary judgment was granted.29
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc, 30 narrowly affirmed the finding of preemption.31
Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lingle v. Norge
18. Id. (en banc).
19. Id. (en band).
20. Id. (en bane).
21. Id. (en banc).
22. Id. (en bane).
23. Id. (en banc).
24. Id. (en bane).
25. Id. (en bane). McCormick's complaint alleged the disposal of his personal effects con-
stituted intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
conversion, and negligent care of a bailment. Id. (en bane).
26. Id. at 533-34 (en bane).
27. Id. at 534 (en bane).
28. Id. (en bane). The statute of limitations on § 301 claims was established in DelCos-
tello v. International Board of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 (1983).
29. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 534 (en banc).
30. Seven circuit judges participated in the decision of the case. Id. at 533 (en bane).
31. Id. (en bane).
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Division of Magic Chef Inc.,32 the Fourth Circuit declared that federal
law under section 301 preempted a state law claim whose resolution
would require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.33 The
court first pointed out that black-letter law underlying each of McCor-
mick's tort claims revealed that the plaintiff would be required to prove
AT & T's conduct was wrongful 34 or negligent. 35 The court then deliv-
ered the fatal blow to McCormick's case: "Virginia follows the general
rule that plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating wrongfulness....
To prove conduct wrongful, a plaintiff must thus demonstrate not that
the conduct was wrongful in some abstract sense, but wrongful under the
circumstances. ' 36 AT & T's duty toward McCormick could be defined
only by interpreting the agreement. 7
The McCormick court then briefly examined the collective bargain-
ing agreement in question, apparently to support the holding that
"wrongfulness" could be defined only through contract interpretation. 8
The court further buttressed its analysis by citing prior Fourth Circuit
39
32. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
33. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 534-35 (en banc). The United States Supreme Court in Lin-
gle had stated expressly that such a tort action should be preempted by section 301. See Lin-
gle, 486 U.S. at 413.
34. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Virginia required proof of
"outrageous and intolerable" conduct by the defendant. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 535 (en
bane) (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974)). Similarly,
"'wrongful exercise.., of authority... over another's goods'" constituted conversion under
Virginia law. Id. (en banc) (quoting Buckeye Natl Bank v. Huff & Cook, 114 Va. 1, 11, 75
S.E. 769, 772 (1912)).
35. See id. at 535 (en bane) (citing Virginia law).
36. Id. at 535-36 (en banc) (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 536 (en banc). The court held that:
The circumstances that must be considered in examining management's conduct
are not merely factual, but contractual .... Cleaning out a locker is not a matter of
intrinsic moral import but a question of legal authority-whether management had
the lawful right to proceed as it did .... State tort claims are preempted where
reference to a collective bargaining agreement is necessary to determine whether a
"duty of care" exists or to define "the nature and scope of that duty .... ." Whether
the actions of management personnel.., were in any way wrongful simply cannot be
determined without examining the collective bargaining agreement ....
Id. (en banc) (quoting International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 862
(1987)).
38. Id. at 536 (en banc). The court found no contract terms directly related to disposal of
an employee's property, but cited clauses that "appl[ied] generally to the conditions of employ-
ment.. . ." Id. (en bane).
39. Id. at 538 (en bane). The court cited Willis v. Reynolds Metals Co., 840 F.2d 254, 255
(4th Cir. 1988) (privacy, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims pre-
empted) and Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253, 255-56 (4th Cir. 1987) (inva-
sion of privacy claim preempted). Although Willis and Kirby were decided prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Lingle, the McCormick court found them consistent with Lingle
and other federal courts of appeals decisions.' The court emphasized
the general policy goals of section 301 and federal labor law: encourag-
ing smooth negotiation and administration of collective bargaining agree-
ments, insuring uniform interpretation of those agreements, and
maintaining bargained-for grievance procedures as the primary means of
dispute resolution.41 Preemption of state tort claims requiring contract
interpretation was necessary to prevent undercutting the policies sup-
porting section 301, the court held, because "[t]here are few workplace
quarrels that could not be framed as some form of tortious conduct."'42
Additionally, a multitude of conflicting state-court interpretations of col-
lective bargaining agreements would undermine the goals of uniformity
severely.43
The dissenting opinion, authored by Judge Phillips, argued that
none of McCormick's tort claims were "'completely' preempted" and
therefore should have been remanded to the state court for resolution of
the tort claims.'
Judge Phillips discussed at length the line of Supreme Court cases
that developed section 301 jurisprudence.4" These cases, he argued, did
not support the majority's broad preemption analysis.' Rather, section
301 complete preemption applies only to those state law claims that
either are expressly, or are in substance, for breach of contract.4 7 If a
plaintiff has stated a claim that in substance alleges violation of a right
created not by the contract, but by a state's tort law, section 301 com-
plete preemption should not apply and the claim should not be remova-
and therefore persuasive, if not expressly controlling. See McCormick, 934 F.2d at 538 (en
banc).
40. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 537-38 (en banc) (citing Douglas v. American Info. Technol-
ogies Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 568-73 (7th Cir. 1989); Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d
1142, 1148-50 (9th Cir. 1§88)).
41. See McCormick, 934 F.2d at 535, 538 (en bane).
42. Id. at 538 (en bane).
43. Id. (en bane)
44. Id. at 538, 545 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judges Murnaghan and Sprouse joined the
dissent. Judge Phillips distinguished, as the majority did not, "ordinary" preemption from
"complete" preemption. Id. at 538-39 (Phillips, J., dissenting). The former, while voiding
otherwise applicable state law, will not support removal unless the plaintiff's pleadings raise a
federal question. See Moss, supra note 7, at 1607-08. Complete preemption, however,
recharacterizes a facially valid state claim as a federal question claim that is removable. See id.
at 1611-14. Section 301 has been interpreted since Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390
U.S. 557 (1968), to preempt completely some state law; the crucial question that remains is
which state law. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 539 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
45. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 539-42 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 538-39, 542 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 543 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
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ble to federal court.4" The dissent argued that the Supreme Court's
decision in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams49 established that only the plain-
tiff's complaint should be examined in deciding whether resolving the
allegations required contract interpretation. 50 Judge Phillips asserted
that defenses requiring contract interpretation should not be considered
in deciding section 301 complete preemption and removal.51
The dissent accused the majority of incorrectly reading Lingle as a
mandate to look beyond the plaintiff's pleadings to determine if the suit
implicated contract interpretation. 2 Focusing only on McCormick's
complaint, the dissent argued that none of his tort claims should be com-
pletely preempted.53 The "wrongful conduct" alleged in each claim was
based on violations of duties imposed by Virginia tort law, not the collec-
tive bargaining agreement.54 An argument by the defendant that the
conduct was "not wrongful" because the agreement permitted it might
be a viable defense, but, as a defense, would not support a finding of
complete preemption and removal." The dissent advocated finding no
preemption and remanding to the state court for decision of the tort
claims, with any defenses requiring contract interpretation to be evalu-
ated by the state court applying federal labor contract law.56
Supreme Court decisions in the 1950s and 1960s gave federal courts
the power to develop federal common law interpreting and enforcing la-
bor contracts, 57 and held that this federal common law must preempt
48. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
49. 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
50. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 540-41, 543, 545 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Caterpillar rein-
forced the "well-pleaded complaint" rule established in Louisville & Nashville Railroad v.
Motley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). The plaintiff is the "master of the complaint" and can
choose to seek enforcement of only his state law rights. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398-99; see
infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
51. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 540-41 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 543 n.2, 544 (Phillips, J., dissenting). The dissent cited language in Lingle im-
plied federal defenses could give rise to complete preemption and removal, and then disarmed
this implication by arguing: (1) preemption arising from a defense would in effect overrule
Caterpillar, and the Lingle decision expressly recognized Caterpillar's continuing viability; (2)
the language was dicta; and (3) the implication would be inconsistent with all other Supreme
Court decisions on § 301 preemption before and after Lingle. Id. at 543 n.2 (Phillips, J.,
dissenting).
53. Id. at 545 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 545-47 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 538-39, 545-47 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 538, 545 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge Phillips also characterized his analysis
as nonthreatening to the goals of labor policy put forth in the majority opinion. Id. at 547-48
(Phillips, J., dissenting). State courts would be bound to federal law in contract interpretations
implicated by defenses, thus insuring uniform labor contract law. Id. at 547 n.5 (Phillips, J.,
dissenting).
57. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
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conflicting state contract law.58 The Court's decision in Avco Corp. v.
Aero Lodge No. 73559 was critical to the still-developing concepts of fed-
eral jurisdiction over labor law. The Avco Court created the doctrine of
"complete preemption," holding that section 301 preemption was so
powerful that labor-management claims based only on state contract law
were not only preempted but were transformed into federal question
claims-claims "arising under federal law" that could be removed to fed-
eral court."o Before Avco the "well-pleaded complaint" rule had limited
removal to claims that on their face stated a federal question.61
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court addressed the question of how far
section 301 complete preemption extends. The plaintiff in Avco had sued
under state law to enjoin a strike allegedly forbidden by a collective bar-
gaining agreement, and the Court easily found complete preemption.62
Suits that explored the border between tort and contract actions, how-
ever, were not to be as clear-cut. In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,63 the
Court found complete preemption of a state law action for tortious
breach of contract," and established a test for section 301 complete pre-
emption: If resolution of a state tort claim will be "inextricably inter-
twined" with interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the
state law is preempted.65 The Court characterized the state tort claim in
Lueck as nothing more than "a way to plead a certain kind of contract
violation in tort" and "firmly rooted in the expectations of the parties
that must be evaluated by federal contract law."' 66 The Court limited its
holding, albeit ambiguously, to contract claims.67
The Supreme Court next acted on section 301 in International
58. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962). State courts were
allowed to retain concurrent jurisdiction over § 301 claims, applying the federal common law
and contributing to it, with new law created by state courts absorbed by the federal common
law. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 511-14 (1962).
59. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
60. Avco, 390 U.S. at 560; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988) (statutory removal of fed-
eral question cases). The question that remains after Avco is how to apply the tests for com-
plete preemption later put forth by the Supreme Court. See infra notes 65 & 87 and
accompanying text.
61. See supra note 50; infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
62. Avco, 390 U.S. at 558.
63. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
64. Id. at 220-21. The plaintiff alleged bad-faith handling of his insurance claims by his
employer after being subjected to repeated medical examinations and periodic denial of bene-
fits. Id. at 205-06.
65. Id. at 213.
66. Id. at 217 (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 212-13, 220. The Court said:
Nor do we hold that every state-law suit asserting a right that relates in some way to
a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement ... necessarily is pre-empted by
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Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Hechler6 8 The Hechler Court
found that section 301 preempted a claim by a union member against the
union for negligent failure to provide a safe workplace. 9 Under state law
the union had no duty to provide a safe workplace.70 Therefore, the
only duty owed the plaintiff that the union could have violated was one
assumed in the collective bargaining agreement.71 Definition of this
duty was a matter of contract law subject to section 301 preemption.72
Two weeks after Hechler, the Court first dealt with removal power
arising under section 301 complete preemption. In Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Williams,73 plaintiffs had filed suit in state court alleging breach of indi-
vidual contracts entered into outside of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.74 Caterpillar removed the action to federal court, where it was
dismissed when the plaintiffs refused to amend their claim to allege a
section 301 violation.75 Applying the Lueck test for preemption,76 the
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' complaint, on its face, did not
depend on a violation of a duty arising from the collective bargaining
agreement.77 The plaintiffs' "well-pleaded complaint" rested on state law
independent of the agreement, and, therefore, removal to federal court
was improper.78 The defendant, not the plaintiffs, had raised an issue
§ 301. The full scope of the preemptive effect of federal labor-contract law remains
to be fleshed out on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 220.
68. 481 U.S. 851 (1987).
69. Id. at 862.
70. Id. at 859-60.
71. Id. at 860-62. Hechler is distinguishable from cases like McCormick because Sally
Hechler expressly alleged in the lower courts that the duty the union owed her arose from the
agreement. Id. at 861. She later attempted to argue before the Supreme Court that the union
owed her a duty of care arising from its relationship with its members, independent of the
agreement. Id. at 862 n.5. The Court did not reach this argument since it had not been raised
below. Id.
72. Id. at 861-62.
73. 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
74. Id. at 390.
75. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court, see Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 786 F.2d 928, 937-38 (9th Cir. 1986), and the
Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 391.
76. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
77. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394-95.
78. Id. The Caterpillar Court referred to complete preemption as an "independent corol-
lary" to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. at 393. This classification marks an important
distinction. Since complete preemption appears to be an exception to the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule in that it converts a facially valid state claim into a federal claim, it is important to
note that the Supreme Court did not deem it to be an exception. Therefore, the well-pleaded
complaint rule's focus on the complaint, rather than defenses, remains valid in applying com-
plete preemption doctrine.
requiring interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement by assert-
ing that the agreement superseded the individual contracts.79 Without
discussing the merits of this defense, the Court rejected it as a basis for
removal:
[A] federal question, even a § 301 question, in a defensive argu-
ment does not overcome the paramount policies embodied in
the well-pleaded complaint rule-that the plaintiff is the master
of the complaint, that a federal question must appear on the
face of the complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing
claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in
state court.80
In Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,"' the plaintiff as-
serted a claim under state law for retaliatory discharge when her em-
ployer allegedly fired her for fMling a worker's compensation claim."2 The
defendant properly removed the suit, 3 and the federal court dismissed
the state claim as preempted by section 301.84 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying the Lueck "inextri-
cably intertwined" test." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
Seventh Circuit had misapplied the preemption test.8 6 Furthermore, the
Court held that, under a proper application of the test, the state claim
could be defined in a way that did not require contract interpretation for
its resolution, and therefore was not preempted.8 7 The Lingle Court pro-
79. Id. at 395-96.
80. Id. at 398-99. In applying Caterpillar the Fourth Circuit in McCormick was divided
on the question of whether the "wrongfulness" of an employer's conduct under the collective
bargaining agreement is an element for the plaintiff to establish in his tort claim or if the
defendant may show the conduct was "not-wrongful" as a defense. See infra notes 111-12 and
accompanying text. Clearly, the Caterpillar Court intended tort actions to survive § 301 com-
plete preemption, since it quoted Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 25 n.28 (1983), for the proposition that a battery suit resulting from a
violent strike would not be preempted simply because the legitimacy of the strike under the
collective bargaining agreement might be at issue. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 396 n.10.
81. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
82. Id. at 402.
83. Removal was not an issue in Lingle; the defendant removed the suit to federal court
on the basis of diversity. Id.
84. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1449, 1449 (S.D. Ill. 1985),
aff'd, 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
85. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 402-03; see Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d
1031, 1046 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
86. The Seventh Circuit based its decision on a finding that resolution of the state claim
would require evaluating the same facts as would a hypothetical claim under § 301 for breach
of the collective bargaining agreement's prohibition of discharge without just cause. Lingle,
823 F.2d at 1046. The Supreme Court rejected the "same facts" test as an incorrect preemp-
tion analysis. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408-10.
87. State law defined retaliatory discharge as: (1) the discharge or threatened discharge of
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ceeded to say that the defense of a nonretaliatory reason for plaintiff's
discharge also did not require interpretation of the agreement.88
In 1990 the Supreme Court split for the first time in deciding a sec-
tion 301 preemption case. In United Steelworkers of America v. Raw-
son,8 9 the Court overturned the Idaho Supreme Court's finding of no
preemption of a state tort claim for negligent inspection and wrongful
death.9" The Idaho court had found that once the union actually under-
took an inspection of the workplace, a duty to inspect properly arose not
from the union's responsibilities defined by the collective bargaining
agreement, but from general tort principles.91 The Rawson Court dis-
agreed, holding that the claim was not independent of the collective bar-
gaining agreement because the union's conduct under the circumstances
could be measured only by the agreement,92 and, therefore, the state
claims were preempted.93 Three justices dissented, arguing that the
Court had presumed to interpret Idaho law over the state's highest
court.94 The Idaho Supreme Court had found that the elements of the
plaintiff's tort claim could be proven without recourse to the collective
bargaining agreement; reversing that decision, the dissenters argued, was
effectively a reinterpretation of Idaho's tort law.9"
Given the Supreme Court's patchwork approach to section 301 pre-
emption jurisprudence, it is small wonder that recent decisions in the
federal circuit courts have been jumbled.96 Nevertheless, the basic skele-
the employee, (2) motivated by a desire to prevent an exercise of rights granted by the worker's
compensation statute. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407 (citations omitted). The Court found these
elements "purely factual" in nature and unrelated to the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
88. Id. This language has caused confusion over whether Lingle allows defenses that raise
a need for contract interpretation to lead to § 301 preemption. See supra note 52 and accom-
panying text.
89. 495 U.S. 362 (1990).
90. Id. at 371-72.
91. See Rawson v. United Steelworkers, 115 Idaho 785, 787, 770 P.2d 794, 796 (1988).
92. Rawson, 495 U.S. at 371. The Idaho Supreme Court had stated that the collective
bargaining agreement defined the union's duty to inspect, but then held that the union had
assumed a general duty by undertaking inspection and found the state law claims not pre-
empted. Rawson v. United Steelworkers, 111 Idaho 630, 640, 726 P.2d 742, 752 (1986), va-
cated, 482 U.S. 901 (1987). In its decision to reverse, the Supreme Court focused on the Idaho
court's derivation of the union's duty from the agreement. Rawson, 495 U.S. at 371.
93. Rawson, 495 U.S. at 372.
94. Id. at 378-79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority and the dissenters largely disagreed over
what the Idaho Supreme Court had decided. The dissenters felt "[tihe Court... doubts that
the Idaho Supreme Court means what it seems to have said." Id. at 379 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
96. See Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 906 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1990) (claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress not preempted); Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1254-55 (5th Cir. 1990) (claims for wrongful discharge and wrongful
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ton of section 301 preemption doctrine is relatively clear and can be dis-
cussed in light of its effects on litigation strategy. First, a plaintiff
wishing to maintain a state tort action must not implicate the collective
bargaining agreement expressly in her pleadings. Referenoe to a duty
owed by the employer as arising from contractual obligations will result
in preemption.97 Second, even if a plaintiff does not invoke the contract
expressly in her allegations, she must avoid allegations that are "inextri-
cably intertwined" with contractual duties.98 If plaintiff's "well-pleaded
complaint" does not raise issues requiring contract interpretation in one
of the two manners listed above, it has not implicated section 301 and
should not be preempted or removable. 99
If a plaintiff has framed a state law complaint that is preempted
under section 301, why should a defendant seek removal to federal court
when he could move for dismissal in the state court? The answer is that
the federal forum carries many advantages for the defendant. The fed-
eral court may be more likely than the state court to find that federal law
preempts state law. Once preemption is found, the plaintiff may then be
foreclosed from formally alleging a cause of action under section 301 for
a number of reasons: failure to amend or denial of a motion to amend his
pleadings,"co failure to exhaust arbitration as provided by the collective
refusal to pay disability benefits preempted, claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress assumed not preempted for purposes of appeal); Krashna v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 895 F.2d
111, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1990) (claims for interference with worker's compensation rights, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with contract not preempted);
O'Shea v. Detroit News, 887 F.2d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 1989) (claims for age and handicap dis-
crimination, constructive discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress not pre-
empted); Douglas v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 573 (7th Cir. 1989)
(claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress preempted); Johnson v. Anheuser Busch,
Inc., 876 F.2d 620, 624-25 (8th Cir. 1989) (claims for slander, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and tortious interference with a contract preempted); Newberry v. Pacific Rac-
ing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 1988) (claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress preempted).
97. See supra note 71.
98. Clearly, "inextricably intertwined" claims include those that are for breach of con-
tract in substance, if not in form. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. Beyond the
clear cases, however, courts are left to define claims "case-by case." See supra note 67.
99. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. The dissenting opinion in McCormick
accused the Fourth Circuit of violating this rule by looking to the defenses raised, as well as
the complaint, for questions requiring contract interpretation. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 543-
45 (Phillips, J., dissenting). As the dissent pointed out, in light of the Supreme Court's holding
in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987), such an analysis would be unquestionably
wrong. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 543-45 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Actually, the majority and
dissent in McCormick agreed that the plaintiff must raise a need for contract interpretation
before a tort claim is preempted, but disagreed on the extent to which a plaintiff can avoid
raising a contract question in making out a tort claim. See infra notes 111-12 and accompany-
ing text.
100. See, e.g., Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 390.
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bargaining agreement, 01 or the expiration of the six-month statute of
limitations applicable to section 301 claims.' 02 Even a viable section 301
claim may prove less damaging to the defendant, because punitive or
emotional harm damages will be unavailable.103 It also should be noted
that if a plaintiff has asserted several tort claims and the suit is properly
removed under complete preemption of one or more of those claims,
under the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction the federal court can elect to
retain jurisdiction over the state claims that were not preempted.°4
With so many issues turning upon the question of whether section
301 preempts state tort law, the Fourth Circuit in McCormick advocated
a straightforward preemption analysis: A court should look to state law
to determine the essential elements of the tort alleged, and then decide if
proof of any of those elements requires interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement between the employer and employee. 05 Although
conceptually simple and appealing, this approach paints with a very
broad brush. If proof of wrongful or negligent conduct by the employer
can be evaluated only by interpreting the collective bargaining agreement
to see if the conduct was permitted or forbidden under the terms of the
agreement, few, if any, tort actions can survive section 301 preemp-
tion.10 6 This result overreaches, and is inconsistent with, Supreme Court
precedent. 107
101. See, e.g., Douglas v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir.
1989).
102. See, e.g., McCormick, 934 F.2d at 534 (en banc).
103. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
104. See, eg., Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1254-55 (5th Cir.
1990).
105. See McCormick, 934 F.2d at 535-37 (en banc). The second prong of this test is taken
from Lingie v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988), see McCormick, 934
F.2d at 534 (en banc), and is essentially a simple restatement of the Lueck "inextricably inter-
twined" test. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
106. Pushed to its logical limits, the Fourth Circuit's analysis completely preempts tort
suits alleging conduct in no way controlled by a collective bargaining agreement unless the
lack of a relationship between the conduct and the contract is obvious. The only tort claims
that would survive preemption are those based on rights that under state law could not be
waived by contract, such as the right to file a worker's compensation claim or the right not to
be discriminated against because of race, age, or handicap. Cf White, supra note 1, at 432-34
(arguing that broad preemption of negotiable and even non-negotiable claims is required by
§ 301).
107. For example, the plaintiffs in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987),
clearly would be required by a state court to prove the validity of their individual contracts.
The McCormick court's analysis could lead to the deduction that the plaintiffs could prove the
contracts valid only if the collective bargaining agreement did not supersede them. Thus, the
plaintiffs' case would require interpretation of the agreement and § 301 would preempt the
suit, a decision contrary to the Supreme Court's actual result in Caterpillar. See supra notes
73-80 and accompanying text.
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The dissent in McCormick would allow a plaintiff to allege wrongful
or negligent conduct measured by a general tort duty to act as a reason-
able, prudent person.10 The defendant may then argue that her conduct
was reasonable when viewed in light of powers or duties arising from the
collective bargaining agreement, but that argument should be considered
a negating defense or an affirmative defense similar to the defense of priv-
ilege to act by consent."° Defenses, even though clearly requiring con-
tract interpretation for evaluation, are irrelevant to the question of
preemption and removal. 1 o
Thus, the fundamental disagreement between the factions of the
Fourth Circuit expressed in McCormick concerns burden allocation. Is a
plaintiff required to prove "wrongful under the circumstances of the con-
tract," or can a plaintiff prove "wrongful under general tort law" with
"not wrongful under the circumstances of the contract" then available as
a defense?" I Since state tort law seldom offers a clear-cut answer to this
question, the problem of burden allocation is unlikely to be solved eas-
ily. 2 This leaves courts to make a choice between the two views, which
ultimately comes down to policy. The McCormick court sided with en-
suring that dispute resolution between employer and employee remains
in the forum of federal law. The dissent favored an approach giving
108. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 545 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
111. Obviously an employer's conduct can be so egregious that it bears no relationship to
powers under the collective bargaining agreement; flagrant battery provides one example.
Drawing that distinction may result only in the intentional torts remaining valid while the
negligence-based torts are preempted-hardly a desirable result. There may be no other way,
however, to reconcile the Eighth Circuit's decisions in Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 906
F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1990) and Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1989).
The Johnson court found a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from
the plaintiff's discharge to be preempted, see Johnson, 876 F.2d at 624, but the Hanks court
did not preempt a claim for the same tort based on the truly outrageous conduct of an em-
ployer who refused to transfer a worker away from a supervisor who had sexually molested her
daughter. See Hanks, 906 F.2d at 344-45. In both cases, however, the employer could plausi-
bly justify its conduct under the collective bargaining agreement; indeed, transfer of workers
seems clearly to be a power of the employer that the agreement would define.
112. The McCormick court relied on the proposition that "Virginia follows the general rule
that plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating wrongfulness." McCormick, 934 F.2d at 535
(en banc) (citing Hoffner v. Kreh, 227 Va. 48, 52, 313 S.E.2d 656, 658 (1984)). The court also
said, "[W]rongfulness cannot be determined in a vacuum," and held that the context in which
the "wrongfulness" of the conduct must be proved is that of the employer-employee contract.
Id. at 535-36 (en banc). The dissenting opinion countered with case law to support the propo-
sition that the duty owed by the employer could be independent of the contract, citing a duty
not to engage in tortious conduct that was "imposed by [Virginia tort law] upon all persons,
running to society in general and not dependent upon any employment relationships.. . ." Id.
at 545 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
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union workers the state tort law protection enjoyed by nonunion
employees.
After McCormick, unionized employees face a nearly insurmounta-
ble task in framing a negotiable tort claim that will not be preempted by
section 301.113 This hurdle preserves uniformity in federal labor law, but
carries the high price of foreclosing state-granted rights to organized la-
bor. This judicial expansion of congressional policy11 may in the long
run actually discourage entry into collective bargaining agreements,115
and kill the golden goose it seeks to protect.
WILLIAM L. CHRISTOPHER
113. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
114. See McCormick, 934 F.2d at 547-48 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Though silent on the
issue, Congress may approve of expanded preemption, not intending for state law to control
the scope of § 301 preemption. Theoretically, a state could define any tort so that a plaintiff
could state a cause of action without implicating her employment contract, simply by estab-
lishing a tort duty independent of contract. It is doubtful that either Congress or the Supreme
Court would approve, beyond the well-established examples of worker's compensation or an-
tidiscrimination statutes. Cf. supra note 106 (§ 301 preemption does not extend to non-negoti-
able rights protected by state law).
115. See Stephanie R. Marcus, Note, The Need for a New Approach to Federal Preemption
of Union Members'State Law Claims, 99 YALE L.J. 209, 229 (1989).
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Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc.: Clarifying the ConfLsion in
North Carolina's Employment-at-Will Doctrine
Throughout the history of employment law in North Carolina, state
courts have subscribed rigidly to the employment-at-will doctrine,'
which governs in both breach of employment contract and wrongful dis-
charge tort actions.' North Carolina courts consider the very relation-
ship between employee and employer to be contractual in nature.'
Historically, "[w]here a contract of employment does not fix a definite
term, it is terminable at the will of either party, with or without
cause...." 4 Several exceptions to this rule have developed under a con-
tract action, wrongful discharge tort action, or an action for statutorily-
protected employment. In reference to the contract action, if an em-
ployee has furnished additional consideration, such as changing resi-
dences or dropping a suit against the employer, North Carolina courts
except the contract from the employment-at-will doctrine.5 Also, where
the contract expressly incorporates an employment manual providing
that termination will be only for cause, the terminable-at-will rule no
longer applies.6 Another exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is
1. See, e-g., Nantz v. Employment See. Comm'n, 290 N.C. 473, 474, 226 S.E.2d 340, 341
(1976); Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 259, 182 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1971); Malever v. Kay Jewelry
Co., 223 N.C. 148, 149, 25 S.E.2d 436, 437 (1943).
2. Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C. App. 331, 336, 328 S.E.2d 818, 822, disc. rev. denied,
314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985).
3. Alliance Co. v. State Hosp., 241 N.C. 329, 332-33, 85 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1955).
4. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 80, 221 S.E.2d 282, 288 (1976) (quoting
STRONG'S N.C. INDEX 2d, Master & Servant § 10).
5. Burkhimer v. Gealy, 39 N.C. App. 450, 454, 250 S.E.2d 678, 682, disc. rev. denied,
297 N.C. 298, 254 S.E.2d 918 (1979); see also Tuttle v. Kernersville Lumber Co., 263 N.C.
216, 219, 139 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1964) (observing that permanent employment contracts are
terminable-at-will unless additional consideration is given); cf. Buffaloe v. United Carolina
Bank, 89 N.C. App. 693, 697, 366 S.E.2d 918, 921 (1988) (holding that an intracompany move
does not constitute additional consideration).
6. Trought v. Richardson, 78 N.C. App. 758, 762, 338 S.E.2d 617, 619-20, disc. rev.
denied, 316 N.C. 557, 344 S.E.2d 18 (1986). In Trought, the court of appeals found Trought's
allegation that the manual was incorporated into the employment contract sufficient to survive
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Trought was required to sign a statement verifying receipt of the manual when she
began employment, and the manual provided for termination only for cause. Id. at 760, 338
S.E.2d at 618; cf. Rucker v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 98 N.C. App. 100, 102-03, 389 S.E.2d
622, 624-25 (finding manuals not part of employment contract where plaintiff received manu-
als only after five and one half years of work), disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 801, 393 S.E.2d 899
(1990).
In Walker v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 77 N.C. App. 253, 335 S.E.2d 79 (1985), disc
rev. denied, 315 N.C. 597, 341 S.E.2d 39 (1986), the court of appeals construed this exception
narrowly. Plaintiff Walker was fired for relaxing after completing his rounds. Id. at 254, 335
S.E.2d at 81. He contended that a handbook he received shortly after he began employment,
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made for statutorily-protected employment.7 Finally, the tort of wrong-
ful discharge in North Carolina has been broadened by a public policy
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine." Until recently, discharge
in bad faith also may have constituted an exception to employment-at-
will and established an action for wrongful discharge.9
stating that "it [the manual] will become more than a handbook.., it will become an under-
standing," id. at 255, 335 S.E.2d at 81, became part of his employment contract. The court,
however, found that "unilaterally promulgated employment manuals or policies do not be-
come part of the employment contract unless expressly included in it." Id. at 259, 335 S.E.2d
at 83-84.
Continuing its trend of interpreting the manual exception narrowly, the North Carolina
Supreme Court, in Harris v. Duke Power Co., 319 N.C. 627, 356 S.E.2d 357 (1987), found that
Duke Power's manual was not part of Harris's contract. Id. at 632, 356 S.E.2d at 360. Harris
alleged that he was discharged without cause and in contravention of the "Rules of Conduct"
set forth in his employment manual and part of his contract. Id. at 628, 356 S.E.2d at 358.
The court noted that, in cases finding a breach of contract based on the employment manual,
the manual had a "no termination except for cause" provision-a provision lacking here. Id.
at 630-31, 356 S.E.2d at 360. Moreover, the court emphasized that the policies were manage-
ment, not employee, guidelines. Id. at 632-33, 356 S.E.2d at 361. See also White v. Hugh
Chatham Memorial Hosp., 97 N.C. App. 130, 132, 387 S.E.2d 80, 81-82 (holding that a per-
sonnel handbook offer of extra benefits if employee became disabled while employed created
unilateral contract when employee did become disabled), disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 601, 393
S.E.2d 890 (1990).
7. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1991) (requiring that employee cannot be dis-
charged for filing worker compensation claims); id. § 95-83 (1989) (requiring that employee
cannot be discharged for engaging in labor union activities); id. § 95-130 (8) (1989) (requiring
that employee cannot be discharged for instituting an OSHA proceeding).
8. Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C. App. 331, 337-38, 328 S.E.2d 818, 823-24, disc. rev.
denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985). In the landmark case of Coman v. Thomas
Manufacturing, 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989), the North Carolina Supreme Court
broadened the cause of action for wrongful discharge by enlarging the public policy exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine. Id. at 176, 381 S.E.2d at 447-48. The Coman court also
discussed the existence of a wrongful discharge action for discharge in bad faith. Id. at 176-77,
381 S.E.2d at 448; see infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text; see J. Michael McGuinness,
The Doctrine of Wrongful Discharge in North Carolina: The Confusing Path from Sides to Guy
and the Need for Reform, 10 CAMPBELL L. REv. 217, 217-47 (1988); Susan K. Datesman,
Note, Sides v. Duke Hospital: A Public Policy Exception to the Employment-at-Will Rule, 64
N.C. L. REv. 840, 840-45 (1986). North Carolina courts previously refused to recognize a
claim for retaliatory discharge. See Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 298-
300, 244 S.E.2d 272, 276-77, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978). For a
complete discussion of the history of wrongful discharge, see Duncan Alford, Note, Coman v.
Thomas Manufacturing Co.: Recognizing a Public Policy Exception to the At-Will Employment
Doctrine, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1178, 1178-92 (1990).
9. See Coman, 325 N.C. at 176, 381 S.E.2d at 448. The bad faith exception to employ-
ment-at-will, like the public policy exception, is a component of a wrongful discharge tort
action. Confusion exists in this area because courts often refer to "bad faith discharge" as if it
were a separate cause of action in tort. Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc., 104 N.C. App. 652,
661-62, 412 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1991), disc. rev. denied, 331 N.C. 119, 415 S.E.2d 200 (1992).
Thus, an employee may prove the tort of wrongful discharge by establishing discharge in viola-
tion of the law or public policy or, until Salt, by discharge in bad faith. Id. at 662, 412 S.E.2d
at 103.
Despite the strong foundation of employment-at-will, employment
law in North Carolina often has been confusing, largely due to courts'
failure to define the contours of the exceptions to the doctrine. The area
of wrongful discharge has remained especially unsettled 0 while contract
exceptions have generated little controversy. Federal courts have also
rendered varied constructions of North Carolina's wrongful discharge
law." In Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc., 2 however, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals attempted to clarify the boundaries of the employment-
at-will exceptions, particularly for wrongful discharge actions. 3 Dis-
missing the North Carolina Supreme Court's recognition of a "bad faith
discharge claim" in Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing14 as "mere dic-
tum," a unanimous North Carolina Court of Appeals concluded that "no
independent tort action for wrongful discharge of an at-will employee
based solely on allegations of discharge in bad faith" existed. Leaving
contract law virtually unaltered, the Salt decision clarified and raised the
prerequisites for a successful wrongful discharge action in North
Carolina.
This Note presents an overview of North Carolina law regarding the
status of the employment-at-will doctrine. The Note examines Salt v.
Applied Analytical, Inc., comparing it with prior employment-at-will case
law and exploring future implications of the case. 6 The Note also dis-
cusses federal cases applying North Carolina law in order to demonstrate
the confusion presently inhering in the employment-at-will doctrine in
North Carolina and Salt's possible resolution of the conflict.17 The Note
concludes that, although North Carolina's rigid adherence to the doc-
trine of employment-at-will has relaxed in recent years, the pendulum is
swinging back toward strict interpretation.1
In 1985, Sylvia Salt worked as a chemist testing pharmaceutical
products at Burroughs Wellcome Company in Greenville, North Caro-
lina, 19 when defendant AAI, another pharmaceutical testing company,
approached her with an employment offer: a chemist's position in Wil-
10. Coman, 325 N.C. at 176, 381 S.E.2d at 447.
11. See infra notes 67-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal cases.
12. 104 N.C. App. 652, 412 S.E.2d 97 (1991), disc. rev. denied, 331 N.C. 119, 415 S.E.2d
200 (1992).
13. Id. at 662-63, 412 S.E.2d 102-03.
14. 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
15. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 662, 412 S.E.2d at 103.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 19-65, 109-167.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 66-108.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 109-167.
19. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 654, 412 S.E.2d at 98. Holding eleven and a half years of
seniority, Salt had an annual salary of $22,000 and received numerous company benefits. Id.
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mington, North Carolina, with a starting salary of between $17,500 and
$18,500.20 After rejecting AAI's first two offers, Salt accepted, but only
after bargaining for promises of "continued career growth" in the com-
pany.21 The main topic during these negotiations was Salt's need for job
security. Salt made clear to her prospective employer that if the job at
AAI ended prematurely, she would be unable either to return to Bur-
roughs Wellcome or to work for another pharmaceutical company be-
cause she lacked a four-year chemistry degree.22 Salt moved herself and
her child to Wilmington, North Carolina, and began working in August
1985. AAI presented Salt with an employment manual on her first day
of work and required her to sign a statement verifying its receipt.23 On
November 14, 1986, AAI's president summarily terminated Salt,
presenting her with a letter which justified her discharge on grounds of
low productivity and bothering other employees.24
Salt sued, alleging breach of contract and wrongful discharge based
on a violation of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, and Salt ap-
pealed. 25 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, basing its deci-
sion on the employment-at-will doctrine.2 6 Rejecting all three arguments
advanced by the plaintiff, the court first found no breach of contract.27
In typical fashion, the court reasoned that the employment manual was
not part of the contract.28 The Salt court also refused to acknowledge
20. Id. The opinion gives no reason why Salt considered an offer at a lower starting sal-
ary. Id.
21. Id. (quoting letter from AAI's general manager confirming job offer).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 655-56, 412 S.E.2d at 99. AAI also required employees periodically to sign
verifications acknowledging they had read revisions to the manual. Id. at 656, 412 S.E.2d at
99. The manual provided for classification of employees as "probationary" for the first six
months of employment, or "tenured" following six months of satisfactory employment. Id.
The manual contained disciplinary guidelines: If a tenured employee committed a severe vio-
lation (illustrations of which included blatant safety rule violations or misappropriation of
corporate assets), AAI could terminate the employee without warning. Id. Less severe viola-
tions by a "tenured" employee required various warnings-the first warning was verbal and
the second and third were written. After a fourth nonsevere violation, a tenured employee
could be terminated. Id. For an in-depth discussion of the effect of employee manuals on the
doctrine of employment-at-will, see Richard H. Winters, Note, Employee Handbooks & Em-
ployment-at- Will Contracts, 1985 DuxE L.J. 196, 196-220 (1985).
24. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 655, 412 S.E.2d at 98. Salt received no warnings before her
dismissal. In fact she had received early tenure in January 1986 along with a $2,000 per year
salary increase. Her supervisors gave her positive evaluations in August 1986. Id. at 654, 412
S.E.2d at 98.
25. Id. at 655, 412 S.E.2d at 98.
26. Id. at 664, 412 S.E.2d at 104.
27. Id. at 655-60, 412 S.E.2d at 99-101; see infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
28. Although the court set out several cases involving employment manuals, the court
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the employee handbook as part of a unilateral contract between Salt and
AAI.2 9 Striking down Salt's final argument alleging breach of contract,
the court found that Salt provided no additional consideration to create a
relationship more permanent than employment-at-will.3 0
Turning to the issue of wrongful discharge, the Salt court held that
no tort for mere discharge in bad faith-outside of the exception created
for discharge in contravention of public policy-existed in North Caro-
lina.3" Although the North Carolina Supreme Court in Coman v.
Thomas Manufacturing32 had previously discussed the idea that an em-
ployer could not discharge an employee in bad faith,33 the Salt court
characterized this language as "pure dicta." 4 It concluded that Coman
was grounded "solely on the premise that North Carolina has created a
neither distinguished Salt from these cases nor advanced any reasons why Salt's manual was
not part of the contract. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 656-58, 412 S.E.2d at 99-100. Using Rosby v.
General Baptist State Convention, 91 N.C. App. 77, 81, 370 S.E.2d 605, 608, disc. rev. denied,
323 N.C. 626, 374 S.E.2d 590 (1988), as an example, the court said a manual did not become
part of a contract unless expressly included within the terminable-at-will contract. Salt, 104
N.C. App. at 656-57, 412 S.E.2d at 99-100. In Rosby, the plaintiff employee had an oral con-
tract, and his manual simply was presented to him as his "work bible." Rosby, 91 N.C. App.
at 81, 370 S.E.2d at 608. The court also referred to Trought v. Richardson, 78 N.C. App. 758,
338 S.E.2d 617, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 557, 344 S.E.2d 18 (1986), in which the North
Carolina Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff sufficiently had alleged the manual to have
been included in the employment contract to survive a 12(b)(6) motion. Id. at 762, 338 S.E.2d
at 619-20. In Trought, the employee was required to sign a statement, at the commencement
of her job, verifying receipt of the manual, which provided that she could be terminated only
for cause. Id. The Salt court also noted that in Harris v. Duke Power, 319 N.C. 627, 631, 356
S.E.2d 357, 360 (1987), the North Carolina Supreme Court failed to extend the Trought ration-
ale to a situation where the manual did not provide for discharge only for cause and consisted
of guidelines directed at management. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 657, 412 S.E.2d at 100.
29. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 658, 412 S.E.2d at 100. A unilateral contract is one in which
there is a promise on one side only: "the offeror makes the promise contained in the offer, and
the offeree renders some performance as acceptance." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§ 3.4 (2d ed. 1990). Under this theory, the handbook and the employee's act of working create
a contract on their own; the employee would not have to incorporate a manual into a preexist-
ing employment contract.
30. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 658-59, 412 S.E.2d at 100-01. The court distinguished Sides v.
Duke University, 74 N.C. App. 331, 345, 328 S.E.2d 818, 828, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331,
333 S.E.2d 490 (1985), where the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a move from
Michigan to Durham demonstrated sufficient additional consideration to remove the employee
from employment-at-will, from the instant case, reasoning that Duke University assured Sides
of discharge only for incompetence whereas Salt received no comparable assurances. Id.
31. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 662, 412 S.E.2d at 103.
32. 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
33. Id. at 176-78, 381 S.E.2d at 448-49. The Coman court stated specifically,
"[N]umerous courts have recognized wrongful discharge theories characterized either as the
bad faith exception to the at-will doctrine or under the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing." Id. at 177, 381 S.E.2d at 448.
34. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 662, 412 S.E.2d at 103.
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public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. ' 35 The Salt
court, further supporting its decision, noted that the North Carolina
Supreme Court in Burgess v. Your House36 commented that employ-
ment-at-will had been "narrowly eroded" by statutory and public policy
exceptions.37 The Salt court thus eliminated any opening in the North
Carolina doctrine of employment-at-will that the Coman decision may
have provided for bad faith discharge.
Salt rests on a large foundation of North Carolina cases interpreting
the traditional employment-at-will doctrine. In Sides v. Duke Univer-
sity,3" Sides, a nurse, was discharged after she refused to commit perjury
in a malpractice action against one of the doctors with whom she
worked. 9 The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that "while there
may be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or for an
arbitrary or irrational reason, there can be no right to terminate such a
contract for an unlawful reason or purpose that contravenes public pol-
icy. ' '40 Noting the great public interest in preventing the obstruction of
justice and characterizing the crime of perjury as "an affront to the integ-
rity of our judicial system,"'" the court upheld Sides's wrongful dis-
charge action.42
The same year in Walker v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,43 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the
defendant on Walker's wrongful discharge claim.' Walker alleged that
his discharge for raising workplace safety concerns fit under the public
35. Id. at 663, 412 S.E.2d at 103 (quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 765 F. Supp. 293,
296 (E.D.N.C. 1991)). The court also characterized McLaughlin v. Barclays American Corp.,
95 N.C. App. 301, 382 S.E.2d 836, disc. rev. denied, 325 N.C. 546, 385 S.E.2d 498 (1989), as
resting on the public policy exception although the case contained "dicta" about bad faith
discharge based on the Coman decision. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 663, 412 S.E.2d at 103 (quot-
ing English, 765 F. Supp. at 296).
36. 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990).
37. Id. at 210, 388 S.E.2d at 137; see, eg., Coman, 325 N.C. at 175-77, 381 S.E.2d at 447-
48; Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C. App. 331, 342-43, 328 S.E.2d 818, 826-27, disc. rev. denied,
314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985).
38. 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490
(1985).
39. Id. at 333-35, 328 S.E.2d at 821-22.
40. Id. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826. Sides illustrates the public policy exception to the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
41. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 343, 328 S.E.2d at 848. See also Williams v. Hillhaven Corp.,
91 N.C. App. 35, 39, 370 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1988) (finding the Sides public policy exception
applicable to discharge for refusing to commit pejury).
42. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 343, 328 S.E.2d at 826-27.
43. 77 N.C. App. 253, 335 S.E.2d 79 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 597, 341 S.E.2d 39
(1986).
44. Id. at 262, 335 S.E.2d at 85.
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policy exception to employment-at-will established in Sides." The court,
however, distinguished Sides on the ground that Sides was asked to vio-
late a law, and her termination was obviously for reasons counter to the
state's public policy. Using Sides as an example, the court dictated a
standard requiring a "clear violation of express public policy."
The court of appeals continued to interpret the public policy excep-
tion narrowly. In Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club,4 7 a chef sexually
harassed the plaintiff employee. The plaintiff contended that she was dis-
charged in retaliation for her complaints against him. 8 Affirming sum-
mary judgment for the defendant, the court framed the test for
successfully invoking the public policy exception as facing a choice be-
tween violation of the law and retaining one's job.4 9
Three years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court significantly
expanded the public policy exception created by Sides in Coman v.
Thomas Manufacturing Co. 50 Mark Coman was fired for refusing to fal-
sify driving logs to bring them into compliance with the United States
Department of Transporation's regulations."1 Although the supreme
court upheld Coman's wrongful discharge action against a 12(b)(6) mo-
tion on the grounds that Coman's discharge might have violated public
policy, the court also discussed the bad faith exception. The court held
that Coman's claim fell within the reasoning of Sides: perjury and oper-
ating a truck in violation of federal law both "offend the public policy of
North Carolina."52 Because North Carolina had adopted these driving
regulations, forcing an employee to violate them represents an evident
affront to state public policy. Coman, according to the court, faced the
Hobson's choice required in successful wrongful discharge claims: vio-
lating public policy and risking imprisonment5 3 or complying with public
45. Id. at 262-63, 335 S.E.2d at 85.
46. Id. at 263, 335 S.E.2d at 86.
47. 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116, disc rev. denied, 317 N.C. 334., 346 S.E.2d 140
(1986).
48. Id. at 500, 340 S.E.2d at 126.
49. Id. Two years later, in Burrow v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 83 N.C. App. 347,
363 S.E.2d 215, disc rev. denied, 322 N.C. 111, 367 S.E.2d 910 (1988), the court held that no
wrongful discharge action will lie for failure to perform an unsafe act: Violation of a federal
regulation did not in itself create an exception to employment-at-will, absent some policy con-
cerns. Id. at 354, 363 S.E.2d at 220; see Alford, supra note 8, at 1186.
50. 325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
51. Id. at 173-74, 381 S.E.2d at 446. The regulations prohibit a shift of more than ten
hours without a minimum rest period of eight hours. Id.
52. Id. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447.
53. Section 20-397 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides criminal penalties for
seeking to evade DOT regulations. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-397 (1989).
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policy and losing his job.14
After discussing the public policy issues, the court devoted two
pages of its opinion to bad faith discharge, essentially recognizing a bad
faith exception to employment-at-will in North Carolina." The court
declared, "This court has never held that an employee at will could be
discharged in bad faith.... Bad faith conduct should not be tolerated in
employment relations, just as it is not accepted in other commercial rela-
tionships." 6 The court never clarified, however, the contours of the bad
faith exception-specifically whether the bad faith exception was a com-
ponent of the public policy exception or if bad faith discharge could be
alleged as a separate cause of action.
Subsequent court of appeals decisions attempted to define the
boundaries of the bad faith discharge. In McLaughlin v. Barclays Ameri-
can Corp., the court of appeals construed a separate bad faith exception
from Coman.58 McLaughlin was fired after hitting an employee in self-
defense to fend off an attack. 9 Refusing to accept McLaughlin's argu-
ment that his discharge violated public policy, the court stressed that
Sides and Coman presented statutory and regulatory evidence of public
policy which were lacking here.' While the court found no evidence of
bad faith to justify an exception to at-will employment in this case,6" it
unequivocally stated "that our analysis of these facts does not close doors
to plaintiffs who are able to show bad faith by the employer in situations
similar to this one."'62 Thus, although the extent of the bad faith excep-
tion remained vague after McLaughlin, some sort of exception appeared
to exist.
63
54. Coman, 325 N.C. at 176, 381 S.E.2d at 447. On remand, the jury, deciding that no
public policy violation was implicated, declined to support the wrongful discharge claim.
Coman v. Thomas Mfg., 105 N.C. App. 88, 89, 411 S.E.2d 626, 627 (1992).
55. Coman, 325 N.C. at 176-78, 381 S.E.2d at 448-49.
56. Id. at 176-77, 381 S.E.2d at 448. The Coman court noted that many courts recog-
nized wrongful discharge theories using a bad faith exception to the at-will doctrine and that
the decision in Coman was in accord with most jurisdictions. Id. at 177, 381 S.E.2d at 448; see
Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co., 223 N.C. 148, 25 S.E.2d 436 (1943); Haskins v. Royster, 70 N.C.
601 (1874).
57. 95 N.C. App. 301, 382 S.E.2d 836, disc. rev. denied, 325 N.C. 546, 385 S.E.2d 498
(1989).
58. Id. at 306, 382 S.E.2d at 840.
59. Id. at 303, 382 S.E.2d at 838.
60. Id. at 306, 382 S.E.2d at 839-40.
61. Id. at 306, 382 S.E.2d at 840. McLaughlin himself did not even raise this issue.
62. Id. at 306, 382 S.E.2d at 840.
63. Id; but see Burgess v. Your House, 326 N.C. 205, 210, 388 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1990)
(asserting that employment-at-will has only been narrowly eroded).
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Finally, in Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co.," the court of appeals held
that, in order to establish a claim for wrongful discharge, a two-step test
applies. First, the discharge must violate some well-established public
policy; further, "there must be no North Carolina statutory remedy to
protect the interests of the aggrieved employee or society."6
In the course of its opinion, the Salt court noted the confusing state
of the employment-at-will doctrine in North Carolina, as demonstrated
above, especially in the area of wrongful discharge.6 Discord among
federal district courts interpreting North Carolina law was also perva-
sive, particularly in construing bad faith discharge in the wrongful dis-
charge area.6 The middle and western districts have found that such a
principle exists in North Carolina. For example, in Iturbe v. Wandell &
Goltermann Technologies,68 the middle district court upheld a claim for
bad faith discharge. In Iturbe, Blanca Iturbe sued in federal court for
discrimination based on national origin under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 when she was discharged; she also attached pendent
state claims of breach of contract and wrongful discharge.6 9 Blanca had
worked for Wandel & Goltermann in New Jersey, but moved her family
to North Carolina when the company offered her a "continuing job" at
its new North Carolina facility.7" Her husband was also hired by Wan-
del & Goltermann, although he had not worked for them in New Jersey.
Five years later, after Blanca's husband protested when his manager told
him that he would be laid off, the manager told him that either he or
Blanca would be fired. Blanca was fired four days later, while a male of
American birth, who worked in the same department and had no better
job performance and less seniority than she, was retained.71 Blanca sued,
stating that the contract was not employment-at-will and alleging wrong-
ful discharge based both on bad faith and violation of public policy.7 2
Consistent with North Carolina law, the middle district court con-
cluded that Blanca had not supplied additional consideration to remove
the contract from the at-will doctrine because she had moved within the
64. 102 N.C. App. 782, 403 S.E.2d 565, disc. rev. allowed, 329 N.C. 495, 407 S.E.2d 529
(1991).
65. Id. at 785, 403 S.E.2d at 568. A statutory remedy would guard adequately the inter-
ests of the employee and public, policy. Id.
66. Salt, 104 N.C. App. 662-63, 412 S.E.2d at 102-03.
67. See supra note 8.
68. 774 F. Supp. 959 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
69. Id. at 960.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 961.
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company and had not foregone other job opportunities.7" The court,
however, found that Blanca met the public policy exception under the
wrongful discharge claim. The court presented the two-part test for the
public policy exception: "(1) the discharge must violate some well-es-
tablished public policy and (2) there must be no North Carolina statu-
tory remedy to protect the interest of the aggrieved employee or
society."'74 Because Title VII was established public policy in North Car-
olina but afforded no state statutory remedy, the court held that Blanca
met the criteria to maintain a wrongful discharge in contravention of
public policy action.75 Regarding Blanca's allegation of bad faith dis-
charge, the Iturbe court held that "discharge from employment in bad
faith can state a claim in North Carolina" and that Wandel &
Goltermann's failure to follow written procedure for termination based
on seniority as outlined in its employment manual constituted bad faith
discharge.76
The United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina has followed an approach similar to that of the middle district
by recognizing bad faith as a relevant issue in wrongful discharge claims.
In Mayse v. Protective Agency, 77 the plaintiff sued a Charlotte insurance
agency which circulated a memo stating that it did not want to hire a
black person to fill its job vacancy. 78 Mayse, a black insurance agent,
was fired for refusing to implement the company's discriminatory policy;
she included both a wrongful discharge claim and Title VII claims in her
complaint. 79 At trial, the jury found that Mayse had not been discharged
in bad faith in violation of public policy.8" Holding that the jury's ver-
73. Id. In Buffaloe v. United Carolina Bank, 89 N.C. App. 693, 366 S.E.2d 918 (1988),
the North Carolina Court of Appeals declined to remove the contract from at-will status for a
similar intracompany move. Id. at 696-97, 366 S.E.2d at 921.
74. Iturbe, 774 F. Supp. at 963. The second prong of this test was promulgated in Amos
v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 102 N.C. App. 782, 786, 403 S.E.2d 565, 568, disc. rev. allowed, 329
N.C. 495, 407 S.E.2d 529 (1991).
75. Iturbe, 774 F. Supp. at 963.
76. Id. at 963-64. The middle district court, in Riley v. Dow Coming Corp., 767 F. Supp.
735 (M.D.N.C. 1991), again upheld a bad faith wrongful discharge action by denying the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on that claim. Id. at 742. In Riley, defendant Dow
Coming terminated Riley after an internal investigation concluded that he had falsified
records. Id. at 737. Riley contended that he acted at the behest of his employers. The court
held that a reasonable person could believe that the defendant acted in bad faith and in contra-
vention of public policy if it fired the plaintiff for falsifying records at its command. Id. at 742.
The Riley court did not differentiate between the bad faith and public policy claims as did the
court in Iturbe.
77. 772 F. Supp. 267 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
78. Id. at 269-70.
79. Id. at 275.
80. Id.
dict against Mayse was contrary to the weight of the evidence, the court
followed the two-part test delineated in Iturbe. Finding that section 143-
422.2 of the North Carolina General Statutes8" established North Caro-
lina's public policy against racially-motivated hiring decisions, the court
held that Mayse satisfied the first prong. The court concluded that,
although Title VII proferred a federal remedy for employment discrimi-
nation, no state statutory remedy existed, and therefore the second part
of the Iturbe test was satisfied.82 Unlike the Iturbe court, however, the
Mayse court inexplicably framed the issue as whether the discharge was
"in bad faith in contravention of public policy" rather than delineating
"bad faith" and "public policy" as two separate tort exceptions to em-
ployment-at-will.
83
The eastern district court remains diametrically opposed to the
other two federal districts on the wrongful discharge issue. In English v.
General Electric Co., 84 the court held that North Carolina did not recog-
nize a bad faith exception to employment-at-will under a wrongful dis-
charge cause of action. English alleged that she had been discharged for
her attempts to alert supervisors to deficiencies in the clean-up of con-
taminated nuclear material.8 Responding to the plaintiff's claim of bad
faith wrongful discharge, the English court held that any language in
Coman concerning bad faith discharge was dicta.8 6 Moreover, the
Coman court's claim that it was following the majority of jurisdictions in
its decision referred to the public policy exception rather than to bad
faith discharge, the English court reasoned, because the ma.jority of juris-
dictions do not recognize an action for bad faith discharge.87
Then, in Percell v. IBM,88 the eastern district went one step further
by narrowly reading the public policy exception. Percell brought an ac-
tion under 42 U.S.C. § 198189 and a pendent state claim under wrongful
discharge.90 Percell worked for IBM as a machine tool operator from
1974 until 1989. IBM maintained an open-door policy under which an
employee could appeal the decision of immediate supervisors to higher-
81. This statute legislatively declares that North Carolina has a public policy to eliminate
discriminatory practices in employment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (1990).
82. Mayse, 772 F. Supp. at 275.
83. Id. at 275-76.
84. 765 F. Supp. 293 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
85. Id. at 294. English added a claim of wrongful discharge in bad faith on appeal be-
cause she failed to appeal the dismissal of her public policy violation claim. Id. at 295.
86. Id. at 295-96.
87. Id. at 296.
88. 765 F. Supp. 297 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
89. The claim was for racially discriminatory discharge in a Title VII action. Id. at 298.
90. Id.
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level management.9" When Percell's supervisor refused to transfer him
to another department, Percell appealed the decision under the open-
door policy.92 Percell contended that after he exercised his rights under
the policy, he began receiving numerous negative evaluations, which ulti-
mately resulted in his termination. 93 Plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim
alleged that he was discharged in violation of public policy and in bad
faith for exercising his rights under the company's open-door policy.94
Responding to the public policy argument, the court first held that
retaliatory discharge for an employee's pursuit of employer-sanctioned
avenues of intracompany relief did not implicate a matter of general pub-
lic concern sufficient to invoke the public policy exception.95 Unlike the
Iturbe and Mayse court, the Percell court did not find an established pub-
lic policy exception under the North Carolina Equal Employment Prac-
tices Act. 96 The court held that, because the North Carolina statute
"acknowledged a public policy against employment discrimination but
chose not to provide aggrieved employees with a private right of action
beyond that already afforded by federal discrimination statutes," 97 ap-
proval of a wrongful discharge action for contravening public policy
against racial discrimination would result in a state claim for wrongful
discharge being attached to every employment discrimination claim.98
The Percell court also emphasized that plaintiffs successfully invoking
the public policy exception had been faced with a choice between per-
forming an act injurious to the public interest or losing their jobs, and
that Percell had not faced this choice.99 Finally, addressing Percell's al-
ternative complaint of bad faith discharge, the court held that such a
cause of action was not recognized under North Carolina law."00
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also has exhibited uncertainty
about employment-at-will in North Carolina. In Harrison v. Edison
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 298-99.
94. Id. at 299.
95. Id. at 300. The court found that potential harm to the public at large, present in both
Sides and Coman, was not present here. For a discussion of Sides and Coman, see supra notes
38-42, 50-56 and accompanying text.
96. Percell, 765 F. Supp. at 300.
97. Id.
98. Id. The court also was concerned about allowing remedies beyond those currently
afforded statutorily. Id.
99. Id. at 301. The court noted that the only alleged violation of public policy here was
the discharge itself. Id.
100. Id. at 302.
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Brothers Apparel Stores, Inc.,101 the plaintiff Harrison worked at Edison's
store. Her manager "made sexually suggestive remarks to her, touched
her without her consent, and requested sex."" °2 On December 11, 1986,
Harrison reported the conduct to the regional manager, and on Decem-
ber 18, she was terminated.10 3 In response to Harrison's allegation of
wrongful discharge, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit determined that her complaint stated a valid claim." 4 The Har-
rison court noted that successful wrongful discharge plaintiffs in North
Carolina "have had to choose between their jobs and violating the crimi-
nal law."10 Finding that Harrison was forced to choose between prosti-
tution-an illegal act-and retaining her job, the Fourth Circuit upheld
Harrison's claim.106 The court also admitted its uncertainty about the
contours of the bad faith exception in North Carolina, thereby implicitly
recognizing the existence of some sort of bad faith exception.107 Thus,
even at the federal appellate level, wrongful discharge remains a garbled
concept. 108
101. 924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1991). The district court denied Harrison's claim because a
federal remedy existed. Id. at 531.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 534.
105. Id. at 533. The Harrison court stated that in Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club, 79
N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116, disc rev. denied, 317 N.C. 334, 346 S.E.2d 140 (1986), the
North Carolina Court of Appeals did not extend the public policy exception to a sexually-
harassed employee. The Harrison court distinguished Hogan, however, on the grounds that
Hogan involved employee-to-employee rather than the management-to-employee harassment
present in Harrison, and because it antedated Coman. Harrison, 924 F.2d at 533.
106. Harrison, 924 F.2d at 534. The Harrison court also explicitly cautioned that a federal
court remedy was irrelevant to the existence of a remedy in state court. Id. at 533.
107. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently addressed a
breach of contract and wrongful discharge claim in Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, 898 F.2d 147
(4th Cir. 1991) (text in Westlaw). Smith transferred from Myrtle Beach, South Carolina,
where he was a Piedmont employee to Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for a trainee position
as a flight attendant. Id. at *2. Piedmont terminated Smith for displaying an unacceptable
attitude. Smith in turn alleged breach of contract and wrongful discharge in breach of an
implied covenant of good faith. Addressing the contract claim, the fourth circuit determined
that even if Smith's move constituted additional consideration, he had received no assurances
of termination only for cause. Id. at *3. Neither did Piedmont's employment manual contain
any "termination only for cause" provisions. Thus, the court concluded, no action for breach
of contract would lie. Id. at *4. The court neither recognized nor rejected the bad faith dis-
charge claim. Instead, the court held that such an implied covenant was not breached in
Smith itself. Id.
108. The United States Supreme Court's most recent opinion on the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) preemption of wrongful discharge claims also raises doubts
about state wrongful discharge claims. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McLendon, 111 S. Ct. 478
(1990). Holding that ERISA preempts "a state common law claim that an employee was
unlawfully discharged to prevent his attainment of benefits under a plan covered by ERISA,"
id. at 481, the Court reasoned that the preemption clause in ERISA covered the instant case
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Employment-at-will has remained a confused doctrine in recent
years. While exceptions to employment-at-will pursuant to a contract
theory have not changed greatly in North Carolina, exceptions under
wrongful discharge have met with vague and confusing interpretations.
Courts have disagreed about what constitutes evidence of public policy
sufficient to invoke the public policy exception to employment-at-will:
For example, the federal district courts split on the question of whether
the North Carolina statute prohibiting racial discrimination evidences
the state's policy against discrimination."co The possibility of proving
wrongful discharge merely by establishing discharge in bad faith was
proferred only vaguely by the North Carolina courts; 110 the conflicting
interpretations by the federal courts illustrate the confusion in this
area.1" Salt v. Applied Analytical Inc. 112 has contributed to the resolu-
tion of the confusing state of the employment-at-will doctrine, especially
regarding the bad faith exception for a wrongful discharge action.
The Salt court continued the strict interpretation of exceptions to
employment-at-will in a breach of contract action and defined the bound-
aries of wrongful discharge tort by holding that proof of bad faith dis-
charge could not establish wrongful discharge in North Carolina." 3 The
court of appeals' treatment of Salt's breach of contract argument does
not diverge significantly from previous North Carolina cases; employ-
ment-at-will contracts remain the rule, subject to a small number of well-
defined and uniformly applied exceptions. Although the court recog-
nized that Salt signed a statement acknowledging receipt of an employee
because the state law here "related" to ERISA as intended by Congress. Id. at 483. The Court
cited an interest in uniformity as the impetus behind the preemption clause. Id. at 482. Thus,
an employee does not have to bring an action under ERISA for the federal statute to apply. In
McLendon, the existence of a pension plan was critical to proving employer liability under
wrongful discharge law. Id. at 483. Finally, the Court held that a wrongful discharge action
may be impliedly preempted by conflicting with § 510 of ERISA, which makes it unlawful to
discharge an employee for exercising his rights under an ERISA pension plan, and § 502 of
ERISA, which reserves remedies for ERISA violations to federal district courts. Id. at 484-85.
Because the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has yet to deal with
this issue, and because Ingersoll was based largely on statutory interpretation, id. at 482, the
effect of the Supreme Court's opinion on North Carolina plaintiffs in federal court remains
unclear. Any filing of a state wrongful discharge action, in which any element may be related
to ERISA, appears eligible for preemption. To protect against removal, the employee should
remain cautious about framing the issue of the case around the existence of pension benefits.
109. See Mayse v. Protective Agency Inc., 772 F. Supp. 267, 275-76 (W.D.N.C. 1991);
Percell v. IBM, 765 F. Supp. 297, 299-302 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
110. See Coman v. Thomas Mfg., 325 N.C. 172, 176-78, 381 S.E.2d 445, 448-49 (1989).
111. See Iturbe v. Wandell & Goltermann Technologies, 774 F. Supp. 959, 963 (M.D.N.C.
1991); English v. General Electric Co., 765 F. Supp. 293, 297 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
112. 104 N.C. App. 652, 412 S.E.2d 97, disc. rev. denied, 331 N.C. 119, 415 S.E.2d 200
(1991).
113. Id. at 662, 412 S.E.2d at 102-03.
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manual as did the plaintiff in Trought v. Richardson, a14 the court fol-
lowed the rationale upheld by the supreme court in Harris v. Duke
Power.III In Harris, the court suggested that, in addition to signing for
the manual, the manual must provide for termination only for cause in
order for a breach of contract claim to survive.116 But even though the
Salt court reached a result consistent with precedent, it did not explain
adequately its rationale; instead, the Salt court simply set forth three ex-
amples of "manual" cases and concluded in one sentence that the manual
was not part of the contract.'
1 7
The Salt court's treatment of the additional consideration exception,
however, was illogical in comparison with previous cases. The Salt court
established a rule that additional consideration exists only when an em-
ployee changes residences and receives assurances of termination only for
cause. 1 8 This rule is inconsistent with the precedent on which Salt re-
lied because the court of appeals had not yet recognized the "termination
only for cause" element when it first accepted the additional considera-
tion argument years earlier." 9 In Sides v. Duke University, the plaintiff
received assurances of termination only for cause, but the decision did
not turn on this point-rather, it turned on her moving from Michigan to
North Carolina.1 20 Furthermore, the Salt court disregarded Buffaloe v.
United Carolina Bank,2 ' in which the court held that a move from
Charlotte to Lumberton did not constitute additional consideration be-
cause the move was within the same company.1 22 The Buffaloe court did
not mention termination only for cause.1 23 Thus, by requiring change of
residence and termination-only-for-cause guarantees, the Salt court es-
tablished a stricter test for the additional consideration exception,
thereby buttressing the employment-at-will doctrine.
The Salt court also narrowed and clarified the scope of wrongful
discharge in the employment-at-will doctrine in North Carolina. While
the analysis in Salt itself departs somewhat from North Carolina cases
114. 78 N.C. App. 758, 338 S.E.2d 617, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 557, 344 S.E.2d 18
(1986).
115. 319 N.C. 627, 356 S.E.2d 357 (1987).
116. Id. at 630-31, 356 S.E.2d at 630.
117. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 658, 412 S.E.2d at 100.
118. Id. at 658-59, 412 S.E.2d at 100-01.
119. Burkhimer v. Gealy, 39 N.C. App. 450, 454, 250 S.E.2d 678, 682, disc rev. denied,
297 N.C. 298, 254 S.E.2d 918 (1979).
120. 74 N.C. App. 331, 345, 328 S.E.2d 818, 828, dis rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333
S.E.2d 490 (1989).
121. 89 N.C. App. 693, 366 S.E.2d 918 (1988).
122. Id. at 696-97, 366 S.E.2d at 920.
123. Id.
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immediately preceding it,12 4 the result is in keeping with prior cases. Ex-
pressly disregarding the Coman court's discussion of bad faith discharge,
the Salt court characterized Coman's analysis of discharge in bad faith as
"dicta."' 125 Despite the Coman dissent's contention that the Coman ma-
jority overemphasized North Carolina's past concern with discharge in
good faith, 126 the Coman court sent the message, which the Salt court
ignored, that employers should not be allowed to discharge employees in
bad faith.127 The Salt court also perceived the McLaughlin court's dis-
cussion of bad faith discharge 12 as mere dictum; however, the Salt court
failed to address why the McLaughlin court lent separate consideration
to the plaintiff's bad faith claim, apart from his public policy claim.
129
Despite Salt's failure to examine adequately the possibility of a sepa-
rate tort of bad faith discharge, Salt's result conforms with the intent
underlying Coman. First, the supreme court, in Burgess v. Your
House,130 recently commented on the narrow statutory and public policy
erosion of employment-at-will,' 3 ' but failed to mention a separate bad
faith exception.' 32 Moreover, the Coman court's declaration that its
holding was in accord with the majority of jurisdictions, 133 must refer to
the public policy exception because the majority of states do not recog-
nize a separate bad faith discharge claim.'3 4 Even the Coman dissent
phrased the question addressed in that case in terms of a bad-faith excep-
tion based on public policy grounds.' 35 The Salt court thus defines more
clearly the boundaries of wrongful discharge for the North Carolina
courts and for federal courts applying North Carolina law.
124. The Salt court abrogates completely the existence of a bad faith discharge claim in
North Carolina. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 662, 412 S.E.2d at 103.
125.. Id. Salt is the first state case which expressly disregards the bad faith discharge lan-
guage in Coman.
126. Coman, 325 N.C. 172, 179, 381 S.E.2d 445, 449 (1989) (Meyer, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 176-78, 381 S.E.2d at 448-49; see supra note 56 and accompanying text for the
precise language used by the Coman court. The Iturbe court recognized this language as dic-
tum, but "powerful dictum." Iturbe v. Wandel & Goltermann Technologies, 774 F. Supp.
959, 963 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
128. 95 N.C. App. 301, 307, 382 S.E.2d 836, 840, disc, rev. denied, 325 N.C. 546, 385
S.E.2d 498 (1989).
129. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 662, 412 S.E.2d at 103.
130. 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990).
131. Id. at 210, 388 S.E.2d at 138.
132. Id.
133. 325 N.C. 172, 177, 381 S.E.2d 445, 448 (1989).
134. English v. General Elec., 765 F. Supp. 293, 296 (E.D.N.C. 1991); see White v. Na-
tional Steel Corp., 742 F. Supp. 312, 330 n.24 (N.D.W. Va. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
938 F.2d 474 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 454 (1991); Schoen v. Consumers United
Group, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 367, 379-80 (D.D.C. 1986).
135. Coman, 325 N.C. at 185, 381 S.E.2d at 452 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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Employment-at-will doctrine implicates various policy considera-
tions. A broad or narrow interpretation of the doctrine may affect the
employer financially, by requiring costly "document[ation of] just cause
of termination" and "produc[tion of] evidence that an at-will employee
was not terminated for a particular improper reason." 136 Employers
may be less willing to hire marginal employees and give them a chance
under an employment-at-will system with many exceptions. This argu-
ment may lack substance, however, because employers rarely hire "mar-
ginal" employees or fire people unless a legitimate "cause" or business
reason exists. Finally, courts must consider the probable logistical re-
sults of any expansion of breach of contract or wrongful discharge ac-
tions: How will companies of different sizes be treated? What damages
are appropriate? What can be done to prevent unduly sympathetic juries
from granting disproportionately large awards?13 7
Although Salt's narrow construction of the doctrine may curb some
of these costs, various deleterious consequences may also flow from the
decision. Because Salt represents a return to a stricter view of employ-
ment at will, a significant reduction of wrongful discharge actions is a
likely result.13 Although excessive jury awards may also decline, the
jury's decision in the remanded Coman case"' illustrates that Salt's fears
of large verdicts were misguided. Finally, the decision in Salt proliferates
the trend permitting employers to promulgate meaningless manuals; not
only does the plaintiff face an uphill battle in proving a manual to be part
of an employment contract, but Salt now abrogates any possibility of
claiming a breach of an implied covenant of good faith based on a
manual. 14'
For legal practitioners, Salt will have varied effects. In order to re-
move employment from at-will status in North Carolina, an employee
may now show in several ways that an employment contract that is more
than terminable-at-will existed. The employee may prove that the con-
tract was for a definite duration.'41 An employee can use oral evidence
to establish duration if the essential elements are not in the written
contract. 142
136. Id. at 183, 381 S.E.2d at 452 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 183-84, 381 S.E.2d at 452 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
138. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 664-65, 412 S.E.2d at 104. Such an action would require any
bad faith claim to be coupled with a public policy violation. Id.
139. 105 N.C. App. 88, 89, 411 S.E.2d 626, 627 (1992). The jury found no public policy
violation and made no award. Id.
140. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 664-65, 412 S.E.2d at 104.
141. Freeman v. Hardee's Food Sys. Inc., 3 N.C. App. 435, 438, 165 S.E.2d 39, 41-42
(1969). The plaintiff employee bears the burden of proving a specific duration. Id.
142. Hall v. Hotel L'Europe, Inc., 69 N.C. App. 664, 666, 318 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1984); see
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An employee may remove a contract from employment-at-will sta-
tus by showing that she furnished additional consideration beyond her
services.143 The most prevalent examples of additional consideration in-
clude moving in order to obtain a job, or sacrificing a tort claim. 144 A
change of residence encompassing a significant distance coupled with
foregoing another job opportunity constitute reliable proof of additional
consideration.145 After Salt, however, it seems as if an employee also
must prove that, before her move, she received assurances that she would
be terminated only for cause. 46
By proving that an employment manual was part of an employment
contract, an employee also may evade employment-at-will status. 147 Sev-
eral factors indicate that an employment manual has been included in a
contract: a requirement that the employee review the manual and sign a
statement verifying receipt when she begins work and a provision that
the employee can only be terminated for cause. 14 1 It should be noted
that any attempt to prove that the manual was a unilateral contract,
thereby requiring adherence to its terms, has met with harsh treat-
ment. 149 The North Carolina courts have consistently asserted that "uni-
laterally promulgated employment manuals or policies do not become
part of the employment contract unless expressly included in it."' 150
also Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 259, 182 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1971) (holding that the court may
consider business usage or other circumstances in establishing duration).
143. Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C. App. 331, 345, 328 S.E.2d 818, 828, disc. rev. denied,
314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985).
144. Id.; see also Buffaloe v. United Carolina Bank, 89 N.C. App. 693, 696-97, 366 S.E.2d
918, 921 (1988) (holding that a move from Charlotte to Lumberton was not additional consid-
eration because no other job opportunities were foregone); cf. Humphrey v. Hill, 55 N.C. App.
359, 362, 285 S.E.2d 293, 296 (1982) (failure to seek employment elsewhere because of promise
of job is insufficient consideration).
145. Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 345, 328 S.E.2d at 828.
146. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 659, 412 S.E.2d at 101.
147. Trought v. Richardson, 78 N.C. App. 758, 762, 338 S.E.2d 617, 619-20, disc. rev.
denied, 316 N.C. 557, 344 S.E.2d 18 (1986).
148. Id.; see, eg., Rucker v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 98 N.C. App. 100, 103, 389 S.E.2d
622, 624-25, disc, rev. denied, 326 N.C. 801, 393 S.E.2d 899 (1990); Walker v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 77 N.C. App. 253, 259-60, 335 S.E.2d 79, 83-84 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C.
597, 341 S.E.2d 39 (1986).
149. Walker, 77 N.C. App. at 259-60, 335 S.E.2d at 83-84.
150. Buffaloe v. United Carolina Bank, 89 N.C. App. 693, 696, 366 S.E.2d 918, 920 (1988);
see also Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 658, 412 S.E.2d at 100 (holding that allowance of a unilateral
contract would undermine employment-at-will). Narrow exceptions to this unilateral contract
rule in the area of vacation pay or disability payments do exist. See, e.g., White v. Hugh
Chatham Memorial Hosp., 97 N.C. App. 130, 131-32, 387 S.E.2d 81, 82, disc. rev. denied, 326
N.C. 601, 393 S.E.2d 890 (1990); Brooks v. Carolina Tel. & Tel., 56 N.C. App. 801, 802-04,
290 S.E.2d 370, 371-72 (1982).
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Hence, proof of an employment contract eliminating at-will status in
North Carolina is, if anything, slightly more difficult in the wake of Salt.
Moreover, an action for wrongful discharge, aside from statutorily-
protected employment,"' can be based only on an abridgment of a well-
established public policy implicating general public concern. Discharge
for failure to commit perjury consistently has been held to come within
the purview of a public policy violation.152 Agreements to violate high-
way safety regulations provide another possible illustration of a well-es-
tablished public policy,"5 3 although the jury on the remanded Coman
case determined that discharge for failure to violate such rules did not
violate public policy.' 5 4 To prove a "well-established" public policy, the
employee ideally should show statutes or state regulations furthering this
policy.15 The courts have refused to extend the public policy exception
to any act other than an instruction to violate a law or state regula-
tions, 1 56 and have occasionally refused to extend it even to that
situation.1
5 7
Besides alleging a well-established public policy, the employee must
prove that no state statutory remedy exists to protect his grievance.' 58
Any specific state remedy provided by statute preempts a wrongful dis-
charge claim. 159
North Carolina does not presently recognize a wrongful discharge
action based on a separate bad faith exception.)" Likewise, no cause of
action exists for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
unless the employment contract had a definite duration.' 61 Hence, any
151. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
152. Williams v. Hillhaven Corp., 91 N.C. App. 35, 41-42, 370 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1988);
Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C. App. 331, 342, 328 S.E.2d 818, 826, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C.
331, 333 S.E.2d 490 (1985).
153. Coman v. Thomas Mfg., 325 N.C. 172, 176, 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1989).
154. Coman v. Thomas Mfg., 105 N.C. App. 88, 411 S.E.2d 626 (1992).
155. Coman, 325 N.C. at 176, 381 S.E.2d at 447; Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at
326.
156. Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club, 69 N.C. App. 483, 485, 340 S.E.2d 116, 118 (holding
that exception applied only when an employee was fired in retaliation for "his refusal to per-
form an act prohibited by law or his performance of an act required by law"), disc rev. denied,
317 N.C. 334, 346 S.E.2d 140 (1986).
157. Burrow v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 88 N.C. App. 347, 354, 363 S.E.2d 215, 219-20,
disc rev. denied, 322 N.C. 111, 367 S.E.2d 910 (1988) (refusing to extend exception where
employee fired for refusing to violate federal highway safety regulations).
158. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 102 N.C. App. 782, 786, 403 S.E.2d 565, 568, disc.
rev. allowed, 329 N.C. 495, 407 S.E.2d 529 (1991).
159. Id.
160. Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 662, 412 S.E.2d at 103.
161. Trought v. Richardson, 78 N.C. App. 758, 762, 338 S.E.2d 617, 619, disc. rev. denied,
316 N.C. 557, 344 S.E.2d 18 (1986).
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attempt to allege bad faith discharge appears to be fruitless.
Employees filing wrongful discharge actions in federal courts in
North Carolina may now face fewer obstacles. The treatment of the pub-
lic policy exception in federal courts conforms to the treatment in North
Carolina courts. 162 Because federal courts in the western and middle dis-
tricts have recognized the existence of a separate bad faith exception to
employment-at-will, any action based on wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy should also include a separate bad faith claim. 163 The
bad faith exception is most likely to find recognition where the employer
has violated either the terms of a manual or some oral agreement.1 4 Be-
cause the eastern district has specifically declined to recognize a claim of
wrongful discharge in bad faith, any such action there most likely will be
futile. 6 It would, however, be prudent for an employee to raise the
claim anyway since the Fourth Circuit has implicitly recognized a bad
faith exception in North Carolina. 166 As a consequence of Salt and con-
fficting federal district court interpretations, employees will have to work
harder in the state and federal courts to establish any case-breach of
contract or wrongful discharge-against their employer.
The employment-at-will doctrine has resumed, to a large extent, its
traditional status as guardian of the employer's interests. The Salt court
resolved the conflict in state and federal courts over the contours of the
wrongful discharge action, particularly the bad faith exception, by inter-
preting Coman to suit its own policy goals and departing from recent
employment cases to affect a realignment with North Carolina's histori-
cal position on employment-at-will. Perhaps, the court of appeals was
responding to a fear of excessive suits and jury verdicts, such as those
faced by other states with a separate bad faith exception.1 67 At any rate,
the Salt court should have dealt more thoroughly with its reasons for
abrogating the Coman bad faith exception. To establish a breach of a
covenant of good faith, the court should have required that an employ-
ment manual be incorporated into the employment contract, rather than
totally abandoning bad faith discharge. A firm stance by the supreme
162. Iturbe v. Wandell & Goltermann Technologies, 774 F. Supp. 959, 961-63 (M.D.N.C.
1991).
163. Mayse v. Protective Agency, 772 F. Supp. 267, 275 (W.D.N.C. 1991); Iturbe, 774 F.
Supp. at 964.
164. Iturbe, 774 F. Supp. at 964.
165. English v. General Elec. Co., 765 F. Supp. 293, 296-97 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
166. Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 924 F.2d 530, 533 (4th Cir. 1991).
167. Coman v. Thomas Mfg., 325 N.C. 172, 185, 381 S.E.2d 445, 453 (1989) (Meyer, J.,
dissenting). California, responding to excessive awards, refuses to recognize bad faith dis-
charge. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1988).
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court on whether a bad faith exception may exist in the future would also
prove helpful; at the same time, the court should clarify the fact that a
bad faith claim is an exception to employment-at-will and a component
of a wrongful discharge action rather than a separate cause of action
itself.
Even in the wake of Salt, the future of the public policy exception to
employment-at-will is far from certain. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina should develop a more clearly defined limitation of public pol-
icy, for example by requiring evidence of violation of a statute or regula-
tions, in order to establish uniform law. By clarifying the boundaries of
the bad faith exception under wrongful discharge and reiterating the re-
quirements for a breach of contract action, however, Salt has begun to
dispel some of the confusion over the employment-at-will doctrine in
North Carolina.
KIMBERLY ANNE HUFF AN
Exercising the Right to Die: North Carolina's Amended Natural
Death Act and the 1991 Health Care Power of Attorney Act
North Carolina's amended Natural Death Act,' endorsing living
wills,2 and the newly enacted Health Care Power of Attorney Act3 offer
greater choice, as well as greater complexity, to those individuals who
wish to make their health care decisions known should they become un-
able to communicate their preferences in the future. Under the 1991
amendments, those who execute a living will now may indicate that if
they reach a persistent vegetative state (PVS),4 they authorize the with-
drawal or withholding of medical treatment, including artificial nutrition
and hydration.5 For those who wish to name someone to make health
care decisions for them should they become incompetent or incapaci-
tated, the health care power of attorney (HCPoA) is now expressly avail-
able.6 In addition, a patient in PVS who has not executed a living will or
an HCPoA still may be removed from medical treatment, including arti-
ficial nutrition and hydration, if persons designated in North Carolina's
family consent statute concur.7 North Carolinians are not alone in con-
fronting these new developments; almost half of the states have made
1. Act of July 11, 1991, ch. 639, § 3, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 486, 494-99 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-321 to -322 (Supp. 1991 & Special Supp. 1992)).
2. A living will is a document by which a competent person, usually at least eighteen
years old, declares that should he become incompetent due to illness or accident, with no
predicted hope for recovery, certain medical treatments are to be withheld or withdrawn.
3. Act of July 11, 1991, ch. 639, §§ 1-2, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 486, 486-94 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-15 to -26 (1991)).
. 4. A persistent vegetative state is "a medical condition whereby in the judgment of the
attending physician the patient suffers from a sustained complete loss of self-aware cognition
and, without the use of extraordinary means or artificial nutrition or hydration, will succumb
to death within a short period of time." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(a)(4) (Special Supp.
1992).
5. Id. § 90-321(b).
6. Id. §§ 32A-15 to -26.
7. Id. § 90-322 (Supp. 1991). This kind of statute, sometimes referred to as a surrogate
decision-making statute, is a codification of the way decisions about death were treated prior to
enactment of living wills and HCPoAs. Before the need for these documents arose due to
medical technology's ability to sustain life past meaningful existence, families and doctors
worked together to effectuate what they perceived as the patient's wishes. The family consent
statute is available in at least fourteen other states. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-214 (Michie
1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571 (Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210 (1989); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 765.07 (West 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-21 (Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 144A.7 (West 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.58.5 (West Supp. 1992); ME,
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 5-707 (West Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-106 (1991);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (Michie 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635(2) (1991); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.009 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1105(2)
(Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-134.4 (Michie Supp. 1991), 54.1-2986 (Michie 1991).
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similar changes to their statutes.'
The General Assembly's impetus for these changes was the United
States Supreme Court's galvanizing decision in Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Department of Health.9 The Cruzan Court tentatively recognized
for the first time that a competent person has the constitutional right to
refuse medical treatment.10 The Court also upheld as constitutional Mis-
souri's requirement that an individual's wishes to forego artificial nutri-
tion and hydration11 be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence
when that individual is unable to communicate health care decisions.12
Though Cruzan dealt solely with Missouri's evidentiary standard, 3 the
decision alerted all states to reexamine their statutes and consider what
options they should make available to their citizens.14 States that heeded
the Court's decision were likely to offer more possibilities for prior con-
sent expressions through the written living will document, because the
Court implicitly approved this method. I" Cruzan also highlighted the
importance of the HCPoA, because appointing an agent 16 through the
8. See, &g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2430-2444, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-
7194.5 (West Supp. 1992) (HCPoA and living will statutes, respectively); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 745.41-.52, 765.05(1) (West Supp. 1992) (HCPoA and living will statutes, respectively);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 to -13 (Michie 1991) (HCPoA statute); N.Y. Pu. HEALTH LAW
§§ 2980-2994 (McKinney Supp. 1992) (HCPoA statute); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-134.4, 54.1-
2981 to -2992 (Michie Supp. 1991) (HCPoA and living will statutes, respectively).
9. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). For a detailed discussion of the Court's decision and its con-
stitutional ramifications, see Jennifer E. Overton, Note, Unanswered Implications--The
Clouded Rights of the Incompetent Patient under Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1293, 1300-07, 1323-31 (1991).
10. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
11. Five of the Justices in Cruzan recognized artificial nutrition and hydration as a medi-
cal treatment. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2866 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun); id. at 2879 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is
not known whether Justice Thomas or Justice Souter would agree with this crucial determina-
tion. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist gave no direct opinion on this issue.
12. Id. at 2852.
13. Justice O'Connor noted that Missouri's standard was not the only constitutional way
to protect the incompetent patient's rights in medical treatment decisions. Id. at 2858-59
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
14. Legislatures were not the only ones to take notice of the decision. The Society for the
Right to Die reported "thousands of calls" from people who wanted to know how to make
their health care choices known. Ellen E. Schultz, Ruling Draws the Worried to "Living
WilS, " WALL ST. J., June 29, 1990, at C1 (quoting Fenella Rouse, executive director of Con-
cern for Dying/Society for the Right to Die).
15. Overton, supra note 9, at 1329, 1329 n.270 (noting the Court's implicit approval of
writings through its reading of Missouri's clear and convincing standard as calling for written
documents).
16. "[IThe person appointed as a health care attorney-in-fact." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-
16(2) (1991).
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HCPoA may cover more medical situations than does the living will.17
The agent can consider the present facts of the patient's situation in mak-
ing health care decisions, whereas the living will only incorporates ex-
pressions of a patient's prior preferences. The North Carolina General
Assembly considered these possibilities, and on July llth, 1991, an-
swered the call of Cruzan by ratifying statutes with expanded protections
for incompetent patients.1 s
This Note reviews the history of the living will statute in North Car-
olina and the use of health care powers of attorney prior to the 1991
statutory authorization.19 The Note then discusses the amendments to
the living will statute and analyzes the issues raised but not resolved by
those amendments.20 It next examines the requirements for the new
HCPoA and examines the issues raised by this statute, including specific
areas of concern for those executing or drafting HCPoAs.21 Finally, this
Note highlights those areas of the statutes that need clarification from
the General Assembly.22
North Carolina always has been in the forefront of natural death
legislation. In 1977 the General Assembly was among the first state leg-
islatures to enact a natural death act.23 The original act was a response
to the technological advances made in life-sustaining treatments and to
In re Quinlan,24 the New Jersey case that focused the nation's attention
on the right to die.
North Carolina's original Natural Death Act "recognize[d] that an
individual's rights as a citizen of this State include the right to a peaceful
and natural death.125 By recognizing this right rather than conferring it,
the legislature avoided the implication that the living will was the only
17. Justice O'Connor explicitly endorsed the appointment of health care agents as "a val-
uable additional safeguard of the patient's interest in directing his medical care." 110 S. Ct. at
2857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
18. See supra notes 1 & 3 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 42-68 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 69-114 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
23. See Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 815, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1101, 1101 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1990, Supp. 1991 & Special Supp. 1992)). By
February 1978, only seven other states had enacted this type of legislation: Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, and Texas. Paul Mitchell, Comment, North Caro-
lina's Natural Death Act: Confronting Death with Dignity, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 771, 771
n.5 (1978).
24. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nor. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
25. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 815, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1101, 1101 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320(a) (1990)).
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method by which the right to a natural death could be exercised.26 The
legislature emphasized the nonexclusivity of the living will by its 1979
amendment to the general purpose section of the Act: "Nothing in this
Article shall impair or supersede any legal right or legal responsibility
which any person may have to effect the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining procedures in any lawful manner. '27 Though the statute
does not delineate how one might exercise the right to die through a
method other than the living will, it does not foreclose the effectuation of
the right through other forms of expression, both oral and written. From
the beginning, then, North Carolina has shown clearly that its citizens
have broad powers to protect their right to die.
The statutory living will form set forth in the original Natural Death
Act has remained virtually unchanged for fourteen years. Under the
terms of the original statute, a person with capacity can declare that
should his condition be diagnosed by the attending physician28 and an-
other physician as terminal and incurable,29 extraordinary means 30 "may
be withheld or discontinued upon the direction and under the supervision
of the attending physician."31 The statute also provides that a physician
will not be subject to civil or criminal liability or charges of unprofes-
sional conduct if he relies on and acts according to a properly executed
living will.32 To be properly executed, the living will must express the
declarant's desires as set forth above, state that the declarant is aware of
the action authorized by the document, be witnessed by two people, and
proved by a clerk or notary.33 The witnesses must know the declarant
26. Mitchell, supra note 23, at 782.
27. Act of May 30, 1979, ch. 715, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 782, 782 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320(b) (1990)).
28. "Attending physician" is not defined in the North Carolina statute. Alabama's statute
offers a typical definition: the "physician selected by, or assigned to, the patient who has
primary responsibility for the treatment and care of the patient." ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3
(1990).
29. For a discussion of the 1991 amendment to this requirement, see infra notes 49-51 and
accompanying text.
30. Since its enactment the statute has defined "extraordinary means" as "any medical
procedure or intervention which in the judgment of the attending physician would serve only
to postpone artificially the moment of death by sustaining, restoring, or supplanting a vital
function." Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 815, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sss. Laws 1101, 1 [02 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (Special Supp. 1992)).
31. Id. For a discussion of this discretionary language of the statute, see injfra notes 64-68
and accompanying text.
32. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 815, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1101, 1104 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (Special Supp. 1992)).
33. Act of March 6, 1979, ch. 112, §§ 1-6, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 76, 76-77 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(c)-(d) (Special Supp. 1992)). Prior to the 1979 amend-
ments only a clerk could prove the document. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 815, § 1, 1977 N.C.
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well enough to be able to judge him of sound mind,3 4 but they cannot be
related to the declarant or the declarant's spouse within the third degree,
entitled to any portion of the declarant's estate either by will or intestacy,
employed by or acting as a medical provider for the declarant, or hold a
claim against the declarant.35
Health care powers of attorney played a lesser role than the living
will in North Carolina's legislation prior to the 1991 amendments.
Though the durable power of attorney statutes do not prohibit the use of
durable36 health care powers of attorney, they do not expressly authorize
them. The principal, however, may authorize the attorney-in-fact, who
is known as the agent under the new HCPoA statute, to act for the prin-
cipal in the area of "personal relationships and affairs,"' 37 thus permitting
her "to provide medical, dental, and surgical care, hospitalization and
custodial care for the principal. '38 This provision may be interpreted to
include health care decisions for the incompetent.
Other factors support the validity of the HCPoA prior to its statu-
tory authorization. Under the law of agency, a person may delegate to
another the power to perform certain acts, as long as those acts are not
ones that depend upon the particular individual's "character, skill or dis-
cretion," because such a delegation might harm those who rely on that
particular person's performance of the acts. 39 North Carolina's enact-
ment of a family consent statute suggests, however, that in North Caro-
lina health care decisions for the incompetent do not depend on such
individual traits and therefore may be delegated. 4' Furthermore, the leg-
islature recognized that the citizens of North Carolina have the right to a
Sess. Laws 1101, 1102 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (Special Supp.
1992)).
34. Act of July 7, 1981, ch. 848, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1227, 1227 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(c)(3) (Special Supp. 1992)).
35. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 815, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1101, 1102 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(c)(3) (Special Supp. 1992)).
36. The power is durable because it survives the incompetence of the principal. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 32A-8 (1991).
37. Id. § 32A-1(9) (1991).
38. Id. § 32A-2(9) (1991).
39. Francis J. Collin, Jr., Planning and Drafting Durable Powers of Attorney, 15 A.C.P.C.
PROB. NoTEs 27, 49 (1989).
40. The General Assembly enacted the family consent statute at the same time as the first
living will statute. Act of June 29, 1977, ch. 815, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1101, 1104 (codi-
fied as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Supp. 1991)). Under the family consent stat-
ute, the attending physician, with confirmation from another physician, diagnoses the patient.
If the patient's condition is terminal, incurable, or PVS, then with the concurrence of either
the health care agent, guardian, spouse of the patient, or a majority of relatives of the first
degree (in that order of preference), medical treatment may be withheld or withdrawn. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Supp. 1991).
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natural death and made clear that the living will was not the only way to
exercise that right. Though no case law exists in North Carolina as to
the validity of the HCPoA prior to the 1991 Act, it is likely that such a
power would have been operative without the express statutory authori-
zation.41 Nonetheless, the General Assembly wisely made such a delega-
tion expressly possible.
The 1991 amendments to the living will statute expand the condi-
tions under which medical treatment may be withheld or withdrawn.
Prior to the amendments, a competent person could declare only that
should her condition be terminal and incurable, treatment should
cease. 2 Now, PVS may trigger the removal of medical treatment, in-
cluding artificial nutrition and hydration.43 The statutory living will
form provides a checklist of conditions for the declarant to mark as those
under which she would consent to the removal of treatment.44 The ex-
culpatory clause protecting the provider has been amended to include
removal of artificial nutrition and hydration in reliance on a valid living
will.4" The amended statute also provides that the living will "may be
combined with or incorporated into a health care power of attorney
form" if the document is executed according to the living will provi-
sions.46 Finally, the statute retains a provision recognizing as valid living
wills properly executed prior to July 1, 1979. 47
The statute raises, but fails to resolve, several important issues, none
of which the North Carolina appellate courts have considered. 4' The
41. The HCPoA statute states that "it shall not be construed to invalidate a power of
attorney that authorizes an agent to make health care decisions for the principal, which was
executed prior to October 1, 1991." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-19(e) (1991). Retroactively,
then, the General Assembly endorses the validity of HCPoAs executed prior to the express
statutory authorization.
42. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(b) (1990), amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(b)
(Special Supp. 1992).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(b) (Special Supp. 1992). The family consent statute was
amended in similar ways. See id. § 90-322 (Supp. 1991). Prior to the amendments, only termi-
nal and incurable conditions were covered. PVS is now included as a condition. Those who
may concur in the removal of treatment now include the health care agent, who is first in order
of preference for concurrence. Id.
44. Id. § 90-321(d).
45. Id. § 90-321(h).
46. Id. § 90-321(j).
47. Id. § 90-321(i).
48. One district court case that upheld a 1983 living will was decided before the newly
enacted amendments took effect. See Rettinger v. Littlejohn, No. 91-CVD-4155, Forsyth
County, Dist. Ct. (N.C. Sept. 12, 1991); see infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text. The
lack of case law in North Carolina may reflect the medical community's willingness to work
with patients and their families in effectuating their wishes. For example, University of North
Carolina Hospitals have a policy that living wills should be respected, and so far doctors pur-
portedly have complied with that policy. Laird Harrison, A Time to Live or A Time to Die?,
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addition of PVS to the statute's list of conditions triggering application of
a declarant's living will prompts the question of what the word "or" lim-
its: Must a patient be terminal and incurable or diagnosed as PVS, or is
the choice between "terminal and incurable" and "terminal and PVS?
' 49
The statutory definition of PVS indicates that without the specified medi-
cal treatment, the patient will die "within a short period of time."'5
Though "short period of time" is not defined, this sounds like a definition
of "terminal," a term the statute also fails to define. Therefore, reading
the statute to require "terminal and diagnosed as PVS" would render the
amended language duplicative." The more likely interpretation of the
statute's definition of PVS is that while the patient is receiving medical
treatment, his condition may remain viable, but without the treatment,
his condition becomes terminal. Thus, the statute should be interpreted
as requiring that the patient's condition be "terminal and incurable" or
"diagnosed as PVS."
The 1991 version of the statute retains an old provision protecting
the validity of living wills executed prior to July 1, 1979.52 The newly
amended statute does not recognize expressly as valid living wills exe-
cuted prior to 1991 but after 1979. Arguably, living wills executed dur-
ing the uncovered years may not be valid, though the lack of statutory
validation may be simply a legislative oversight.5"
CAROLINA ALUMNI REV., Winter 1991, at 13, 19 (quoting Benjamin Gilbert, director of hos-
pital legal affairs). But see Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directives for
Life-Sustaining Care, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 882, 884 (1991) (study performed in a North
Carolina hospital and in a nursing home revealed that the health care provider did not follow
advance directives in 25% of the cases).
49. The relevant section of the statute provides for cessation of medical treatment:
(b) If a person has dclared ... a desire that his life not be prolonged by extraordi-
nary means or by artificial nutrition or hydration, and the declaration has not been
revoked... and




(c) Diagnosed as a persistent vegetative state; and
[there is confirmation from a second physician of the diagnosis, then the medical
treatment may be stopped].
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(b)(1) (Special Supp. 1992).
50. Id. § 90-321(a)(4).
51. As one North Carolina court has held, "If a strict literal interpretation of the language
of a statute contravenes the manifest purpose of the Legislature, the reason and purpose of the
law should control and the strict letter thereof should be disregarded." In re Hardy, 294 N.C.
90, 95, 240 S.E.2d 367, 371 (1978) (citation omitted).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(i) (Special Supp. 1992).
53. In 1979, the legislature amended the statute to allow a notary as well as a clerk to
prove the document, perhaps justifying a statutory validation for earlier living wills. See Act
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Other problems may plague living wills executed prior to the 1991
amendments. Unless the declarant's expressed preferences deviated from
the statutory provisions, pre-1991 living wills will not include an indica-
tion of the desired action if the patient is in PVS and on artificial nutri-
tion and hydration. Should an attending physician remove artificial
nutrition and hydration without such an indication? This lack of stipula-
tion may be viewed as evidence that the patient wants the artificial nutri-
tion and hydration to continue.5 4 In this situation, the patient without a
pre-amendment living will may be better protected, because the family
consent statute would allow the removal of artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion, whereas the pre-amendment living will may not specifically request
such termination. 5 The case of Rettinger v. Littlejohn,5 6 however, illus-
trates one North Carolina district court's willingness to allow the re-
moval of artificial hydration and nutrition under a 1983 living will that
did not express consent to its termination.
Lawrence Rettinger suffered from incurable Parkinson's disease that
left him in a permanent fetal position57 and rendered him incompetent to
make health care decisions. He lived in a convalescent home and was fed
and given water by artificial means.5 8 In 1983, while competent to do so,
Mr. Rettinger had executed a living will complying with the then-ex-
isting statutory form; therefore, his living will gave no indication of his
decisions regarding artificial nutrition and hydration. 9 Concerned about
possible liability, the home refused to discontinue food and water at the
request of Mr. Rettinger's wife because Mr. Rettinger's condition was
not definitely terminal and the home was uncertain that "extraordinary
means," as defined in the statute, included artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion." After visiting the patient, Judge William Reingold ruled that the
living will was enforceable and that artificial nutrition and hydration
of March 6, 1979, ch. 112, §§ 1-6, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 76, 76-77 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (Special Supp. 1992)); supra note 33 and accompanying text. Other
amendments, such as the witness requirements, have been made since July 1, 1979, however,
and yet no express validations were made for living wills executed prior to the later
amendments.
54. Carol A. Schwab, Advance Directives: North Carolina's Response to Cruzan, THE
WILL AND THE WAY: N.C. B. ASS'N EST. PLAN. AND FIDUCIARY L. SEC. NEWSL., Nov.
1991, at 1, 3.
55. Id.
56. No. 91-CVD-4155, Forsyth County, Dist. Ct. (N.C. Sept. 12, 1991). For a discussion
of this case, see Living Will Validated in First Test of N.C. Law, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Sept. 9,
1991, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Living Will Validated].
57. No. 91-CVD-4155, at 2, Forsyth County, Dist. Ct. (N.C. Sept. 12, 1991).
58. Id. at 1.
59. Id. at 2.
60. Id. at 3.
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could be terminated.61 The court may have taken notice that the statu-
tory inclusion of artificial nutrition and hydration had been passed by the
legislature and soon would become effective. 62 For those competent per-
sons who fail to execute new living wills under the amended statute, how-
ever, the possibility remains that their inaction may be considered
evidence of a desire for continued maintenance via artificial nutrition and
hydration.63
The amendments leave unchanged the language of the statutory liv-
ing will that authorizes the physician to withhold or withdraw medical
treatment. The declarant does not direct the physician to stop treatment;
rather, the declarant states that under the specified medical conditions,
"I authorize [that] my physician may withhold or discontinue" desig-
nated medical treatments." This language is very permissive in compari-
son with that of the forty-five other states that have living will forms.65
Arguably, the physician may refuse to follow the living will even if the
medical condition of the patient falls within the living will's prescrip-
tions. The American Medical Association, however, has stated that
"[t]he preference of the individual should prevail when determining
whether extraordinary life-prolonging measures should be undertaken in
the event of a terminal illness. ' 66 To ensure that the patient's preferences
are followed, some states provide that if a physician refuses to act on a
valid living will, she must transfer the patient to another physician who is
willing to do so.67 North Carolina lacks such a provision.
The liability of a physician who refuses to act on a valid living will
remains unclear. Presumably, the risk of liability to a North Carolina
61. Id. at 4.
62. Living Will Validated, supra note 56, at 4 (interviewing Norman L. Sloan, attorney in
Rettinger).
63. Schwab, supra note 54, at 3. A related problem confronts those who executed
HCPoAs prior to the newly enacted statute. Old HCPoAs may not cover those areas that the
statute now allows. Though an old HCPoA may not work against the principal in the way a
pre-amendment living will may, the principal should consider executing a new HCPoA in
order to take full advantage of the statute's coverage.
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(d) (Special Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
65. Only Mississippi's stautue contains similarly permissive language. See Miss. CODE
ANN. § 41-41-107(1) (Supp. 1988) ("I desire that the mechanisms be withdrawn so that I may
die naturally.") (emphasis added).
66. THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS 15 (1992).
67. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3204(C) (Supp. 1991) (directing the physician
to transfer the patient promptly to another physician who "will effectuate the declaration");
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.09 (West 1986) (providing that if a physician refuses to comply then
he "shall make reasonable efforts to transfer" the patient); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D- 11
(Supp. 1991) (requiring doctor to transfer the patient if the doctor will not comply with the
living will).
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physician would be less than that of a physician who refuses to act on a
living will that contains directive language, but no federal or state cases
address this precise issue. One state court discussing the enforcement of
a valid living will has suggested that if "a competent patient has ex-
pressly refused to receive some form of medical care, a doctor would be
acting tortiously if he insisted on providing the treatment against his pa-
tient's will."6 Thus, if the living will serves as an expression of the pa-
tient's refusal of specific medical treatments in certain situations, an
action for battery may lie against a physician who maintains life support
in the face of a valid living will. Again, however, North Carolina's per-
missive statutory language may preclude such a result.
The new HCPoA statute covers more medical situations than does
the living will.69 The principal who executes the power appoints an agent
to make decisions regarding medical treatment should the principal be-
come incapacitated, including decisions not permitted under the living
will. An agent may make not only decisions involving "life-sustaining
procedures," but also those affecting "any care, treatment, service, or
procedure to maintain, diagnose, treat, or provide for the principal's
physical or mental health or personal care or comfort."' 70 The appoint-
ment of an agent, therefore, would prevent the tragic situation of a per-
son who, like Mr. Rettinger, has executed a living will, but whose
situation is not specifically covered by the terms of the document. The
agent can act as a surrogate decisionmaker and direct that treatment be
withdrawn so that death can come naturally. The principal also may
authorize the agent to make decisions about organ donation, autopsy,
and the disposition of the body.71 It should be noted that the principal is
not required to grant such broad powers; instead, he may specifically
limit the agent's authority in the document.72
Anyone who is at least eighteen years old may execute an HCPoA if
he has the capacity and understanding required "to make and communi-
cate health care decisions."'73 The principal may appoint as her agent
anyone who is at least eighteen years old and who is not providing health
care to the principal in return for payment. 74 The HCPoA must be
68. In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 951 (Me. 1987).
69. Though the statute is in a separate chapter from the living will statute, the HCPoA
provisions are to be consistent with those of the Natural Death Act, and if they conflict, the
Natural Death Act controls. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-15 (1991). For a discussion of the po-
tential overlap and conflict of these two Acts, see infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-16(I) (1991).
71. Id. § 32A-19(b) (1991).
72. Id. § 32A-19(c).
73. Id. § 32A-17 (1991).
74. Id. § 32A-18 (1991).
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witnessed by two persons who meet the same criteria as those for the
living will,7" and the document must be notarized.76 The principal may
combine the health care power with a general power of attorney."7 If,
however, these two powers are in separate documents, and an overlap
regarding health care decisions exists, the agent's powers are superior to
those of the general attorney-in-fact.7
The HCPoA vests decisionmaking authority in two people: one
who serves as the principal's agent and one who determines the incapac-
ity of the principal. The HCPoA becomes effective when the physician
or physicians named by the principal determine in writing that the prin-
cipal is incapable of making health care decisions. 79 If the named physi-
cian is not available or is unwilling to act, an attending physician may
make the determination.8" Should the principal not wish to name a phy-
sician, he may designate someone else to make the incapacity determina-
tion, but only if religious or moral reasons for doing so are stated in the
document.81 If a named nonphysician makes the incapacity determina-
tion, she must do so in a notarized writing. 2 This person cannot be the
agent, must be at least eighteen years old and competent, and must not
be providing health care to the principal for payment.83
The HCPoA is effective until the death of the principal or until the
principal communicates his intent to revoke to each named agent and to
the attending physician. 4 This communication may take the form of an
executed revocation, a subsequently executed HCPoA, or "any other
manner" of communication by the principal.8 The HCPoA also may
become ineffective if all the named agents are unable or unwilling to act86
or ifa court appoints a guardian for the patient.8 The HCPoA statutory
form permits the principal to nominate the agent to be guardian should
the court appoint one, and the court must accept the nomination except
75. Id. § 32A-16(6) (1991); see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-25(9) (1991).
77. Id. § 32A-22(d) (1991); see also id. §§ 32A-1 to -14 (1991) (providing requirements
for general powers of attorney).
78. Id. § 32A-22(c).





84. Id. § 32A-20(b) (1991).
85. Id.
86. Id. § 32A-21(b) (1991).
87. Id. § 32A-22(a) (1991).
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for "good cause shown." 8 An HCPoA that names the spouse of the
principal as agent is revoked by the entry of a court decree of divorce or
separation, unless an alternate agent has been named.89
The General Assembly has provided a form that satisfies the
HCPoA's requirements, though the statute states that the fbrm is an op-
tional, nonexclusive method for creating an HCPoA.90 The statute does
not indicate whether co-agents may be named, but the form provides for
the appointment of only one named agent at a time, "each to act alone
and successively,"91 with named alternate agents assuming the power
should the first named be unavailable, unable, or unwilling to serve.
92
The statutory form provides that a physician or physicians be named or
the attending physician designated to determine the capacity of the prin-
cipal.93 Upon a determination of incapacity, the named agent receives
broad powers to make health care decisions, and the form cautions the
principal to be aware of this, noting, however, that the agent must "use
due care to act in [the principal's] best interests." '94 The principal may
alter the due care standard through inclusion of a miscellaneous exculpa-
tory provision dictating that the agent will be liable only for acts of "will-
ful misconduct or gross negligence." 95
The new HCPoA is an important tool for those who wish to ensure
that their preferences will be followed in situations that are not covered
by the living will. There are, however, several problems presented by this
new legislation. The first issue confronting those who execute an
HCPoA is its operation in conjunction with a living will. The HCPoA
statute maintains that in a conflict between the two documents, the living
will provisions control.96 Nonetheless, it remains unclear how the con-
flict provision in the HCPoA is intended to operate, and it is not difficult
to imagine situations where the two documents might conflict. The
HCPoA form, for example, contains a provision allowing a grant of au-
thority to an agent to make decisions regarding the cessation of life-sus-
88. Id. § 32A-22(b).
89. Id. § 32A-20(c) (1991).
90. Id. § 32A-25 (1991).
91. Id. § 32A-25(1); see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 804-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991)
(expressly disallowing co-agents). If more than one person has authority to act for the princi-
pal, the likely result is disagreement among the agents about health care decisions.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-25(1) (1991).
93. Id. § 32A-25(2); see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-25 (1991).
95. Id. § 32A-25(7)(C).
96. Id. § 32A-15(c) (1991). Some states take the opposite approach. For example, Cali-
fornia's HCPoA statute provides that a durable HCPoA prevails over a living will. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7193 (West Supp. 1992).
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taining procedures if the principal becomes "terminally ill, permanently
in a coma, suffer[s] severe dementia, or [is] in a persistent vegetative
state,"19 7 but severe dementia98 is not a condition covered by the living
will statute.9" It is unlikely, however, that the General Assembly in-
tended to cancel an HCPoA containing a statutorily authorized provision
for severe dementia in the event of a conflict with a living will that does
not contain this provision. Rather, the legislature's likely intent in enact-
ing the HCPoA statutes was to offer a method for people to exercise their
right to make their health care wishes known in situations not covered by
the living will.
A person who considers executing both a living will and an HCPoA
might choose instead to execute only the HCPoA, because it contains
provisions for medical situations not covered by the living will. The ad-
vantage of having both is that the living will would serve as a statement
of the patient's health care choices should the HCPoA become ineffective
because the named agents are unavailable or unwilling to act. Should the
court appoint a guardian"00 to the principal and thereby revoke the
health care agent's power, 10' the living will may serve as a guide for the
guardian in effectuating the patient's wishes.
One advantage to the living will is accessibility. Under the terms of
the statute, an HCPoA may not be available to all who wish to execute
one. An HCPoA becomes effective "when and if the physician or physi-
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-25(3)(E) (1991).
98. Severe dementia is "a general designation for mental deterioration." DORLAND'S IL-
LUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTnONARY 367 (W.B. Sauders ed., 24th ed. 1965) Examples of this
condition are progressed Alzheimer's disease, dementia praecox, which results from schizo-
phrenia, and toxic dementia, which results from the abuse of poisonous drugs such as alcohol.
Id.
99. In addition, unlike the living will, the HCPoA does not require that the patient's
condition be incurable.
100. Although the principal may nominate his health care agent to be his guardian, it
would seem wise to nominate another trusted individual. This nomination would protect the
principal if the agent's decisionmaking capabilities become impaired through grief or sudden
moral indecision in implementing the principal's desires for a natural death. The statute does
provide a safeguard in such a situation by allowing the agent who is nominated to become
guardian unless there is "good cause shown." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-22(b) (1991). After a
guardian is appointed, the ineffective HCPoA would still provide evidence of the patient's
wishes.
101. Id. § 32A-22(a). The HCPoA statute, however, dictates that when there is a conflict
between the statutes in Article 23 of Chapter 90, which include the family consent statute, and
those of the HCPoA, Chapter 90 controls. Id. § 32A-15(c). In the absence of a living will, the
amended family consent statute ranks the parties who must concur with the doctor in deciding
to withhold treatment: The health care agent is listed first, followed by the guardian. Id. § 90-
322 (Supp. 1991). This leads to the argument that, applying § 32A-15(c), the hierarchy under
the family consent statute controls, and the agent retains power over a subsequently appointed
guardian when the patient has not executed a living will.
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cians designated by the principal determine in writing that the principal
lacks sufficient understanding or capacity" to make health care deci-
sions. 102 Such a requirement necessitates that to execute a valid HCPoA
one must have a physician whom one can name. If a physician is not
designated and a lay person is named instead, the statute requires that
the moral or religious reasons for not designating a physician must be
given.103 Requiring the designation of a named physician may make it
difficult for many people to execute the HCPoA, because not everyone
has a regular physician whom they could name or religious or moral
reasons for not naming one."
An HCPoA naming alternate agents may prove problematic for the
health care provider. The statute offers no guidelines for the physician
who must determine when the first-named agent is unavailable. May the
physician rely on the alternate's word as to the first-named's unavailabil-
ity, or does the physician have to take steps to locate the first-named
agent?10 5 A health care provider faced with such an ambiguity may
choose to ignore an HCPoA. In drafting the HCPoA, guidelines for the
physician in determining an agent's authority may be helpful in ensuring
its enforcement.
A related problem for the health care provider arises in determining
the effectiveness of the HCPoA. The revocation standards for HCPoA
are low. 06 The principal may revoke the power in any manner that com-
municates her intent to revoke,10 7 but the statute limits this type of revo-
cation by requiring that the principal alert the attending physician and
each agent named in the HCPoA of her desire to revoke. 1 8 This limita-
tion protects the principal from the desire of a concerned party, such as a
relative, to prolong the principal's life by falsifying a revocation and
thereby undermining the power of the agent to decide to withhold treat-
102. Id. § 32A-20(a) (1991). The statutory form, however, provides that the declarant
"may include ... a designation of [his] choice [of physician]." Id. § 32A-25(2) (1991) (empha-
sis added). See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
103. Id. § 32A-20(a).
104. Similarly, many declarants may hesitate to execute an HCPoA because they feel un-
able to name an appropriate person as their agent. See Nancy M.P. King, Tie Natural Death
Act: A Philosophical Context for a Practical Problem, N.C. ST. B.Q., Winter 1992, at 12, 13-14.
105. Schwab, supra note 54, at 5.
106. The General Assembly likely believes that it is better to maintain the principal's life
than to terminate treatment if there is any indication from the principal that the termination is
not desired.
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-20(b) (1991). The living will contains a similar provision
that allows revocation to be communicated "in any manner" to the attending physician, re-
gardless of the declarant's mental or physical condition. Id. § 90-321(e) (Special Supp. 1992).
108. Id. § 32A-20(b). Arguably, notification to either the agent or the attending physician
might suffice as "any other manner."
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ment. Requiring that the doctor be notified by the principal helps ensure
that a revocation will be genuine.
The revocation of the HCPoA upon the entry of a court decree of
divorce or separation raises further questions. If a spouse is designated
as the agent and the couple separates without a court decree, the HCPoA
can be a powerful weapon. Often couples with marital problems are un-
able to think clearly regarding their partner. Although the requirement
of a court decree offers certainty for the provider in determining the lack
of authority of the spouse-agent, this bright-line rule may lead to harmful
consequences for the incompetent patient. A provision for a cut-off of
the spouse-agent's power upon separation with or without a court decree,
though more ambiguous than the present rule, would provide more pro-
tection for the principal. Attorneys who draft HCPoAs should suggest
to their clients who are separated from their spouse-agents that they con-
sider executing a new HCPoA.
The statute allows the principal to restrict his agent's powers, and
the physician must determine whether the agent is authorized to make
the given decision. The physician will not be held liable for following the
agent's instructions as long as the physician relies "in good faith on the
authority of the . . . agent."'" The physician, therefore, needs to be
certain as to the extent of the HCPoA's authority. To aid in the physi-
cian's determination, the principal should clearly outline any limitation,
or lack thereof, on the agent's power. 10
The principal should consider carefully the amount of authority he
wishes to give his agent. Unless he places restrictions on the power, the
agent will be able "to consent to and authorize [the principal's] admis-
sion to and discharge from a hospital, nursing or convalescent home, or
other institution."' A person who does not want her agent to be able to
commit her to a mental institution should say so in the document. Also,
the types of life-sustaining treatments covered by the HCPoA statute are
much broader than those in the living will. Under an unrestricted
HCPoA, an agent can request the withholding of "dialysis, antibiotics,
artificial nutrition and hydration, and other forms of medical treatment
which sustain, restore or supplant vital bodily functions."' 2 For exam-
109. Id. § 32A-24(b) (1991).
110. Schwab, supra note 54, at 4 (suggesting a bold, capitalized statement regarding the
unlimited nature of the agent's authority at the beginning of the HCPoA or grouping restric-
tions and guidelines together in one part of the document).
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-25(3)(C) (1991); see also id. § 32A-16(I) (1991) (defining
"health care").
112. Id. § 32A-25(3)(E); see also id. § 32A-16(4) (defining "life-sustaining procedures").
The agent also has the power to make decisions regarding organ donation and autopsies. Id.
§ 32A-19(b) (1991). The power of the agent, however, is revoked at the principal's death. Id.
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ple, a principal who is incapacitated due to severe dementia brought on
by alcohol use and who contracts pneumonia might be denied antibiotics
at the request of the agent. Obviously, there are many hypotheticals that
may concern a principal in dictating the agent's authority. The best solu-
tion is for the principal to choose his agent with care and, if desired,
place well-considered limitations on the agent's power. The principal
must keep in mind, however, that a doctor may be wary of relying on an
agent with restricted power. The advice of counsel and a discussion with
a physician about various medical procedures would be helpful in ad-
dressing these issues.
Another area of concern is the standard of care to which an agent
will be held in making the decisions for the principal. Although the stat-
ute does not discuss a standard, the statutory form notes that the agent
must exercise due care.1 13 The form, however, also offers a miscellane-
ous provision allowing the principal to relieve the agent from liability
except for willful misconduct or gross negligence.1 1 4 This provision may
be viewed as a bargaining chip between the principal and the agent who
is unlikely to take on the responsibility of making the health care deci-
sions without the assurance that liability will be limited. If the principal
does not limit the liability via the miscellaneous provision, it would seem
that although the statute provides no standard, the "due care" language
of the form would hold the agent to an ordinary negligence standard.
Both the living will and the HCPoA significantly expand North
Carolina's citizens' choices in planning for future health care, yet im-
provement is needed. 1 5 The General Assembly should clarify the living
will statute by endorsing the validity of all living wills executed prior to
the 1991 amendments, instead of only those executed prior to 1979. The
statute should expressly outline the interaction of the living will with the
HCPoA. The Legislature should rewrite the "or" provision in the condi-
tions that trigger the enforcement of the living will. If the doctor's role
in following the living will is to remain discretionary, then a provision
directing the physician to transfer the patient if he refuses to act on a
§ 32A-20(b) (1991). Arguably, the agent could only exercise this power prior to the principal's
death, though this authority may be granted to him by the form's allowance of "any lawful
actions that may be necessary to carry out these decisions." Id. § 32A-25(3)(G). See Schwab,
supra note 54, at 4 (noting that the agent may have the authority to sign contracts that carry
out the health care decisions).
113. "Due care" likely means the absence of negligence. Cf W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 210 (5th ed. 1984) (defining ordinary
negligence as the "failure to use ordinary care").
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-25(7)(C) (1991).
115. See supra notes 42-114 and accompanying text (criticizing shortcomings of the living
will and HCPoA statutes).
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valid living will is needed. Finally, some additional definitions would
clarifv the statute. Defining "attending physician" and "terminal" in
connection with "persistent vegetative state" would aid those who exe-
cute these documents.
The HCPoA statute should delineate a standard of care for the ap-
pointed agent. This improvement would aid those who are considering
accepting the designation. The statute also should allow the principal to
name the attending physician as the person to make the incapacity deter-
mination. Co-agents should be expressly disallowed. The agent who is
the spouse of the patient should lose his power if the principal is sepa-
rated from her spouse, even without a court decree. The HCPoA's pro-
visions that conflict with the living will should be expressly endorsed by
the statute as valid. Finally, some indication of the steps a doctor should
take to locate alternate agents would be helpful.
The problematic areas of the statutes need to be addressed, espe-
cially in light of the federal Patient Self-Determination Act," 6 which
mandates that hospitals participating in Medicare and Medicaid inform
all patients about their rights to make health care choices under state
law." 7 The increased availability of information resulting from this Act
no doubt will cause a great proliferation of both living wills and
HCPoAs. 1" 8 More people will become aware of the benefits of living
wills and HCPoAs and may be inclined simply to follow the statutory
forms. 19 Therefore, unless the statutes are free of ambiguity, North
Carolinians who prepare for the possibility of exercising their right to die
will be confronted not only by hard, futuristic choices but also by need-
lessly confusing ones.
BETH TILLMAN
116. See Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-117 & 1388-204 (codified as amended in
scattered subsections of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395-1396 (West 1991)).
117. See King, supra note 104, at 14.
118. One study of 405 patients found that when the patients learned about living wills and
HCPoAs, 57% of the patients wanted a living will and 78% wanted an HCPoA. Linda L.
Emanuel et al., Advance Directives for Medical Care: A Case for Greater Use, 324 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 889, 891 (1991).
119. Individuals who want treatment to continue or be provided in spite of the low odds of
recovery should exercise the broad rights to control health care choices that North Carolina
recognizes by executing a document to that effect. At least one state expressly allows for this
possibility. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 327D-1 (Supp. 1991) (adult has right to execute declara-
tion instructing physician "to provide [or] continue ... life-sustaining procedures").
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Retroactivity Refused: North Carolina Defies Supreme Court
Precedent in Swanson v. Statet
For any government, a tax refund is a nuisance in even the best of
financial times. In more troubled times, such refunds can become a
nightmare. During the difficult recession that has gripped the United
States in the early 1990s, states burdened by budget deficits have spent
most tax revenues as soon as the dollars reached state coffers. Under
such conditions, refunds to taxpayers have forced state officials to make
the difficult choice between the Scylla of increased taxes and the Charyb-
dis of reduced services.
The state of North Carolina faced such a predicament in the wake of
Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury,1 a 1989 United States
Supreme Court decision that held unconstitutional a Michigan tax law
similar to North Carolina's and found that the taxpayer was entitled to a
refund.2 The offending Michigan statute provided preferential treatment
to state employees over federal employees,3 thereby violating the doctrine
of intergovernmental tax immunity.4 The North Carolina General As-
sembly quickly amended its tax laws to comply with the decision,5 pro-
viding prospective relief. The revenue department balked at providing
retroactive relief, partly because the estimate for refunds for tax years not
barred by statutes of limitation was $140,000,000.6
The conflict over refunds reached the North Carolina Supreme
t Editor's Note: On May 18, 1992, as this issue was going to print, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 242 Va. 322,
410 S.E.2d 629 (1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 863 (1992), a case that presents the
retroactivity issue in a factual situation that is practically identical to Swanson v. State. On
June 1, 1992, the Court modified its May 18 order granting certiorari by restricting Harper to
the retroactivity issue addressed in Swanson. 112 S. Ct. 2298 (1992).
1. 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
2. Id. at 817.
3. Id. at 806. The Michigan statute exempted from its definition of taxable income all
retirement benefits from the state or its political subdivisions, but the state did not exempt
retirement benefits of federal employees. Id.
4. The doctrine's purpose is to protect each sovereign government from undue interfer-
ence from other governments. Id. at 810. It protects federal employees from discriminatory
state taxes by prohibiting inconsistent taxation based upon the source of the income unless
there are significant differences between the two classes. Id. at 815-16 (citing Phillips Chem.
Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 383 (1960)).
5. Act of August 12, 1989, ch. 792, § 2, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 2891, 2892-95 (repealing
exemptions for state pensions); Act of July 20, 1990, ch. 1002, 1990 N.C. Sess. Laws 494, 494
(repealing National Guard exemption). The General Assembly created a $4,000 exclusion for
retirement benefits of state and federal employees. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134.6(b) (1989 &
Supp. 1991).
6. To put this figure in perspective, North Carolina received individual income tax reve-
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Court in Swanson v. State. Although the case raised several difficult
questions, the court's first hurdle was to decide whether the Supreme
Court's Davis decision should apply retroactively8 to North Carolina. If
the decision applied retroactively, the state possibly owed refunds to
some 100,000 potential litigants in a related class action suit.9 If Davis
were not retroactive, then compliance would require nothing more than
what already had been done by amending the statutes.
The retroactivity question was complicated by the fact that the
United States Supreme Court was in the process of modifying its rules on
prospective versus retroactive application.10 Under normal circum-
stances, American jurisprudence requires that any new judicial decision
apply retroactively so that all other potential litigants not barred by stat-
nues of $3,002,300,000 during fiscal year 1988-89. N.C. STATE BUDGET, 1989-91 BIENNIUM:
POST-LEGISLATIVE BUDGET SUMMARY 9 (1989).
7. 329 N.C. 576, 407 S.E.2d 791, afi'd on other grounds on reh'g, 330 N.C. 390, 410
S.E.2d 490 (1991), petition for cert filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3641, 3655-56 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1992) (No.
91-1436). The complex issues of Swanson are best explained by example: If Sam State and
Fran Federal both received $10,000 in retirement benefits, then under pre-Davis North Caro-
lina law, Sam State incurred no state tax liability on his state benefits while Fran Federal was
exempted only from the first $3,000 of her federal benefits. At North Carolina's beginning tax
rate of 6%, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134.2 (1989 & Supp. 1991), the difference cost Fran $420
($7,000 x .06) per year. While prospective application of Davis requires elimination of this
disparate treatment, retroactive application might force a state to refund the extra payments
Fran made during the three tax years not foreclosed by statutes of limitation.
Swanson also raised the issue of the limitations period for filing a refund demand. The
state contended that North Carolina General Statutes § 105-267 limited the demand period to
30 days after payment. Defendant-Appellants' Brief at 24-25, Swanson (No. 64PA91). Peti-
tioners claimed that published revenue department materials allowed demands for refunds ap-
plied for within three years of the due date of a tax return. Plaintiff-Appellees' Brief at 6-7,
Swanson (No. 64PA91). The revenue department refunded taxes on federal pensions for the
1988 tax year to the 12,404 federal retirees who filed demand letters within thirty days. Id. at
3.
8. When a court announces a new rule of law, that law may apply in one of three ways.
At one end of the spectrum, prospective application restricts application of the new law to
cases arising from situations that occur after the new rule is announced. At the other end,
retroactive application permits the new rule to apply to all cases that are either already in the
court system or else not barred by final judgment, statutes of limitation, or repose. Between
these two positions is modified prospectivity, which restricts the new rule to prospective appli-
cation, except as to litigants who bring the challenging suits. The rationale for the litigant
exception is that it provides an incentive to challenge existing laws. See infra notes 85-88 and
accompanying text.
9. Bailey v. State, 330 N.C. 227, 246, 412 S.E.2d 295, 306-07 (1991) (holding that absent
statutory authority for class action demands for tax refunds, such demands are ineffective),
petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3641, 3655 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1992) (No. 91-1434).
10. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991) (limiting non-
retroactive application); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (allowing non-retroactive
application in narrow circumstances).
utes of limitation or final decision" can benefit from the new rule. To
avoid undesirable results, however, the Warren Court created narrow ex-
ceptions that allowed certain decisions to apply only prospectively.
12
The Rehnquist Court has modified the retroactivity doctrine over the
past three terms,"3 moving it back toward its status prior to the Warren
Court's decisions.14 The Rehnquist Court's modifications meant that if
the facts of Swanson did not fit the newly narrowed exceptions to the
general rule of retroactive application, then North Carolina would be re-
quired to provide a retroactive remedy to the taxpayer plaintiffs.
In a four-to-three decision, the Swanson court ruled that Davis did
not apply retroactively, based upon the equitable analysis established in
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson 15 that allows consideration of the results in
determining how to apply new rules.16 Taking judicial notice of North
Carolina's poor financial condition, the Swanson court determined that
refunds would burden blameless citizens unfairly."7 The dissenting jus-
tices argued that the majority erred in its Chevron Oil analysis because
withholding refunds represented a greater wrong than depleting the
treasury." The dissenters also contended that a recent Supreme Court
decision19 removed Swanson from the exceptions to retroactivity, thereby
requiring North Carolina to apply the Davis rule retroactively in Swan-
son.20 The plaintiffs, encouraged by the narrow margin of defeat and
bolstered by references in the dissenting opinion to recent United States
Supreme Court cases, subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for re-
11. A case is final after judgment is rendered, appeal is exhausted, and the time for peti-
tion for certiorari has elapsed or such petition has been denied. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622 n.5.
12. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text for a description of these exceptions.
13. See, eg., Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J., announcing the
judgment of the Court) (holding that new judicial rules applied to litigants in one case must
apply to litigants in all other cases not barred by statutes of limitation or final judgment);
McKesson Corp. v. Florida Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco Div., 496 U.S. 18, 51 (1990) (re-
quiring certain remedy for constitutional violations).
14. Beam essentially removed the equitable analysis announced in Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971), from cases involving what is known as "modified" or
"selective" prospectivity. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text. The Beam Court did
not address the issue of Chevron Oil's viability in cases of pure prospectivity. Beam, 111 S. Ct.
at 2448 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
15. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
16. Id at 108.
17. Swanson, 329 N.C. at 583, 407 S.E.2d at 794.
18. Id. at 588, 407 S.E.2d at 797 (Mitchell, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices argued
that this was particularly unfair in light of government's power to tax the citizens. Id. (Mitch-
ell, J., dissenting).
19. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
20. Swanson, 329 N.C. at 588, 407 S.E.2d at 797.
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view of the decision.2
This Note traces how Davis prompted North Carolina litigants to
seek tax refunds through retroactive application of Davis in North Caro-
lina.2 The Note discusses how the possible cost of applying Davis retro-
actively helped convince the North Carolina Supreme Court to eschew
retroactive application.23 The Note also describes the ascent of retroac-
tivity under the Warren Court and its subsequent retraction in recent
years, 4 and it examines several signals that should have indicated to the
Swanson court that the United States Supreme Court intended that Davis
apply retroactively.25 The Note concludes that the Swanson court erred
in refusing to apply Davis retroactively and briefly considers one method
by which the court could have satisfied constitutional requirements and
Supreme Court precedent without impoverishing North Carolina.26
Understanding Swanson requires an appreciation of the Supreme
Court's decision in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury.2 The
plaintiff in Davis was a retired federal employee who challenged a Michi-
gan tax law that exempted retirement benefits of former state employees
but did not exempt retirements benefits of former federal employees.28
Davis asserted that such inconsistent treatment violated a federal law
that allowed states to tax a federal employee's compensation only so long
as the tax did not discriminate on the basis of the source of the compen-
sation.29 The United States Supreme Court held that Michigan's incon-
sistent tax treatment violated the constitutional principle of
intergovernmental tax immunity by favoring state and local retirees over
federal retirees.3" Absent proof that there was a rational reason to dis-
criminate between similarly situated state and federal retirees, the Court
determined that the tax scheme violated the Constitution.31
The Davis Court remanded the case to the Michigan courts for de-
21. Swanson, 329 N.C. 576, 407 S.E.2d 791, affd on other grounds on reh'g, 330 N.C. 390,
410 S.E.2d 490 (1991), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3641, 3655-56 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1992)
(No. 91-1436).
22. See infra notes 27-44 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 68-125 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 126-54 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
27. 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
28. Id. at 805-06.
29. 4 U.S.C. § 111 (1988).
30. Davis, 489 U.S. at 817. The Michigan Court of Appeals had affirmed the trial court's
decision in favor of the state because the appellate court considered Davis an annuitant instead
of an employee, so his retirement pay was not compensation subject to 4 U.S.C. § 111. 160
Mich. App. 98, 103, 408 N.W.2d 433, 435, appeal denied, 429 Mich. 854 (1987).
31. Davis, 489 U.S. at 817.
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termination of one remedial issue.32 This spawned great confusion about
the precedential effect of Davis; as some courts interpreted Davis as fail-
ing to decide any remedial issues.33 The source of this confusion can be
traced to a concession by the State of Michigan that a refund would be
the appropriate remedy if the Court found the tax unconstitutional. Sig-
nificantly for Swanson, however, the Davis Court held that the plaintiff
was entitled to a refund,34 indicating its intent that the rule of that case
apply retroactively to the plaintiff." The Court remanded Davis to the
Michigan courts only for consideration of the appropriate prospective
relief from the offending taxes. The Davis Court asserted that although
its decision mandated equal treatment, the Michigan courts were in a
better position to decide whether the tax preference should be withdrawn
from state and local retirees or extended to federal retirees.36
In North Carolina, the seeds of Swanson were sown in the confusion
surrounding the state's response to Davis, which was decided only three
weeks before North Carolina income tax returns were due.37 The deci-
sion surprised North Carolina officials, because Davis overturned a tax
policy effective in North Carolina since the state enacted its retirement
system in 1941.38 With the tax deadline approaching, there was confu-
32. Id. at 817-18. The remedial issue concerned prospective relief: whether the state
would withdraw the preferential treatment from state retirees or extend it to federal retirees.
See infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
33. For example, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the Davis Court did not
intend to apply Davis retroactively. Bass v. State, 302 S.C. 250, 252, 395 S.E.2d 171, 172
(1990),judgment vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 2881 (1991) (per curiam), affd on remand,
414 S.E.2d 110, 115 (S.C. 1992) (alternative holding).
34. Davis, 489 U.S. at 817.
35. See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
36. Davis, 489 U.S. at 817.
37. When Davis was decided, 23 states had similar tax policies favoring state employees.
Swanson, 329 N.C. at 582, 407 S.E.2d at 794. Although most states responded to Davis by
amending their laws to comply with the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, such
prospective relief did not address the contention of many federal retirees that they were enti-
tled to refunds. For a thorough discussion, see Plaintiff-Appellees' Brief, Appendix A, Swan-
son (No. 64PA91) (listing the status, as of April 17, 1990, of state court litigation of Davis-type
cases).
38. The purpose of North Carolina's pre-Davis law, which exempted the pensions of re-
tired teachers and state employees from state income tax, was to give state officials an addi-
tional inducement in recruiting employees. Act of February 17, 1941, ch. 25, § 9, 1941 N.C.
Sess. Laws 20, 36 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134.6(b) & (c) (1989 &
Supp. 1991)). The state extended a similar benefit in 1979 to active members of the North
Carolina National Guard, excluding the first $1500 of National Guard pay from state taxes.
Act of June 6, 1979, ch. 801, § 37, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 927, 935 (repealed 1990). In compar-
ison, state laws exempted only the first $3000 of pension benefits paid to retired federal em-
ployees and provided no exemptions for beneficiaries of private pensions. Act of July 2, 1969,
ch. 1272, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1494, 1494 (repealed 1989). The laws also did not provide
comparable deductions to active duty members of the military, who are the federal counter-
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sion within the revenue department over how to respond to Davis.3 9
Shortly before the deadline, a group of federal retirees sought to establish
a class action for refunds, with one goal being to preserve an ability to
demand refunds for a tax year on which the three-year limitation was
rapidly approaching. The trial court certified Swanson as a class ac-
tion.4 With no disputed facts, the trial court determined on a motion for
partial summary judgment that Davis should apply retroactively41 and
ordered the state to refund the excess taxes.42 The State appealed, peti-
tioning for direct review by the North Carolina Supreme Court.4 3 The
State requested direct review because of the potential impact on the
state's financial status, characterizing the dollar amount of refunds as
"staggering," with interest expenses alone running into the tens of mil-
lions of dollars.'
The North Carolina Supreme Court determined Swanson's retroac-
tivity issue by using the United States Supreme Court test enunciated in
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson 45 that allows equitable considerations to pre-
vent the retroactive application of a new rule.4 6 In Chevron Oil the
Court declined to apply a new rule retroactively because it determined
that a party reasonably relying upon earlier law would be deprived of its
rights if the new law were applied to that case.47 Chevron Oil espoused a
three-pronged test consisting of novelty, purpose, and equity.48 If the
parts of the North Carolina National Guard. Defendant-Appellants' Brief at 6, Swanson (No.
64PA91).
39. Plaintiff-Appellees' Brief at 6, Swanson (No. 64PA91). The response was to instruct
federal retirees to report and pay taxes on all benefits and to petition for a refund within thirty
days. I. at 9. However, the state so poorly communicated this message to the public that
many accountants did not know what income to report or how to file protests for earlier years.
Id. at 10. Although 12,404 retirees complied and received refunds, 9,627 federal retirees were
denied relief because they missed the 30 day deadline. Id. at 3. The remaining federal retirees,
thought to number approximately 80,000, made no claims other than the class action demand
made on their behalf. Id.
40. Swanson, 329 N.C. at 580, 407 S.E.2d at 793. The class action consisted of two
classes, federal retirees and active federal military employees. Id.
41. Id at 580-81, 407 S.E.2d at 793.
42. Id at 581, 407 S.E.2d at 793.
43. Id. at 580, 407 S.E.2d at 792. The North Carolina Supreme Court can certify a case
for review prior to determination by the court of appeals. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1989).
44. Petition for Discretionary Review at 3-4, Swanson (No. 64PA91).
45. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
46. Swanson, 329 N.C. at 581-83, 407 S.E.2d at 793-94.
47. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 108.
48. Id. at 106-07. The novelty prong is a threshold question, requiring that the new law
establish an original principle of law by either directly overruling clear precedent or by creat-
ing a new law whose result was not foreshadowed. Id. at 106. The second prong examines the
purpose of the new rule and asks whether retroactive application would impede the new rule's
operation. Id at 106-07.
novelty and purpose prongs are met, Chevron Oil permits a court to
weigh the potential effects of retroactive versus prospective application.49
If retroactive application would result in extreme hardship or injustice, a
court may limit the rule to prospective application.50
Applying the Chevron Oil test, the Swanson court decided that the
Davis decision passed the novelty test because it was a case of first im-
pression not foreshadowed by earlier decisions.' The court noted that
twenty-two other states had similar tax schemes and that North Caro-
lina's retiree tax laws went unchallenged for almost fifty years.52 As to
the second prong, the court determined that retroactive application
would not advance the purpose of Davis because the North Carolina
General Assembly already had fully accomplished that purpose by re-
pealing the unconstitutional tax provisions.53 For the third prong, the
court accepted the state's argument that retroactive application of Davis
would have a "devastating financial impact"54 on a state that was in
"dire financial straits."5 5 Without discussing the weight it gave to the
unconstitutionality of the tax laws, the court reasoned that exposing the
state to even the possibility of such massive refunds was simply inequita-
ble.56 Claiming that the state had acted reasonably under pre-Davis law,
the Swanson court held that Davis should not be applied retroactively,
thereby limiting petitioners' relief to the prospective relief offered by the
amended tax laws.57
The Swanson court also rejected the taxpayers' contention that the
Supreme Court's recent decision in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Geor-
gia " required that it apply Davis retroactively. 9 In Beam the Supreme
Court decided that retroactive application of a new rule to one litigant
required that courts apply the rule retroactively to all other similarly
situated parties." If Beam applied to Swanson, it would require North
Carolina courts to apply the Davis rule retroactively to the benefit of the
Swanson taxpayers, because the United States Supreme Court had re-
49. Id. at 107.
50. Ia
51. Swanson, 329 N.C. at 582-83, 407 S.E.2d at 794.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 583, 407 S.E.2d at 794.
54. Defendant-Appellants' Brief at 18, Swanson (No. 64PA91).
55. Swanson, 329 N.C. at 583, 407 S.E.2d at 794.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 586, 407 S.E.2d at 796.
58. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
59. Id. at 2448 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court)
(Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.). See infra notes 107-25 and accompanying text.
60. Id. (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
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quired Michigan to apply the Davis rule retroactively.6 The Swanson
majority distinguished Davis from Swanson,62 thereby concluding that
Beam did not require such a result because Davis did not address reme-
dial issues.
63
Swanson's three dissenting justices came to the opposite conclusion
on each prong of the Chevron Oil test. Justice Mitchell contended that
Swanson did not pass the novelty test because Davis clearly was foreshad-
owed," that retroactive application would further the purpose of Davis,6"
and that the equities weighed heavily in favor of refunding the taxes.
6
The dissenting justices further maintained that Beam might trump the
Chevron Oil analysis and require the state to give Davis retroactive
application.67
The Swanson court's confusion over retroactivity is representative of
the problems American courts have encountered throughout the
Supreme Court's "experiment" with prospectivity during the last three
decades.68 Although the jurisprudence of prospectivity is widely debated
today, there was no question in early American law that new rules had
full retroactive effect. Early common law was based upon Blackstone's
concept of natural law, which allowed judges only to "declare" a law
from a pre-existing body of law.69 This "declaratory theory" denied
61. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
62. The Swanson court distinguished the two cases because it apparently interpreted
Michigan's concession of a refund as removing the remedial issues from the Davis Court.
Swanson, 329 N.C. at 584, 407 S.E.2d at 795.
63. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
64. Justice Mitchell believed that the novelty test was not met because Davis cited several
cases that foreshadowed the Davis rule. Swanson, 329 N.C. at 587, 407 S.E.2d 796-97 (Mitch-
ell, J., dissenting). See Davis, 489 U.S. 803, 814-16 (1989). For example, the Davis Court cited
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 446 (1939), for the proposition that state tax
laws may not discriminate against federal employees based on the source of compensation.
Davis, 489 U.S. at 811. The Davis Court also cited Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch.
Dist., 361 U.S. 376 (1960), for the proposition that heavier taxes must be justified by "signifi-
cant differences between the two classes." Davis, 489 U.S. at 812.
65. Justice Mitchell argued that refunding taxes collected in violation of the Constitution
would further the purpose of the Davis rule. Swanson, 239 N.C. at 587, 407 S.E.2d at 797
(Mitchell, J., dissenting).
66. The dissenters were particularly critical of the majority's reliance on the state's finan-
cial problems. Id, at 588, 407 S.E.2d at 797 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 588, 407 S.E.2d at 797 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
68. See generally Frances X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a
Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1557 (1975) (suggesting that the numerous unanticipated
problems that arose as prospectivity was expanded demonstrated the complexities of the
emerging doctrine). Professor Beytagh described prospectivity as one of the Court's "most
fascinating jurisprudential experiments." Id. Recent modifications demonstrate that the doc-
trine remains in transition.
69. Blackstone believed that the judicial role was not to "pronounce a new law, but to
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courts the authority to limit the effect of a decision. Such jurisprudence
provided no legal rights or protections for those who relied upon a law
subsequently declared invalid.7 ° Applied to Swanson, the declaratory
theory would compel the North Carolina Supreme Court to order a re-
fund because Davis was the law in effect when Swanson was decided.
American jurisprudence shifted in the nineteenth century to accept
the concept that some laws were "created" by legislators and judges.7
This shift provided a rationale for allowing overruled laws to retain some
effect in cases arising under them.72 Prospectivity did not fully develop
until the mid-1960s, however, when it became an essential component in
the Warren Court's revision of criminal procedure. Prior to the 1965
decision of Linkletter v. Walker,7" all Supreme Court decisions were ret-
roactive, so that a new rule applied to pending cases as well as those
arising after a new rule was announced.74 Retroactive application posed
a dilemma for a Court that, under the guidance of Chief Justice Earl
Warren, wanted to create new rules of criminal procedure "without con-
cern that prison doors would be opened as a result."75 Ained with the
authority of an opinion by Justice Cardozo,76 the Warren Court held in
Linkletter that it possessed the authority to decide whether a new rule
maintain and expound the old one." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69. Under
this view, a "new" rule is nothing more than a preexisting law: a judge need only identify the
law, then declare what she has found. See Beryl H. Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospec-
tive Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1960).
70. "For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is de-
clared, not that such sentence was bad law, but that it was not law." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 69, at *70-71.
71. See, eg., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 596-97 (1958) (suggesting that "positivism" separated laws created by courts and
legislatures from the "natural laws" cited by Blackstone).
72. Justice Cardozo, concerned with retroactivity's potential for unjust results, wrote an
important 1932 Supreme Court opinion, Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S.
358 (1932), which enabled later courts to develop the doctrine of prospectivity. In that deci-
sion, Justice Cardozo stated that the Constitution does not prohibit a state from choosing
prospective application of a new law. Id at 364. One commentator has suggested that Justice
Cardozo's interest in prospective application arose during his studies at Columbia Law School.
After he enrolled in the two-year curriculum, the faculty extended it to three years. He refused
to submit to retroactive application of the new curriculum and never received his law degree.
See Levy, supra note 69, at 10 n.31.
73. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
74. James B. Haddad, "Retroactivity Should be Re-Thought'" A Call for the End of the
Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. ScI. 417, 417 (1969). Linkletter
marked "the first time the Supreme Court had held that it and the courts it reviews possess the
power to deny the benefit of a constitutional right to a person equipped with a procedural
remedy for challenging the lawfulness of present incarceration attributable to a denial of that
constitutional right." Id.
75. Beytagh, supra note 68, at 1562.
76. Sunburst, 287 U.S. at 367. See supra note 72.
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applied retroactively or only prospectively.7 7 The Court ruled that deter-
mining whether a law was retroactive required consideration of the pur-
pose of the new rule, the actual reliance upon the old rule by the parties
and the effect upon the administration of justice if a new rule were ap-
plied retroactively.7"
The Court expanded prospectivity into civil cases 9 and subse-
quently refined its standards for prospectivity in Chevron Oil Company v.
Huson, ° in which the Court declined to apply a new rule retroactively.
The Court determined that the new rule reflected an unanticipated
change and that retroactive application would not further its purpose."1
The Chevron Oil Court also weighed the equities of retroactive and pro-
spective application and decided that it would be unfair to allow the new
rule to invalidate the plaintiff's cause of action. 2 Therefore, the Court
held that the new rule was not retroactive.8 3 The Chevron Oil analysis
proved to be an effective and resilient test and was the standard for retro-
activity questions in civil cases for more than two decades.
This shift toward prospectivity in American jurisprudence had its
critics, 4 particularly after the emerging doctrine created a hybrid appli-
cation known as "modified" or "selective" prospectivity. Modified pros-
pectivity is similar to pure prospectivity in that it does not require a new
rule to apply to all pending cases.8 5 The difference is that modified pros-
pectivity, in addition to applying a new rule to future cases, also allows a
77. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629. Linkletter held that a new rule would not apply retroac-
tively to cases that were final when the new rule was announced. Id. at 639-40. The Court
extended Linkletter in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), by holding that a new rule could
apply to the defendants who brought a challenge but not to cases still at trial or pending direct
review. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 300-01.
78. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636. The Linkletter Court established the three considerations
without indicating the weight that each factor should carry. Id.
79. The doctrine of prospective application was expanded into civil law in Cipriano v.
City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per curiam), which involved a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. The Cipriano Court held that retroactive application of a rule invalidating
bond elections would impose significant hardships on holders and issuers of bonds created in
reliance on pre-Cipiano law. Id. at 706. The Court decided that "substantial inequitable
results" provided an adequate basis for the Court to limit a new rule to prospective applica-
tion. Id.
80. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
81. Id. at 107-08.
82. Id. at 108-09.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Haddad, supra note 74, at 429 ("Having damned the old rule, how can the
Court continue to give it effect in cases where a proper remedy exists to correct the wrong?").
85. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2444 (1991) (Souter, J.,
joined by Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) ("[A] court may apply a new rule
in the case in which it is pronounced, then return to the old one with respect to all others
arising on facts predating the pronouncement.").
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new rule to apply to the case that raised the challenge.8 6 Thus, modified
prospectivity was well suited to criminal cases, because the Court could
apply a new rule to the party who brought the challenge, but not to
others whose appeals were final. This meant, for example, that the
named defendants in Miranda v. Arizona 7 benefitted from the new warn-
ing rule while other similarly situated petitioners did not.8
While concerns about the fairness of prospective application focused
on criminal cases, the emerging doctrine also held special significance for
tax decisions, because the Supreme Court typically allowed state courts
to determine whether a new rule applied retroactively.8 9 This gave state
courts the option of denying refunds in many cases and providing only
prospective relief for unconstitutional taxes.9" The Court modified this
policy in McKesson Corp. v. Florida Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco Divi-
sion,91 in which a unanimous Court held that certain cases will require
states to provide "meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any un-
constitutional deprivation." 92 In McKesson, such meaningful relief re-
quired refunds of unconstitutional taxes that the taxpayer felt obligated
to pay to avoid penalties while challenging the statute.93
In McKesson a liquor distributor challenged a Florida excise tax as a
86. In Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971), Justice Harlan argued that modified
prospectivity was "[s]imply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a
vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting the stream of simi-
lar cases to flow by unaffected by that new rule." Id. at 679 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
87. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
88. Even original supporters of prospectivity criticized the Court for extending the doc-
trine too far and creating disparate results among indistinguishable litigants. For example,
Justice Harlan voted with the Linkletter majority but soon decided that Linkletter's progeny
violated a basic judicial tradition by selecting only certain litigants to benefit from new consti-
tutional rules. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Douglas, who joined in the Linkletter dissent, subsequently cited Miranda as the "most
notorious example" of the evils of modified prospectivity. Desist, 394 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas complained that "sheer coincidence" determined which four
cases out of eighty similar petitions were selected for Miranda, yet the Supreme Court subse-
quently applied the new Miranda rule to only those four cases while denying relief to the
others. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
89. See Philip M. Tatarowicz, Right to a Refund for Unconstitutionally Discriminatory
State Taxes and Other Controversial State Tax Issues under the Commerce Clause, 41 TAx
LAW. 103, 117-18 (1987) ("With growing success, states are increasingly relying on the so-
called prospectivity doctrine, among other strategies, to deny refunds.").
90. Id. at 117. This allows a state to retain taxes collected under laws later determined to
violate the Constitution.
91. 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
92. Id. at 31.
93. Id. at 51. McKesson was "one of the rare Supreme Court decisions to establish a
constitutional right to a particular remedy." Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New
Law, Non-Retroactivity and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731, 1824 (1991).
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violation of the Commerce Clause.94 The trial court agreed with the cor-
poration that the taxes violated the Constitution, but it refused to order a
refund.95 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, partly due to its belief
that such a refund would be a windfall to the corporation because the
unconstitutional taxes had been passed on to consumers.96 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause requires a state to provide meaningful relief to restore any uncon-
stitutional deprivation. 97
In the companion case of American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith,9" how-
ever, a divided Court99 upheld a state decision denying retroactive relief
for taxation in violation of the Commerce Clause."°° The four-Justice
Smith plurality employed a Chevron Oil analysis to determine that the
state did not owe refunds."0' The plurality emphasized that the rule at
issue was a new one, so the state was entitled to rely in good faith on its
belief that the rule existing prior to the change was valid.
10 2
The Smith dissenters, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens, ar-
gued that constitutional rules cannot be limited to prospective applica-
tion, because no court should enforce an interpretation of the
Constitution that has been overruled.'0 3 Justice Stevens wrote that retro-
activity questions should be divided into two parts: first, determining the
current state of the law and, second, determining the appropriate rem-
94. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 22. An earlier version of the Florida tax was similar to the one
deemed to be unconstitutional in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). See
infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. The McKesson Court determined that amendments
intended to comply with Bacchus were merely cosmetic, so that even the amended statutes
violated the Constitution. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 46.
95. Florida Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco Div. v. McKesson Corp., 524 So. 2d 1000,
1002 (Fla. 1988).
96. Id at 1010.
97. McKesson, 496 U.S. at 51.
98. 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
99. Three Justices joined Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion. Id. at 171. Three other
Justices joined Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion. Id. at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia cast the deciding vote. Id. at 200 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
100. The facts of Smith are almost identical to the case of American Trucking Ass'ns v.
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), which established the new rule that flat-rate use taxes discrimi-
nated against out-of-state drivers. Id. at 298. The Smith petitioners sought retroactive appli-
cation of their earlier success in Scheiner in order to recover taxes paid prior to the Schetner
decision. Smith, 496 U.S. at 176.
101. Smith, 496 U.S. at 179-82.
102. d at 182. Justice Scalia's opinion demonstrated the frailty of the Smith decision.
Though he agreed with much of Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia felt com-
pelled to concur with the plurality's result because he dissented in the case that established the
new rule of law for Smith. Id. at 204-05 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
103. Id. at 212 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
edy. 11 Justice Stevens emphasized that on constitutional issues litigants
are entitled to a resolution based upon the best current understanding of
the law.105 In the context of Swanson, this first step would require a
court to apply Davis retroactively. The second step, however, would pro-
vide a court latitude to consider the equities of the case before determin-
ing the appropriate remedy. 16
While the North Carolina Supreme Court was considering the
Swanson case, the United States Supreme Court announced significant
restrictions on prospectivity in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Geor-
gia. "I The history of Beam is .analogous to Swanson, except that the tax
in Beam was an excise tax that favored liquor produced from Georgia-
grown products.108 Similar laws had been challenged as violating the
Commerce Clause,"°l but until 1984 the Supreme Court had held that
such discriminatory laws fell within the broad powers that the Twenty-
first Amendment gave the states in matters concerning liquor. The
Supreme Court overruled this line of cases in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v.
Dias, 110 prompting Beam to sue the state of Georgia for retroactive appli-
cation of Bacchus and a refund of $2,400,000."l
The trial court rejected Beam's claim based upon a Chevron Oil
analysis, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed." 2 The state courts
agreed with Beam that the tax violated the Constitution, but they denied
a refund because the legislature reasonably relied on pre..Bacchus deci-
sions." 3 Claiming that retroactive application of Bacchus would be ineq-
uitable, the supreme court noted that Georgia was in poor financial
condition and that a ruling for refunds in Beam would expose the state to
104. Id. at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This analysis was adopted by Justice Souter in
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2443 (1991) (Souter, J., joined by
Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (holding that once a rule is found to apply
retroactively, a second step concerning remedial issues may be governed by state law).
105. Smith, 469 U.S. at 206 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. For example, a court could determine that refunding all tax payments might be unfair
to a state, thereby allowing the state to provide tax credits, spread the refunds over several
years, or provide some other form of remedy. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
107. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
108. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Beam (No. 89-680).
109. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 274-76 (1984). Although the Constitu-
tion does not explicitly limit state interference with interstate commerce, the Supreme Court
has developed the dormant commerce clause doctrine, which prohibits discriminatory treat-
ment among states. LAURENCE A. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-2, at 403
(2d ed. 1988).
110. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
111. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2442 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
112. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. State, 259 Ga. 363, 367, 382 S.E.2d 95, 96-97 (1989),
rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
113. Id. at 364-65, 382 S.E.2d at 96.
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liability in similar claims valued at $28,000,000.114
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Georgia decision,
holding that Beam was entitled to retroactive application of Bacchus."5
Writing for the Court in an opinion in which he was joined only by Jus-
tice Stevens,11 6 Justice Souter argued that modified prospectivity violated
the concept of equality because it resulted in disparate treatment of indis-
tinguishable litigants. 11 7 Justice Souter's opinion represented an interme-
diate position on the Court, with the extremes being three dissenting
Justices who wanted to retain the equitable test of Chevron Oil,18 and
three concurring Justices who argued for elimination of prospectivity in
all constitutional decisions. 119
Justice Souter based his opinion on principles of equality and stare
decisis and argued that these prevail over the Chevron Oil analysis. 2 '
Once a new rule (in the Beam case, the Bacchus rule) was applied retro-
actively to one party (as it was to the Hawaiian importer in Bacchus),
then, according to Justice Souter, the new rule also must apply to all
cases not barred by statutes of limitation or final judgment when the new
rule is announced.1 2 1 Justice Souter reached this conclusion by focusing
on what constituted "similarly situated" litigants. 22 First, he eliminated
cases in which the operative facts arose after a new rule was announced,
because the new rule obviously applied to such cases. 23 He likewise
eliminated cases barred by res judicata or statutes of limitation or repose,
because such cases are final.' 24 This analysis left only litigants or poten-
tial litigants with causes of action that arose before a new rule was an-
nounced, but not so long before the rule that the actions were barred.
114. Id. at 365, 382 S.E.2d at 97.
115. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of
the Court).
116. Four other Justices concurred in the narrow holding that Beam was retroactive. Jus.
tice White wrote separately to note that several rationales supported the same conclusion. Id.
at 2448-49 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Justices Blackmun and Scalia wrote separate
opinions, signed by Justices Blackmun, Scalia, and Marshall, that criticized the limited scope
of Justice Souter's opinion. Id. at 2449-50 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 2450
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
117. Id. at 2446. (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
118. The dissent argued that Chevron Oil's equitable test is the best method for determin-
ing whether a specific rule should apply retroactively. Id. at 2451 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
119. Justices Scalia and Blackmun argued that failure to apply "new" constitutional rules
to pending cases violated the traditions of constitutional adjudication. Id. at 2450 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in judgment); id. at 2451 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
120. Id. at 2446 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
121. Id. at 2448 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
122. Id. at 2443-44 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
123. Id. (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
124. Id. at 2446-47 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
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Justice Souter stated that it offended the Court's notions of equality to
allow one litigant (such as Bacchus Imports) to benefit from a new rule
while denying an identical party (such as Beam) relief.1 2
The timing of Beam was unfortunate for the Swanson court, as
Beam was decided after Swanson was argued but before the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court announced its decision.126 The state court was
forced, therefore, to confront Beam's multiple opinions and arguably
murky holding without hearing the two parties present their respective
interpretations. The state justices took careful notice of Beam, as evi-
denced by Beam's prominence in the majority and dissenting opinions.
127
Nonetheless, given that retroactivity was the central question in the case
and three state justices agreed that Beam cast new light upon the issue,128
the court should have requested reargument on the issue of Beam's ap-
plication to Swanson. Several factors should have indicated to the court
that the Supreme Court intended for Beam to require lower courts to
apply newly announced rules, such as the rule of Davis, retroactively.
1 29
Presumably, reargument would have emphasized these factors.
The Swanson majority concluded with little discussion that Davis
did not apply retroactively, 3 ' despite Beam's emphasis on this question.
In Beam six Justices agreed that if a new rule of law applied retroactively
to one litigant, then it must be made available to all other similarly situ-
ated litigants.' 3 ' Although these six Justices signed four opinions, the
three concurring opinions agreed with Justice Souter's conclusion that
providing different treatment for identical litigants offended a basic no-
tion of American jurisprudence.1 3 2 Applied to Swanson, the Beam deci-
125. Id. at 2447-48 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
126. Swanson was argued on May 7, 1991, and decided on August 14, 1991. The Supreme
Court announced the decision in Beam on June 20, 1991.
127. Swanson, 329 N.C. at 583-84, 407 S.E.2d at 794-95 (majority opinion distinguishes
Swanson from Beam); id at 588, 407 S.E.2d at 797 (Mitchell, J., dissenting) (contending that
Beam provided an alternative rationale for the conclusion that Davis should apply retroac-
tively to Swanson).
128. Id. at 588, 407 S.E.2d at 799 (Mitchell, J., dissenting) ("I am convinced that... Davis
must be given fully retroactive application for whichever of the several reasons set forth by the
various Justices in Beam ultimately prevails.").
129. See infra notes 135-54 and accompanying text.
130. Swanson, 329 N.C. at 584, 407 S.E.2d at 795.
131. Justices Souter and Stevens agreed that equality and stare decisis compelled such a
result. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2446 (1991) (Souter, J.,
joined by Stevens, J.). Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Scalia believed that the Constitution
prohibited prospectivity. Id. at 2450 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment). Justice White wrote that several rationales supported Justice Sou-
ter's conclusion. Id. at 2448 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
132. Justice White also criticized the plurality's speculation on the propriety of pure pros-
pectivity. Id. at 2449 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Justices Blackmun and Scalia ar-
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sion means that if the Supreme Court intended the Davis rule to apply to
the Michigan litigants, then Davis also must apply to the similarly situ-
ated litigants in North Carolina.
The Swanson court's fundamental error was in summarily dis-
missing a Beam analysis. The court distinguished Beam from Davis on
the ground that the Davis Court did not intend to apply its holding to the
parties at bar.133 It is on this critical issue that reargument by the Swan-
son parties might have assisted the North Carolina Supreme Court's
analysis. The Swanson court apparently assumed that Davis remanded
all questions of remedy to the Michigan courts, so that the Davis Court
did not intend that Davis would apply its own rule.
Had the Davis Court not determined retroactivity, then the North
Carolina Supreme Court would have been free to decide, as it did in
Swanson, whether Davis should apply retroactively in North Carolina.
As Justice Webb noted, if Davis were not retroactive then it would not
provide the precedent that, under a Beam analysis, would require a court
to apply Davis retroactively to other cases.1 34 However, a careful review
of Davis demonstrates that the Supreme Court settled one issue of rem-
edy and therefore determined that Davis applied retroactively.
The strongest evidence that the Supreme Court intended the rule of
Davis to apply retroactively to that case is found in the Davis opinion. 135
In its brief to the Supreme Court, the State of Michigan had conceded
that a refund to Davis was the appropriate remedy if the tax were held
unconstitutional,1 36 which led some courts, including the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, to maintain that the Davis Court did not resolve the
issue of retroactivity.1 37 Justice Kennedy's language in Davis concerning
gued that the Constitution requires courts to apply all decisions retroactively. Both Justices
would eliminate modified and pure prospectivity, thereby overruling Chevron Oil. Id. at 2450
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 2451 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). See
supra note 116 and accompanying text.
133. Swanson, 329 N.C. at 584, 407 S.E.2d at 795 ("The question of retroactivity was not
determined in Davis and it may be determined in this case.") An essential finding in Beam was
that the Bacchus Court had intended to apply its holding to the litigants at bar. Beam, 11 S.
Ct. at 2445 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.). See infra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
134. Swanson, 329 N.C. at 584, 407 S.E.2d at 795.
135. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 818 (1989) (remanding Davis to
Michigan courts). As Justice Souter noted in Beam, the Court's remand of Davis is itself a
sufficient indicator that the Davis Court intended retroactive application: "Indeed, any consid-
eration of remedial issues necessarily implies that the precedential question has been settled to
the effect that the rule of law will apply to the parties before the Court." Beam, 111 S. Ct. at
2445 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
136. Brief for Appellees at 63, Davis (No. 87-1020).
137. Swanson, 329 N.C. at 584, 407 S.E.2d at 795. The Swanson majority placed great
emphasis on Michigan's concession; nevertheless, the concession does not negate the Davis
Court's intention to apply the rule of Davis to the Davis parties. See also Bass v. State, 302 S.C.
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retroactivity was ambiguous, when he stated that Michigan "conceded
that a refund is appropriate for these circumstances, [therefore] to the
extent appellant has paid taxes pursuant to this invalid tax scheme, he is
entitled to a refund." 138 This sentence can be read to mean that it was
Michigan's concession that entitled Davis to a refund for the unconstitu-
tional taxes. However, the ambiguity is clarified somewhat by Justice
Kennedy's subsequent citation to a 1931 Supreme Court decision, Iowa-
Des Moines Bank v. Bennett, 139 which required refunds of an unconstitu-
tional tax.1" The Bennett Court determined that higher tax rates for
banks violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,." and that the petitioners were entitled to refunds of the excess
taxes. 142 This citation to Bennett supports the argument that Davis was
entitled to a refund because of the constitutional violation, not the Michi-
gan concession; therefore, the Davis rule must have applied to the Michi-
gan petitioner.
A second indication of the Davis Court's retroactive intent requires
an appreciation of the analogy that Beam dictates between the Bacchus
and Beam decisions on alcohol taxes and the Davis and Swanson deci-
sions on retiree taxes. The central question in Beam was whether the
Bacchus rule must be applied retroactively to the benefit of the Beam
plaintiff.143 To resolve that question, the Court had to return to its
Bacchus analysis to determine whether it intended that the Bacchus rule
apply to the Bacchus litigants. Although the Bacchus Court remanded
the case to the Hawaiian courts, 1" it did so only for evaluation of
whether the pass-through defense should have been considered.1 45 Jus-
tice Souter argued that because Bacchus was remanded only to deter-
mine the pass-through defense, 146 the Bacchus Court must have intended
for Bacchus to apply its own rule. 47 Since the Beam petitioner was iden-
250, 252, 395 S.E.2d 171, 172 (1990) (Davis Court did not intend to apply its rule retroac-
tively),judgment vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 2881 (1991) (per curiam), affid on remand,
414 S.E.2d 110 (S.C. 1992) (alternative holding).
138. Davis, 489 U.S. at 817.
139. 284 U.S. 239 (1931).
140. Id. at 247.
141. 1d at 245-46.
142. Id. at 247.
143. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2445 (Souter, J., joined by
Stevens, J.).
144. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1984).
145. Id. at 277. The state's pass-through defense was that refunds would constitute wind-
fall profits for the importer, because the extra tax was simply passed on to consumers. Id.
146. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2445 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
147. Further evidence of the Supreme Court's retroactive intent for Davis is found in Beam,
in which the Court cited Davis to support the proposition that if Bacchus were remanded only
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tical to the Bacchus petitioner and Bacchus was retroactive, the Beam
Court held that the Bacchus rule must apply retroactively to Beam. 148
This analogy, applied to Swanson, would have required the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court to determine whether the Davis Court intended that
the Davis rule apply to the Davis litigants. It is apparent that the Davis
Court intended that Davis receive the benefit of the Court's decision,
meaning not only that Michigan's scheme violated the Constitution but
also that Davis was entitled to a refund. The Court remanded Davis to
the Michigan courts, but only for consideration of prospective remedies
because it already had determined Davis's entitlement to retroactive rem-
edies in the form of refunds. 49 Therefore, just as the Supreme Court
intended that Bacchus apply retroactively because it only remanded a
portion of the decision to the Hawaiian courts, it also intended that Davis
apply retroactively because the case was remanded only for consideration
of prospective remedies.
The Supreme Court further evidenced its intention that Davis apply
retroactively by reference to Davis in Beam.'50 Justice Souter reasoned
that because Bacchus was remanded only for discussion of the pass-
through defense, the Supreme Court intended that the new rule apply
retroactively to Bacchus."' He supported this proposition with the cita-
tion, "cf. Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury."'52 This strong in-
dication that Davis was retroactive went unchallenged by the dissenting
and concurring opinions.
Finally, the Supreme Court provided substantial, albeit indirect, no-
tice that it considered Beam relevant to a Swanson-type decision by re-
manding denial of claims similar to those in Swanson in a South
Carolina case and two Virginia cases.' 53 In these cases, the respective
to determine a possible defense, then the rest of the Court's decision must apply retroactively.
Id at 2445-46 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
148. Id. at 2446 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
149. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989). The Supreme Court
left unanswered the question of prospective relief because Davis mandated only equal treat-
ment for federal and state retirees. Id. at 817-18. The state could achieve such equal treat-
ment either by extending the benefits to federal retirees or by withdrawing them from state
retirees. Id. at 818. The Court said that the Michigan courts were in a better position to
decide which of these two courses to pursue and remanded Davis for that determination. Id
Therefore, since Davis applied retroactively to provide Davis with the refund to which he was
entitled, Beam would require state courts to apply Davis retroactively to their decisions.
150. Beam, 111 S. Ct at 2445-46 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
151. Id. at 2445 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
152. Id. at 2446 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.).
153. Bass v. South Carolina, 111 S. Ct. 2881 (1991) (per curiam); Harper v. Virginia Dep't
of Taxation, 111 S. Ct. 2883 (1991) (per curiam); Lewy v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, Ill S.
Ct. 2883 (1991) (per curiam).
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state supreme courts denied refunds by ruling that Davis did not apply
retroactively. Shortly after the Beam decision, the Supreme Court va-
cated those judgments and remanded the cases to the respective supreme




The obvious reluctance of state courts to apply Davis retroactively is
understandable in light of the amounts of money at stake. State courts,
which often are accused of being protectionist,155 are understandably.re-
luctant to disgorge millions of dollars from the same treasury that pro-
vides for the courts' operating expenses. Courts that adopt the belief that
Davis is not retroactive, however, are destined to clash with a Supreme
Court determined to roll back the prospectivity doctrine at least to the
point at which modified prospectivity is eliminated. This conflict will
force state courts to find a compromise that satisfies constitutional re-
quirements while not depleting their state treasuries.
The most promising avenue for compromise would involve Justice
Stevens's two-step analysis that separates the issue of retroactivity from
the issue of remedy.156 In cases like Davis involving the Constitution, the
first step requires that a court determine the interpretation of the Consti-
tution in effect at the time a court renders a decision, instead of the inter-
pretation that was in effect when the facts of the case occurred.15 7 This
step would meet the requirements set out in Justice Blackmun's and Jus-
tice Scalia's concurring opinions in Beam, in which they properly argued
that it is patently wrong for any court to apply an outdated interpretation
of the Constitution to any case, regardless of the reliance interests of the
various parties. Applied to Swanson, this first step would require the
North Carolina Supreme Court to apply the Davis rule retroactively for
the benefit of taxpayer plaintiffs, because Davis represented the current
interpretation of the Constitution when the North Carolina court de-
cided Swanson.
The second step, however, would permit a court to take into account
154. On remand, the supreme courts of Virginia and South Carolina again determined that
Davis was not retroactive in their respective states. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 242
Va. 322, 327, 410 S.E.2d 629, 632 (1991), cert granted, 112 S. Ct. 863 (1992); Bass v. South
Carolina, 414 S.E.2d 110, 115 (S.C. 1992) (alternative holding).
155. See, e.g., CHARLES A. WRiGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 108. 760-61 (4th ed.
1983) (suggesting that state courts are more likely than federal courts to refuse to comply with
Supreme Court decisions).
156. Justice Stevens outlined this approach in his dissenting opinion in Smith, see supra
notes 104-06 and accompanying text, and Justice Souter adopted it in his opinion for the Court
in Beam. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
157. American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 206 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens argued, "Our disposition left the state court room to apply its own remedy...
but not to avoid the force of our mandate and declare the taxes under challenge constitutional
'in the first place.'" Id at 211 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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equitable considerations in its determination of an appropriate remedy.
Although McKesson demonstrated that courts must provide at least a
sufficient remedy to provide a party with meaningful relief, it does not
require a full refund.15 In Swanson, for example, this step would allow
a court to consider the fiscal interests of the state when selecting the
appropriate remedy. Under the right circumstances, this test might lead
a state court to require a full refund. In more difficult times, however, a
court would have the flexibility to stretch out refunds over several years
or even to return part of the excess taxes through credits instead of cash.
While such remedies would have to meet the minimum level as set out in
McKesson, the added flexibility might allow a court to lessen the negative
effect of the remedy on the state's budget.
In Swanson, the North Carolina Supreme Court allowed the magni-
tude of a potential refund to influence its decision as to how to apply a
constitutional rule. The Swanson decision is unfortunate from a constitu-
tional standpoint but understandable when viewed in light of the appar-
ent "all-or-nothing" quality of the remedy. If the Supreme Court will
incorporate Justice Stevens's analysis into an opinion carrying more
precedential effect than Beam, it would allow a state court to meet con-
stitutional requirements without drowning the treasury in a sea of red
ink.
DAVID T. WATrERS
158. McKesson Corp. v. Florida Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco Div., 496 U.S. 18, 31
(1990).
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